
JCIC CORRESPONDENCE

TELEMETRIC PLAYBACK DEMONSTRATION

Geneva, Switzerland
November 26, 1991

Mr. Gennadiy Shabannikov
Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept your proposal that an agreement be concluded pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Protocol on Telemetric Information (hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol) Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty). The substantive portion of this agreement follows:

The purpose of this agreement is to:

- (a) make it possible to play back the tapes to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol; and
- (b) provide confidence that the interpretive data and acceleration profiles to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty will contain all the information necessary to meet the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.

Under this agreement, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, agree to conduct the initial demonstrations, provided for in paragraph 4(a) of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, in accordance with the following:

1. During the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall:
 - (a) Demonstrate each type of tape to be provided to the other Party after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. Each such demonstrated tape shall contain a recording of telemetric information that either:
 - (i) is broadcast during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM. Such a recording shall contain: actual telemetric information representative of an entire flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or telemetric information containing characteristic features that fully represent all telemetric information that is obtained during an actual flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or

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- (ii) was encapsulated during an actual flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, for an entire encapsulation period.
 - (b) Describe each type of tape, as well as the recording methods and formats for each type of tape. The demonstrating Party shall also describe the telemetry signal conversion process from reception to recording.
 - (c) Demonstrate all equipment used to play back telemetric information recorded on tapes. Such equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of tapes demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph 1(a) of this agreement.
 - (d) Answer all questions of the observing Party pertaining to its ability to play back the telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated tapes.
 - (e) Provide an example of interpretive data illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated. The demonstrating Party shall have the right to select the specific parameters to be provided pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.
 - (f) Provide an example of an acceleration profile illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example shall be presented in table form and need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated.
2. Prior to conclusion of the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall provide all the demonstrated tapes to the observing Party.
3. The demonstration shall be sufficient for the observing Party to fully understand all technical requirements that are necessary for playing back the demonstrated tapes. Ambiguities and unresolved questions in connection with the demonstration shall be considered within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
4. Any demonstrated playback equipment that the observing Party requests, and all technical documentation necessary to play back the tapes using such equipment, shall be provided by the demonstrating Party. The date of delivery and method of payment for such equipment and documentation shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission as soon as possible following conclusion of both Parties' demonstrations.
5. The demonstration shall be conducted in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol and the arrangements and procedures used to implement the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty, including the provisions on inspection reports, non-disclosure of information, and status of inspectors and aircrew members. The following exceptions shall apply:

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- (a) Both Parties' demonstrations shall be completed as soon as possible following entry into force of this agreement. The dates of such demonstrations shall be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.
- (b) The observing Party shall have the right to have no more than 17 observers take part in the demonstration.
- (c) The observing Party shall provide the list of its observers no less than three days prior to their arrival in the territory of the demonstrating Party. There shall be no requirement to provide notification of the demonstrating Party's agreement with the designation of each individual on the list.

For the purposes of the demonstration, the Parties shall have the right to agree on additional specific exceptions to the provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty.

This reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of this reply and shall terminate upon completion of all activities provided for herein.

Sincerely,

[S]
Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

TELEMETRIC PLAYBACK DEMONSTRATION

Geneva, Switzerland
November 26, 1991

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Protocol on Telemetric Information (hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol) Relating to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty). The substantive portion of this proposed agreement follows:

The purpose of this agreement is to:

- (a) make it possible to play back the tapes to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol; and
- (b) provide confidence that the interpretive data and acceleration profiles to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty will contain all the information necessary to meet the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.

Under this agreement, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, agree to conduct the initial demonstrations, provided for in subparagraph 4(a) of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, in accordance with the following:

1. During the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall:
 - (a) Demonstrate each type of tape to be provided to the other Party after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with paragraph I of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. Each such demonstrated tape shall contain a recording of telemetric information that either:
 - (i) is broadcast during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM. Such a recording shall contain: actual telemetric information representative of an entire flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or telemetric information containing characteristic features that fully represent all telemetric information that is obtained during an actual flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or
 - (ii) was encapsulated during an actual flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, for an entire encapsulation period.

