The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) is a review conducted pursuant to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, while also addressing the legislative requirement to assess U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy. The BMDR evaluates the threats posed by ballistic missiles and develops a missile defense posture to address current and future challenges.

First-Ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review

- The Secretary of Defense delivered the 2010 BMDR report to Congress on February 1, 2010.
  - Mandated by Congress, and guided by a Presidential directive, the review comprehensively considered U.S. BMD policies, strategies, plans, and programs.
  - The BMDR aligns the missile defense posture with the near-term regional ballistic missile threat while sustaining and technically enhancing the U.S. ability to defend the homeland against a limited long-range attack.
  - The review includes input from agencies across the entire U.S. government.
- The report begins with an overview of the ballistic missile threat to the United States and its allies and partners, followed by the strategy and policy framework and the priorities of the Administration.
  - The report describes the steps proposed by the Administration both to defend the homeland and to address threats to our forces overseas, and our allies and partners.
  - It also sets out in detail steps to strengthen international cooperation on BMD.
  - Finally, the report addresses a series of issues associated with the Department’s management of the missile defense program.

The Ballistic Missile Threat

- The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade.
- Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range.
- Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles.
- Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue to develop long-range missiles that will be capable of threatening the United States.
- There is some uncertainty about when and how this type of long-range threat to the U.S. homeland will mature, but there is no uncertainty about the existence of regional threats.
The threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains security relationships is growing steadily.

Strategy and Policy Framework

Following guidance from the President, this review has set the following six policy priorities:

- The United States will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.
- The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.
- Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions.
- The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term.
- U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.
- The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.

Defending the Homeland

The United States is currently protected against limited ICBM attacks.

This is a result of investments made over the past decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense (GMD).

Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of ground-based interceptors now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future.

In order to maintain defense of the U.S. homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack, and hedge against the possibility of new threats emerging, we will:

- Continue to develop existing operational capabilities at Fort Greely, Ala., and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.
- Invest in further development of the Standard Missile 3 for future land-based deployment as the ICBM threat matures.
- Increase investments in sensors and early-intercept kill systems to help defeat missile defense countermeasures.

Defending Against Regional Threats

Over the past decade, the United States has made significant progress in developing and fielding capabilities for protection against attack from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These include increasingly capable:
• PATRIOT batteries for point defense
• AN/TPY-2 X-band radar for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles
• Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries for area defense
• Space-based sensors
• Sea-based capabilities such as the SM-3 Block IA interceptor.

➢ The Department of Defense will further invest in these deployable assets while developing new capabilities that will increase the capability of our ballistic missile defense system.

**Integrating Capabilities Regionally**

➢ As threats have advanced and technical solutions have matured, it has become increasingly important to think strategically about the deployment of low-density, high-demand missile defense assets in a regional context.

➢ Such deployments must be tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region, which vary considerably in their geography, the character of the threat, and the military-to-military relationships on which to build cooperative missile defenses.

➢ To help facilitate regional integration, the United States will work with allies and partners to strengthen regional deterrence architectures, pursue a phased adaptive approach to missile defense within each region that is tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to that region, and develop capabilities that are mobile and re-locatable.

**Strengthening International Cooperation**

➢ The United States seeks to create an environment in which the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of such attacks.

➢ Toward this end, the United States seeks broad-based international cooperation.

➢ Strengthening cooperation with allies and partners to develop and field, pragmatic and cost-effective capabilities is an important priority.

➢ In Europe, the Administration is committed to implementing the new European Phased Adaptive Approach within a NATO context.

➢ In East Asia, the United States is working to improve missile defenses through a series of bilateral relationships.

➢ The United States is also pursuing strengthened cooperation with a number of partners in the Middle East.

➢ The Administration also seeks to engage Russia and China on missile defense.
• With Russia, we are pursuing a broad agenda concentrating on shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical cooperation, and even operational cooperation.
• With China, we seek further dialogue on strategic issues of interest to both nations, including missile defense.

Managing the Missile Defense Program

➢ The Administration is committed to deploying capabilities that have been proven under extensive testing and assessment and are affordable over the long term.

➢ To ensure adequate oversight of the missile defense program, DoD has enhanced the roles and responsibilities of the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) which provides oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode involving all missile defense stakeholders in DoD and some from outside DoD.

➢ The MDEB also oversees the Ballistic Missile Defense System Life Cycle Management Process, which is used by DoD to identify requirements, allocate resources, and provide departmental insight to control costs.

➢ After careful study, DoD has come to the conclusion that it does not see benefit in bringing MDA into the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) or the full DoD 5000 acquisition reporting process at this time.

➢ There is, however, benefit in further innovation in management of the program, and DoD is pursuing the creation of additional hybrid MDA/Service program offices.