did work on this problem specifically. However, it was realized that this was a long-range project and that the main efforts of Los Alamos must be concentrated on making A-bombs. Teller, working on the H-bomb at Los Alamos, discovered a major difficulty (testimony by Oppen-heimer). This discovery made it clear that it would be a very hard problem to make a "classical super" work, as this type of H-bomb was called. I shall refer to the classical super as Method A.
The work on thermonuclear weapons at Los Alamos never stopped. At this stage of the development, the main requirements were for theoretical work and for a few experimental physics measurements. Both of these types of work went ahead. On the basis of the monthly reports of the theoretical division of Los Alamos, it has been estimated that between 1946 and 1949 the work of that division was about equally divided between fission weapon design and problems related to thermonuclear weapons. (In this respect I was mistaken when testifying in the Oppenheimer case. I said then, from memory, that a relatively small fraction of the scientists of the division, though consisting of especially able men, were working on thermonuclear problems. Actually, the fraction was large.)
Two new methods of designing a thermonuclear weapon were invented (Methods B and C). Both inventions were due to Teller. Method B was in-vented in 1946, Method C in 1947. Method B was actively worked on by Richtmyer, Nordheim, and others. However, at that time, there seemed to be no way of putting Method B into practice, as Dr. Bradbury has mentioned in his statement to "The New Mexican." Teller himself wrote a most pessi-mistic report on the feasibility of this method in September 1947.
Method C is different from all the others in that thermonuclear reactions are used only in a minor way, for weapons of relatively small yield. This method seemed quite promising from the start, as early as the summer of 1948 it was added to the devices to be tested in the Greenhouse tests.
Theoretical work on the "classical super," Method A, proceeded continually, since this method was considered the most important of all thermonuclear devices. New plans for calculations were made frequently, mostly by consultation between Teller and the senior staff of the theoretical division. However, as Teller stated in 1946, "The required scientific effort is clearly much larger than that needed for the first fission weapon." In particular, the theoretical computations required were of such complication that they could not be handled in any reasonable time by any of the computing machines then available. Some greatly simplified calculations were done but it was realized that they left out many important factors and were therefore quite unreliable. Work was therefore concentrated on preparing full-scale calculations "for the time when adequate fast computing machines become available" - a sentence which recurs in many of the theoretical reports of this period. The plans for such a calculation on Method A were laid in September 1948, and the mathematical work was virtually completed by December 1949 - all before the directive of President Truman - but it was not until mid-1952 that adequate computing machines finally became available, and by that time the most capable of them were fully engaged on the new and more promising proposal (Method D) discussed below.
When Dr. Teller and Admiral Strauss proposed in the Fall of 1949 to start a full-scale development of H-bombs, the method in their minds, as well as in the minds of the opponents of the program, was Method A. To accomplish Method A, two major problems had to be solved which I shall call Part I and Part 2. Part I seemed to be reasonably well in hand according to calculations made by Teller's group from 1944 to 1946 although nobody had been able to perform a really convincing calculation, as discussed in the paragraph above. Teller now believed that he had a solution for Part 2. In principle, the accomplishment of Part 2 had never been seriously in doubt, although the question of whether or not any particular device would behave in the way required could not be settled without experiment.
The Greenhouse thermonuclear experiment was designed to test Part 2. After President Truman made the decision to go ahead with a full-scale thermonuclear program, Los Alamos made plans to add to the Greenhouse test series an experiment intended to test a particular proposal relating to Part 2. Teller played a large part in the specification of this device, and as it turned out it behaved very well. However, as on previous occasions, Teller did not do so well in directing the detailed theoretical work of his group. Only as late as January 1951, a month or so before the test device had to be shipped to the Pacific, was the full theoretical prediction of the (probably successful) behavior of the device available. But even while complete theoretical proof was lacking, most of us connected with the work at Los Alamos were confident that the Greenhouse experiment would work. As far as I could make out, at a meeting at Los Alamos in October 1950 which I attended as a guest, this was also the opinion of the GAC including Dr. Oppenheimer. Shepley and Blair instead report on page 116 that Dr. Oppenheimer expected the device to fail. (The correct story on Oppenheimer's attitude will be discussed below.)