United States Department of State

- (b) Describe each type of tape, as well as the recording methods and formats for each type of tape. The demonstrating Party shall also describe the telemetry signal conversion process from reception to recording.
 - (c) Demonstrate all equipment used to play back telemetric information recorded on tapes. Such equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of tapes demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph 1(a) of this agreement.
 - (d) Answer all questions of the observing Party pertaining to its ability to play back the telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated tapes.
 - (e) Provide an example of interpretive data illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated. The demonstrating Party shall have the right to select the specific parameters to be provided pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.
 - (f) Provide an example of an acceleration profile illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example shall be presented in table form and need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated.
2. Prior to conclusion of the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall provide all the demonstrated tapes to the observing Party.
 3. The demonstration shall be sufficient for the observing Party to fully understand all technical requirements that are necessary for playing back the demonstrated tapes. Ambiguities and unresolved questions in connection with the demonstration shall be considered within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
 4. Any demonstrated playback equipment that the observing Party requests, and all technical documentation necessary to play back the tapes using such equipment, shall be provided by the demonstrating Party. The date of delivery and method of payment for such equipment and documentation shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission as soon as possible following conclusion of both Parties' demonstrations.
 5. The demonstration shall be conducted in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol and the arrangements and procedures used to implement the Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty, including the provisions on inspection reports, non-disclosure of information, and status of inspectors and aircrew members. The following exceptions shall apply:

- (a) Both Parties' demonstrations shall be completed as soon as possible following entry into force of this agreement. The dates of such demonstrations shall be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.
- (b) The observing Party shall have the right to have no more than 17 observers take part in the demonstration.
- (c) The observing Party shall provide the list of its observers no less than three days prior to their arrival in the territory of the demonstrating Party. There shall be no requirement to provide notification of the demonstrating Party's agreement with the designation of each individual on the list.

For the purposes of the demonstration, the Parties shall have the right to agree on additional specific exceptions to the provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter, together with your reply, shall constitute an agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of your reply and shall terminate upon completion of all activities provided for herein.

Sincerely,

Gennadiy Shabannikov
Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the
Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

LETTERS ON CORRIGENDA

Geneva, Switzerland
December 19, 1991

Mr. Gennadiy I. Shabannikov
Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

I have the honor to refer to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991.

I have the honor to propose that the corrections set forth in the Corrigenda attached to this letter be made in the texts of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. I have the further honor to propose that this letter, and your letter in reply accepting the Corrigenda attached to this letter, shall constitute corrections to the texts of the above-mentioned documents.

Sincerely yours,
[s]

Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Attachment:
As stated.

CORRIGENDA

I. Agreed Statements Annex
To the Treaty
Between the United States of America
And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
Hereinafter Referred to as
The Agreed Statements Annex

In the Russian of paragraph (b) of the Tenth Agreed Statement in the Agreed Statements Annex, the words "notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol".

United States Department of State

II. Protocol on Inspections
And Continuous Monitoring Activities
Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America
And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
Hereinafter Referred to as
The Inspection Protocol

Subparagraph 23(a)(iii) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol shall read as follows:

- "(iii) for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, and for SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles: the diameter and length of an ICBM or SLBM of each type in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM or SLBM of that type without the front section, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs."

III. The Memorandum of Understanding
On the Establishment of the Data Base
Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America
And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
Hereinafter Referred to as
The Memorandum of Understanding

1. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Bomber Type and Variant of a Type" for the air base for former heavy bombers at Engel's, the designator "Bison A" in the left column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B" in the right column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".
2. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the repair facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at Ryazan' for the category of data "Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility", the designator "Bison A" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B".
3. In the English and Russian of subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister Without Front Section³ (meters)" under "SS-24 for Silo Launcher" and "SS-24 for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the numbers "19.4" and "19.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "20.4" and "20.6", respectively.

