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## **CORRIGENDA**

The following are corrections to the text of the Treaty that were agreed between the Parties in an exchange of diplomatic notes on May 21, 1988.

1. In the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base for the Treaty, Section II, paragraph 1, concerning intermediate-range missiles and launchers, for the United States: the number of non-deployed missiles should read "266," the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles should read "695," and the aggregate number of second stages should read "238."

2. In the MOU, Section III, paragraph 1(A)(II), for missile operating base Wueschheim -- the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 007 25 40 E., and the number of launchers should read "21."

3. In the MOU, Section III, paragraph 2(A)(I), for launcher production facilities: Martin Marietta -- the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 39 19 N. For missile storage facilities: Pueblo Depot activity -- the number of missiles should read "120"; Redstone Arsenal -- the number of training missile stages should read "0"; Weilerbach -- the number of missiles should read "9." For launcher storage facilities: Redstone Arsenal -- the number of training stages should read "4." For launcher repair facilities: Redstone Arsenal -- the number of training missile stages should read "20"; Ft. Sill -- the number of launchers should read "1"; Pueblo Depot activity -- the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 38 17 N. For training facilities: Ft. Sill -- the number of training missile stages should read "76."

4. In paragraph 2(b)(i) of Section III and in paragraph 2(b)(i) of Section IV of the Memorandum of Understanding, the geographic coordinates for the Barrikady Plant, Volgograd, should be 48 46' 50" N and 44 35' 44" E.

5. In paragraph 2(b)(i) of Section III of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Elimination Facility at Aralsk with the coordinates 46 50' N and 61 18' E should be changed to the Elimination Facility at Kapustin Yar with the coordinates 48 46N and 45 59' E.

6. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 2(A)(I), for missile production facilities: Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant -- the number of missiles should read "8" and the number of training missile stages should read "1." For launcher production facilities: Martin Marietta -- the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 39 19 N. For missile storage facilities: Pueblo Depot activity -- the number of missiles should read "162" and the number of training missile stages should read "63." For missiles, launchers, and support equipment in transit the

number of missiles should read "0" and the number of training missile stages should read "6."

7. In paragraph 2(b)(ii) of Section IV of the Memorandum of Understanding, the geographic coordinates for the V.I. Lenin Petropavlovsk Heavy Machine Building Plant, Petropavlovsk, should be 54 54' 20" N and 69 09' 58" E.

8. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 1(A)(IV) for the BGM 109G, the maximum diameter of the missile should read "0.52."

9. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 1(B)(I), for the BGM 109G launcher the maximum length should read "10.80" and the maximum height should read "3.5."

10. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 1(D)(I) for the BGM 109G launch canister the maximum length should read "6.97" and the maximum diameter should read "0.54."

11. In the Protocol Regarding Inspections, paragraph 7 of Section I regarding points of entry for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should read "Moscow or Ulan Ude."

12. In the Protocol Regarding Inspections, Section XI, paragraph 1, the reference to "paragraph 10 of Section VI of this protocol" should read "paragraph 11 of Section VI of this protocol."

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## **AGREED MINUTE**

**Geneva**

**May 12, 1988**

Representatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics discussed the following issues related to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed in Washington on 8 December, 1987, during the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Geneva on 11-12 May 1988. As a result of these discussions, the Parties agreed on the points that follow.

1. In accordance with paragraph 7 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, during baseline, close-out and short-notice inspections, the Parties will be inspecting the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, capable of containing: for the United

States -- the second stage of the Pershing II, and the BGM-109G cruise missile; for the USSR -- the first stage of the SS-12 missile, the stage of the SS-23 missile, the SSC-X-4 cruise missile and the SS-4 launch stand.

2. Regarding the second stages of United States GLBMs, the aggregate numbers of these stages are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding and will be updated in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and at six-month intervals thereafter. Except in the case of close-out inspections and inspections of formerly declared facilities, the United States in-country escort is obliged to provide the Soviet inspection team leader with the number of such second stages at the inspection site as well as a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of those stages. Finally, as set forth in the Elimination Protocol, Soviet inspectors will observe the elimination of all the stages of United States GLBMs.