A very large fraction of the members of the Los Alamos Laboratory, not just a "small handful of his" (Teller's) "associates" were extremely busy from Spring 1950 to Spring 1951 with the preparation of Teller's thermonuclear experiment. They did this in addition to preparing the Nevada tests of early 1951.
The major feature of the year 1950 was, however, the discovery that Part I of Method A was by no means under control. While Teller and most of the Los Alamos Laboratory were busy preparing the Greenhouse test, a number of persons in the theoretical division had continued to consider the various problems posed by Part 1. In particular, Dr. Ulam on his own initia-tive had decided to check the feasibility of aspects of Part 1 without the aid of high-speed computing equipment. He, and Dr. Everett who assisted him, soon found that the calculations of Teller's group of 1946 were wrong. Ulam's calculations showed that an extraordinarily large amount of tritium would be necessary. In the Summer of 1950 further calculations by Ulam and Fermi showed further difficulties with Part 1.
That Ulam's calculations had to be done at all was proof that the H-bomb project was not ready for a "crash" program when Teller first advocated such a program in the fall of 1949. Nobody will blame Teller because the calcu-lations of 1946 were wrong, especially because adequate computing machines were not then available. But he was blamed at Los Alamos for leading the Laboratory, and indeed the whole country, into an adventurous program on the basis of calculations which he himself must have known to have been very incomplete. The technical skepticism of the GAC on the other hand had turned out to be far more justified than the GAC itself had dreamed in October 1949.
We can now appreciate better the attitude of the GAC, and indeed of most of the members of Los Alamos, to the Greenhouse thermonuclear test. They did not expect it to fail, but they considered it as irrelevant because there appeared to be no solution to Part 1 of the problem. The correct description of this attitude is given by Oppenheimer in his own testimony.
The lack of a solid theoretical foundation was the only reason why the Los Alamos work might have seemed to some to have gotten off to a slow start in 1950. Purely theoretical work may seem slow in a project intended to develop "hardware," but there was simply no basis for building hardware until the theory had been clarified. As far as the mental attitude of Los Alamos in early 1950, it was almost the exact opposite of that described by Shepley and Blair. I visited Los Alamos around April 1, 1950 and tried to defend the point of view of the GAC in their decision of October 1949. I encountered almost universal hostility. The entire Laboratory seemed en-thusiastic about the project and was working at high speed. That they continued to work with full energy on Teller's Greenhouse test, after Ulam's calculations had made the success of the whole program very doubtful, shows how far they were willing to go in following Teller's lead.
Teller himself was desperate between October 1950 and January 1951. He proposed a number of complicated schemes to save Method A, none of which seemed to show much promise, it was evident that he did not know of any solution. In spite of this, he urged that the Laboratory be put essen-tially at his disposal for another year or more after the Greenhouse test, at which time there should then be another test on some device or other. After the failure of the major part of his program in 1950, it would have been folly of the Los Alamos Laboratory to trust Teller's judgment, at least until he could present a definite idea which showed practical promise. This attitude was strongly held by most of those on the permanent staff of the Laboratory who were responsible for its operation. As might be expected, the many discussions of aspects of this situation bred considerable emotion.
Between January and May 1951, the "new concept" was developed. (This I shall call Method D.) In addition, it should be remembered that between January and May both tests in Nevada and the Greenhouse series of tests took place, and this required many senior members of the Laboratory to be at the test sites for prolonged periods of time and the attention of many others was engaged on study of results of these tests.
But what are the actual facts about this alleged delay in work on the new concept? In January Teller obviously did not know how to save the thermonuclear program. On March 9, 1951, according to Bradbury, s press statement, Teller and Ulam published a paper which contained one-half of the new concept. As Bradbury has pointed out, Ulam as well as Teller should be given credit for this. Ulam, by the way, made his discovery while studying some aspects of fission weapons. This shows once more how the important ideas may not come from a straightforward attack on the main problem.
Within a month, the very important second half of the new concept occurred to Teller, and was given preliminary checks by de Hoffman. This immediately became the main focus of attention of the thermonuclear design program.
It is worth noting that the entire new concept was developed before the thermonuclear Greenhouse test which took place on May 8, 1951. The literature is full of statements that the success of Greenhouse was the direct cause of the new concept. This is historically false. Teller may have been influenced by thinking about the Greenhouse design when developing the new concept, but the success of Greenhouse (which was anticipated) had no influence on either the creation of the new concept, or on its quick adoption by the Laboratory or later by the GAC. The new concept stood on its own.