4. In the English and Russian of subparagraph (b)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Rail-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs* (in Transport Position, Without Missile): Width (meters)" under "PK for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the number "2.8" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "2.9".

5. In the English and Russian of subparagraph (b)(ii) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)" under "Poseidon", "Trident I", and "Trident II", the numbers "10.4", "10.4", and "13.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "8.1", "10.3", and "13.4", respectively; for the category of data "First Stage Length (meters)" under "Trident II", the number "7.1" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "7.0".

6. In the English of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "Recognition features of Bison A former heavy bombers" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Recognition features of Bison¹ former heavy bombers"; the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison A former heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison B former heavy bomber"; under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The Bison A former heavy bomber is a modification of the Bison¹ heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The Bison B former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the Bison¹ heavy bomber".

7. In the Russian of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is a modification of the 3M¹ heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the 3M¹ heavy bomber".

8. In the English of subparagraph 1(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays: Bomber Type", in all four places the designator "Bison B" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

9. In the English and Russian of paragraph 8 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Former Heavy Bombers", the designator "Bison A", which corresponds to the designator "3MS-2", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B", which corresponds to the designator "M-4", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

10. In the English and Russian of paragraph 3 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section I of the Notification Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section I of the Notification Protocol."

Soviet Component
of the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
December 19, 1991

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 18, 1991, in which you refer to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991.

I have the honor to accept your proposal that the corrections set forth in the Corrigenda attached to this letter be made in the texts of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. I have the further honor to accept your proposal that this letter, accepting the Corrigenda attached hereto, and your letter shall constitute corrections to the texts of the above-mentioned documents.

Sincerely yours,

Gennadiy I. Shabannikov
Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the
Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment:
As stated.

CORRIGENDA

I. Agreed Statements Annex
To the Treaty
Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
And the United States of America
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
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The Agreed Statements Annex

United States Department of State

In the Russian of paragraph (b) of the Tenth Agreed Statement in the Agreed Statements Annex, the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol".

II. Protocol on Inspections
And Continuous Monitoring Activities
Relating to the Treaty
Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
And the United States of America
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"(iii) for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, and for SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles: the diameter and length of an ICBM or SLBM of each type in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM or SLBM of that type without the front section, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs."

III. The Memorandum of Understanding On the Establishment of the Data Base
Relating to the Treaty
Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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On the Reduction and Limitation of
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1. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Bomber Type and Variant of a Type" for the air base for former heavy bombers at Engel's, the designator "Bison A" in the left column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B" in the right column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

2. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the repair facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at Ryazan, for the category of data "Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility", the designator "Bison A" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B".

3. In the Russian and English of subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Total Length of Missile

as a Unit with Launch Canister Without Front Section³ (meters)" under "SS-24 for Silo Launcher" and "SS-24 for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the numbers "19.4" and "19.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "20.4" and "20.6", respectively.

4. In the Russian and English of subparagraph (b)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Rail-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs* (in Transport Position, Without Missile): Width (meters)" under "PK for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the number "2.8" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "2.9".

5. In the Russian and English of subparagraph (b)(ii) of Annex F of the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)" under "Poseidon", "Trident I", and "Trident II", the numbers "10.4", "10.4", and "13.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "8.1", "10.3", and "13.4", respectively; for the category of data "First Stage Length (meters)" under "Trident II", the number "7.1" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "7.0".

6. In the English of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "Recognition features of Bison A former heavy bombers" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Recognition features of Bison B former heavy bombers"; the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison A former heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison B former heavy bomber"; under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The Bison A former heavy bomber is a modification of the Bison¹ heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The Bison B former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the Bison¹ heavy bomber".

7. In the Russian of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is a modification of the 3M1 heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the 3M1 heavy bomber".

8. In the English of subparagraph 1(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays: Bomber Type", in all four places the designator "Bison B" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

9. In the Russian and English of paragraph 8 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Former Heavy Bombers", the designator "Bison A", which corresponds to the designator "3MS-2", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B", which corresponds to the designator "M-4", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

10. In the Russian and English of paragraph 3 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section I of the

Notification Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section 1 of the Notification Protocol".