3. The entire area of an inspection site, including all buildings, within the outer boundaries depicted on the site diagrams are subject to inspection. In addition, anything depicted outside these outer boundaries on the site diagrams is subject to inspection. Any technical corrections to the site diagrams appended to the Memorandum of Understanding will be made via the corrigendum exchange of notes prior to entry into force of the Treaty. Such corrections will not involve the exclusion of buildings, structures or roads within or depicted outside the outer boundaries depicted on the site diagrams currently appended to the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. The Soviet side assured the United States side that, during the period of continuous monitoring of facilities under the Treaty, no shipment shall exit a continuous monitoring facility on the territory of the USSR whose dimensions are equal to or greater than the dimensions of the SS-20 missile without its front section but less than the dimensions of an SS-20 launch canister, as those dimensions are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. For the purposes of this assurance, the length of the SS-20 missile without its front section will be considered to be 14.00 meters. In the context of this assurance, the United States side will not be inspecting any shipment whose dimensions are less than those of an SS-20 launch canister, as listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

5. Inspection teams may bring to the inspection site the equipment provided for in the Inspection Protocol. Use of such equipment will be implemented in accordance with the procedures set forth in that Protocol. For example, if the inspecting Party believes that an ambiguity has not been removed, upon request the inspected Party shall take a photograph of the object or building about which a question remains.

6. During baseline inspections, the Parties will have the opportunity, on a one-time basis, to verify the technical characteristics listed in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding, including the weights and dimensions of SS-20

stages, at an elimination facility. Inspectors will select at random one of each type of item to weigh and measure from a sample presented by the inspected Party at a site designated by the inspected Party. To ensure that the items selected are indeed representative, the sample presented by the inspected Party must contain an adequate number of each item (i.e., at least 8-12, except in the case of the United States Pershing IA launcher, only one of which exists).

7. Immediately prior to the initiation of elimination procedures, an inspector shall confirm and record the type and number of items of missile systems which are to be eliminated. If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters. This visual inspection can include looking into the launch canister once it is opened at both ends. It can also include use of the equipment and procedures that will be used eight times per year at Votkinsk and Magna to measure missile stages inside launch canisters (i.e., an optical or mechanical measuring device). If it should turn out, in particular situations, that the inspector is unable to confirm the missile type using the above techniques, the inspected Party is obligated to remove the inspectors doubts so that the inspector is satisfied as to the contents of the launch canister.

8. The length of the SS-23 missile stage will be changed, in a corrigendum to the Memorandum of Understanding, to 4.56 meters. The length of the SS-12 first stage will continue to be listed as 4.38 meters, which includes an interstage structure.

9. The sides will exchange additional photographs no later than May 15, 1988. For the United States side, these photographs will be of the Pershing IA missile and the Pershing II missile with their front sections attached and including a scale. For the Soviet side, these photographs will be of the SS-23, SS-12, and SS-4 with their front sections attached, and of the front section of the SS-20.

10. In providing notifications of transit points in accordance with paragraph 5(f)(iv) of Article IX of the Treaty, the Parties will specify such intermediate locations by providing the place-name and its center coordinates in minutes.

11. The United States side has informed the Soviet side that Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona will serve as the elimination facility for the United States BGM-109G cruise missile. In order to address Soviet concerns on a related matter, the United States will formally inform the Soviet side before entry into force of the Treaty, of an elimination facility for each of its Treaty-limited items.

These points reflect the understandings of the two Parties regarding their obligations under the Treaty.

*Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman  
United States Chief Negotiator  
on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces*

*Colonel General N. Chervov  
Chief of Directorate General Staff  
of the Soviet Armed Forces*

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**NOTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

In light of the discussions between the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Geneva and Moscow on April 14 and April 21-22, 1988, and the Foreign Ministers letter to the Secretary of State, dated April 15, 1988, the Government of the United States of America wished to record in an agreement concluded by exchange of notes the common understanding reached between the two Governments as to the application of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty"), signed at Washington on December 8, 1987, to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles flight-tested or deployed to carry weapons based on either current or future technologies and as to the related question of the definition of the term "weapon-delivery vehicle" as used in the Treaty.