As early as the end of May 1951, 1 received from the Associate Director of Los Alamos a detailed proposal for the future program of the Laboratory in which Teller's new concept figured most prominently. By early June, when I visited Los Alamos for two weeks, everybody in the theoretical division was talking about the new concept.
Not only was the acceptance of the new concept not slow; but the realization of the development was a sensationally rapid accomplishment, in the same class as the achievement of Los Alamos during the war.
It is difficult to describe to a non-scientist the novelty of the new concept. It was entirely unexpected from the previous development. It was also not anticipated by Teller, as witness his despair immediately preceding the new concept. I believe that this very despair stimulated him to an invention that even he might not have made under calmer conditions. The new concept was to me, who had been rather closely associated with the program, about as surprising as the discovery of fission had been to physicists in 1939. Before 1939 scientists had a vague idea that it might be possible to release nuclear energy but nobody could think even remotely of a way to do it. If physicists had tried to discover a way to release nuclear energy before 1939, they would have worked on anything else rather than the field which finally led to the discovery of fission, namely radio-chemistry. At that time, concentrated work on any "likely" way of releasing nuclear energy would have led nowhere. Similarly, concentrated work on Method A would never have led to Method D. The Greenhouse test had a vague connection with Method D but one that nobody, including Teller, could have foreseen or did foresee when that test was planned. By a misappraisal of the facts many persons not closely connected with the development have concluded that the scientists who had shown good judgment concerning the technical feasibility of Method A were now suddenly proved wrong, whereas Teller, who had been wrong in interpreting his own calculations, was suddenly right. The fact was that the new concept had created an entirely new technical situation. Such miracles incidentally do happen occasionally in scientific history but it would be folly to count on their occurrence. One of the dangerous consequences of the H-bomb history may well be that government admin-istrators, and perhaps some scientists, too, will imagine that similar miracles should be expected in other developments.
Before the end of the summer of 1951, the Los Alamos Laboratory was putting full force behind attempts to realize the new concept. However, the continued friction of 1950 and early 1951 had strained a number of personal relations between Teller and others at Los Alamos. In addition, Teller in-sisted on an earlier test date than the Laboratory deemed possible. There was further disagreement between Teller and Bradbury on personalities, in particular on the person who was to direct the actual development of hard-ware. Bradbury had great experience in administrative matters like these. Teller had no experience and had in the past shown no talent for administra-tion. He had given countless examples of not completing the work he had started; he was inclined to inject constantly new modifications into an al-ready going program which becomes intolerable in an engineering develop-ment beyond a certain stage; and he had shown poor technical judgment. Everybody recognizes that Teller more than anyone else contributed ideas at every stage of the H-bomb program, and this fact should never be ob-scured. However, as an article in "Life" of September 6, 1954, clearly por-trays, nine out of ten of Teller's ideas are useless. He needs men with more judgment, even if they be less gifted, to select the tenth idea which often is a stroke of genius.
It has been loosely said that the people at Los Alamos couldn't "get along" with Teller and it might be worthwhile to clarify this point. Both during the difficulties of the wartime period and again in 1951, Teller was on excellent terms with the vast majority of the scientists at Los Alamos with whom he came in contact in the course of the technical work. On both oc-casions, however, friction arose between him and some of those responsible for the organization and operation of the Laboratory. In each case, Teller, who was essentially alone in his opinion, was convinced that things were hopelessly bad and that nothing would go right unless things were arranged quite differently. In each case, the Laboratory accomplished its mission with distinction. In September 1951, when the program for a specific test of the new concept was being planned, Teller was strongly urged to take the re-sponsibility for directing the theoretical work on the design of Mike. But he felt sure the test date should be a few months earlier; he didn't like some of the people with whom he would have to work; he was convinced they weren't up to the job; the Laboratory was not organized properly and didn't have the right people. Teller decided to leave and left. The Mike shot went off exactly on schedule and was a full success.
It took much more than the idea of the new concept to design Mike. Major difficulties occurred in the theoretical design in early 1952, which happened to be a period when I was again at Los Alamos. They were all solved by the splendid group of scientists at Los Alamos.