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
CONCERNING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY**

The Republic of Belarus, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The Republic of Belarus understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

- (a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.
- (b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the

United States Department of State

territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialed]

Aleksandr Baichorov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
CONCERNING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY**

The Republic of Kazakhstan, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

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The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

- (a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.
- (b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed

on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialed]

Kairtay Zhabatyrov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY**

The Russian Federation, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The Russian Federation understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Russian Federation understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

- (a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.

United States Department of State

- (b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The Russian Federation understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

[Initialed]

Mikhail Strel'tsov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY UKRAINE CONCERNING INSPECTION
ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY**

Ukraine, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

Ukraine understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

Ukraine understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out

United States Department of State

inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

- (a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.
- (b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

Ukraine understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

Ukraine understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the

United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialed]

Anatoliy Shevtsov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONCERNING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY**

The United States of America, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The United States of America understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these States on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The United States of America understands that, for the duration of the Treaty, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine each has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America with the understanding having been reached among these Parties that:

- (a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.

United States Department of State

- (b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after strategic offensive arms have been removed from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The United States of America understands that the apportionment of personnel between the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

The United States of America understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

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Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS CONCERNING
REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS**

The Republic of Belarus makes the following statement concerning its understanding of the plans of the United States of America with respect to costs of inspections conducted by the United States of America on its territory under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

United States Department of State

If the Republic of Belarus does not conduct inspections, except as provided below, on the territory of the United States of America during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Belarus the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America during that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection airplanes at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America will consider inspections conducted on the territory of the United States of America, notified by the Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States, by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on U.S. territory during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialed]

Aleksandr Baichorov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS**

The Republic of Kazakhstan makes the following statement concerning its understanding of the plans of the United States of America with respect to costs of inspections conducted by the United States of America on its territory under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

United States Department of State

If the Republic of Kazakhstan does not conduct inspections, except as provided below, on the territory of the United States of America during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Kazakhstan the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America during that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection airplanes at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America will consider inspections conducted on the territory of the United States of America, notified by the Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States, by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on U.S. territory during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

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Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY UKRAINE CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT
OF INSPECTION COSTS UNDER THE START TREATY**

Ukraine makes the following statement concerning its understanding of the plans of the United States of America with respect to costs of inspections conducted by the United States of America on its territory under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

United States Department of State

If Ukraine does not conduct inspections, except as provided below, on the territory of the United States of America during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, Ukraine understands that the United States of America intends to reimburse Ukraine the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America during that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection airplanes at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, Ukraine understands that the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Ukraine understands that the United States of America will consider inspections conducted on the territory of the United States of America, notified by the Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States, by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty.

Ukraine understands that the United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on U.S. territory during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

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Anatoliy Shevtsov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS**

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to costs of START Treaty inspections conducted on the territory of the Republic of Belarus:

If the Republic of Belarus does not conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America, except as provided below, during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent

United States Department of State

six-month period, the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Belarus the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America for that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection aircraft at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

With regard to inspections notified by Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States of America, the United States of America plans to consider inspections on the territory of the United States of America by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligation provided for in the Treaty.

The United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on the territory of the United States of America during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

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Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS**

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to costs of START Treaty inspections conducted on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan:

If the Republic of Kazakhstan does not conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America, except as provided below, during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Kazakhstan the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America for that six-month period in the following cost

United States Department of State

categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection aircraft at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

With regard to inspections notified by Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States of America, the United States of America plans to consider inspections on the territory of the United States of America by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligation provided for in the Treaty.

The United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on the territory of the United States of America during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

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Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS**

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to costs of START Treaty inspections conducted on the territory of Ukraine:

If Ukraine does not conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America, except as provided below, during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the United States of America intends to reimburse Ukraine the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America for that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection aircraft at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and

United States Department of State

agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

With regard to inspections notified by Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States of America, the United States of America plans to consider inspections on the territory of the United States of America by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligation provided for in the Treaty.