It is the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as defined by the Treaty, both at present and in the future, are subject to the provisions of the Treaty.

In this connection, it is also the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that the term "weapon-delivery vehicle" in the Treaty means any ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile in the 500 kilometer to 5500 kilometer range that has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon -- that is, any warhead, mechanism or device, which, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it. Therefore, the Treaty requires elimination and bans production and flight-testing of all such missiles tested or deployed to carry or be used as weapons based on either current or future technologies, with the exception of missiles mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty. It is also the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that the Treaty does not cover non-weapon-delivery vehicles.

It is the understanding of the Government of the United States of America that the above reflects the common view of the two Governments on these matters. If so, the Government of the United States of America proposes that this note and the Soviet reply note confirming that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shares the understanding of the Government of the United States of America, as set forth above,

shall constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Max M. Kampelman  
Geneva, May 12, 1988

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**NOTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST  
REPUBLICS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA**

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acknowledges receipt of the note of the Government of the United States of America of May 12, 1988, as follows:

"In light of the discussion between the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Geneva and Moscow on April 14 and April 21-22, 1988, and the Foreign Ministers letter to the Secretary of State, dated April 15, 1988, the Government of the United States of America wished to record in an agreement concluded by exchange of notes the common understanding reached between the two Governments as to the application of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty"), signed at Washington on December 8, 1987, to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles flight-tested or deployed to carry weapons based on either current or future technologies and as to the related question of the definition of the term "weapon-delivery vehicle" as used in the Treaty.

It is the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as defined by the Treaty, both at present and in the future, are subject to the provisions of the Treaty.

In this connection, it is also the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that the term "weapon-delivery vehicle" in the Treaty means any ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile in the 500 kilometer to 5500 kilometer range that has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon --that is, any warhead, mechanism or device, which, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it. Therefore, the Treaty requires elimination and bans production and flight-testing of all such missiles tested or deployed to carry or be used as weapons based on either current or future technologies, with the exception of missiles mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty. It is also the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that the Treaty does not cover non-weapon-delivery vehicles.

It is the understanding of the Government of the United States of America that the above reflects the common view of the two Governments on these matters. If so, the Government of the United States of America proposes that this note and the Soviet reply note confirming that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shares the understanding of the Government of the United States of America, as set forth above, shall constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states that it is in full accord with the text and contents of the note of the Government of the United States of America as quoted above and fully shares the understanding of the Government of the United States of America set forth in the above note.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the note of the Government of the United States of America of May 12, 1988, and this note in reply thereto, constitute an agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America that the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles is applicable to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles flight-tested or deployed to carry weapons based on either current or future technologies, and also regarding the related question of the definition of the term "weapon-delivery vehicle" as used in the Treaty.

Geneva, May 12, 1988

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**EXCHANGE OF NOTES AT MOSCOW MAY 28, 1988 IDENTIFYING AND  
CONFIRMING WHICH DOCUMENTS, IN ADDITION TO THE TREATY,  
HAVE THE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS THE TREATY  
EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
MOSCOW, MAY 28, 1988**

*No. MFA/148/88*

The Government of the United States of America has the honor to refer:

- 1) to the notes exchanged in Geneva on May 12, 1988, between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the application of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (the INF Treaty);

2) to the agreed minute concluded in Geneva on May 12, 1988, concerning certain issues related to the Treaty; and

3) to the agreements concluded by exchanges of notes, signed on May 21, 1988, in Vienna and Moscow, respectively, correcting the site diagrams and certain technical errors in the Treaty.

The Government of the United States proposes, in connection with the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the INF Treaty, that the two Governments signify their agreement that these documents are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the Treaty, and that this note together with the reply of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments to that effect.

John M. Joyce  
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

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**UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**  
**MAY 29, 1988**

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confirms receipt of U.S. Government Note no. MFA/148/88, which reads as follows:

[The Russian text of Note no. MFA/148/88 of May 28, 1988, agrees in all substantive respects with the original English text]

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that documents mentioned in U.S. Government Note no. MFA/148/88 of May 28, 1988, are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and that this note and the reply thereto shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to that effect.

Moscow  
May 29, 1988

[S.] V. Karpov

/Seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR/