At this time more than one-half of all the development work of the Los Alamos Laboratory went into thermonuclear weapons and into the prepara-tion of the Mike test in particular. All but a small percentage of the theoreti-cal division were thinking about this subject. In addition, there was a group of theorists working in Princeton under the direction of Professor John A. Wheeler in collaboration with the theoretical group at Los Alamos. Shepley and Blair, however, have to say of this period (on page 141) "Progress on the thermonuclear program still lagged."
Teller "helped" at this time by intensive agitation against Los Alamos and for a second laboratory. This agitation was very disturbing to the few leading scientists at Los Alamos who knew about it. Much precious time was spent in trying to counteract Teller's agitation by bringing the true picture to Washington. I myself wrote a history of the thermonuclear development to Chairman Dean of the AEC which was mentioned in the Oppenheimer testimony. This loss of time could be ill afforded at a time when the technical preparations for Mike were in a crisis.
Nevertheless, the theoretical design of Mike was completed by June 1952 in good time to make the device ready for test on November 1. Not only this, but, in the same period, much work was done leading to the conceptual design of the devices which were later tested in the Castle series in the spring 1954. The approximate date for the Castle tests was also set at that time, and it was planned then that it should lead to a deliverable H-bomb if the experimental Mike shot was successful. It is necessary always to plan approximately two years ahead. Between summer 1952 and Spring 1954, theoretical calculations on the proposed thermonuclear weapons pro-ceeded; they were followed and in some areas paralleled by mechanical design of the actual device and finally followed by manufacture of the "hardware".
In July 1952, the new laboratory at Livermore was officially established by the AEC. Its existence did not, and in fact could not, accelerate the Los Alamos work because in all essentials the work for Castle had been planned before Livermore was established. In August 1952 an additional device was conceived at Los Alamos which might possibly have been slightly influenced by ideas then beginning to be considered at Livermore. In addition, Los Alamos decided to make a few experimental small-scale shots in Nevada in the Spring of 1953, and this program may have been slightly stimulated by the existence of Livermore. Livermore did assist in the observation of the performance of some of the devices tested at Castle.
Concerning the performance of Livermore's own designs, I will only quote the statement of Dr. Bradbury to the press which says, "Every suc-cessful thermonuclear weapon tested so far" (1954) "has been developed by the Los Alamos Laboratory." This statement has not been contradicted.
Was the H-bomb Necessary?
Although the GAC were seeking a solution rather than offering one, the proposal of its minority still seems worthwhile, even as seen from today's (1954) viewpoint. The proposal was to enter negotiations with Russia with the aim that both countries undertake an obligation not to develop the H-bomb. If such an agreement could have been reached and had been kept, it would have gone far to avoid the peril in which the world now stands. At that time neither we nor the Russians presumably knew whether an H-bomb could be made. In this blissful state of ignorance we might have remained for a long time to come. Since the technical program was a very difficult one it could never be accomplished without a major effort. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the Russians would have refused to enter an agreement on this matter. If they had done so, this refusal would have been a great propaganda asset for us in the international field and would in addition have gone far to persuade the scientists of this country to cooperate in the H-bomb program with enthusiasm.
Many people will argue that the Russians might have accepted such an agreement, but then broken it. I do not believe so. Thermonuclear weapons are so complicated that nobody will be confident that he has the correct solution before he has tested such a device. But it is well known that any test of a bomb of such high yield is immediately detected. Therefore, with-out any inspection, each side would know immediately if the other side had broken the agreement.
It is difficult to tell whether or not the Russians would have developed the H-bomb independently of us. I am not sure what would have happened if we had followed the recommendations of the GAC majority and had merely announced that for such and such reasons, we would refrain from developing the H-bomb. Once we announced that we would go ahead, the Russians clearly had no choice but to do the same. In the field of atomic weapons, we have called the tune since the end of the war, both in quality and in quantity. Russia has to follow the tune or be a second-class power.
In summary I still believe that the development of the H-bomb is a ca-lamity. I still believe that it was necessary to make a pause before the deci-sion and to consider this irrevocable step most carefully. I still believe that the possibility of an agreement with Russia not to develop the bomb should have been explored. But once the decision was made to go ahead with the program, and once there was a sound technical program, I cooperated with it to the best of my ability. I did and still do this because it seems to me that once one is engaged in a race, one clearly must endeavor to win it. But one can try to forestall the race itself.