The United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on the territory of the United States of America during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

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Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON NOT
LOCATING SILO LAUNCHERS OUTSIDE NATIONAL TERRITORY**

Ambassador V. I. Trifonov
Representative of the Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the United States of America with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The United States of America notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

United States Department of State

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the United States of America does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside its national territory.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner,
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Dr. K. K. Zhanbatyrov
Deputy Representative of the Republic of Kazakstan
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Deputy Representative:

On behalf of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the United States of America with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The United States of America notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the United States of America does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside its national territory.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner,
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Mr. A. O. Sannikov
Representative of the Republic of Belarus
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

United States Department of State

On behalf of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the United States of America with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The United States of America notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the United States of America does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside its national territory.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner,
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Mr. K. I. Hrishchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the United States of America with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The United States of America notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the United States of America does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside its national territory.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner,
Ambassador

United States Department of State

**STATEMENTS OF POLICY BY BELARUS, KAZAKSTAN, THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, AND UKRAINE ON NOT LOCATING SILO LAUNCHERS
OUTSIDE NATIONAL TERRITORY**

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Representative of the Republic of Belarus
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Minsk, Republic of Belarus

Dear Mr. Deputy Representative:

On behalf of the Republic of Belarus, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the Republic of Belarus with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The Republic of Belarus notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the Republic of Belarus does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside the national territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Sincerely,

[S]
Andrey O. Sannikov
Head of Delegation

To Ambassador Steven Steiner,
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Representative of the Republic of Kazakstan
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Almaty, Republic of Kazakstan

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Republic of Kazakstan, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the Republic of Kazakstan with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The Republic of Kazakstan notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the Republic of Kazakstan does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside the national territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Sincerely,

[S]
Kairtay K. Zhanbatyrov

To Ambassador Steven Steiner,
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Representative of the Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Moscow, Russian Federation

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Russian Federation, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the Russian Federation with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The Russian Federation notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the Russian Federation does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside the national territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Sincerely,

[S]

Ambassador Viktor I. Trifonov

To Ambassador Steven Steiner,
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Kiev, Ukraine

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of Ukraine, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of Ukraine with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

Ukraine notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that Ukraine does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside the national

United States Department of State
Revised: 5/02

territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Sincerely,

[S]
Ambassador Konstantin I. Hrishchenko

To Ambassador Steven Steiner,
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

WITHDRAWAL OF RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPMENT FROM UKRAINE

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Mr. Konstantin I. Hryshchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform the Government of Ukraine that the United States of America understands that Ukraine, having fulfilled its obligations under the Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of the United States of America, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation of January 14, 1994, and the provisions of Article V of the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty, and having acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party, does not have on its territory nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms.

In this connection, the United States of America, as a matter of policy, will withdraw from Ukraine the radiation detection equipment (RDE), which is listed in subparagraph 2(c) of subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol to the Treaty, stored at the Kiev point of entry.

The United States of America retains the right to conduct inspections on the territory of Ukraine using RDE for the duration of the Treaty.

The United States of America agrees that should it in the future decide to bring RDE to the Kiev point of entry, such RDE will be examined and will undergo an operability check, and if necessary, the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and type of inspection will be delayed pending completion of such examination and operability check in accordance with the procedures

United States Department of State

provided for in subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of Annex 15 to the Inspection Protocol.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

WITHDRAWAL OF RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPMENT FROM UKRAINE

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of Ukraine, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform the Government of the United States of America that Ukraine, having fulfilled its obligations under the Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America, and the Russian Federation of January 14, 1994, and the provisions of Article V of the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty, and having acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party, does not have on its territory nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms.

In this connection, Ukraine understands that the United States of America will, as a matter of policy, remove the radiation detection equipment (RDE), which is listed in subparagraph 2(c) of Subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol to the Treaty, stored at the Kiev point of entry.

Ukraine confirms that the United States of America retains the right to conduct inspections on the territory of Ukraine using RDE for the duration of the Treaty.

Ukraine agrees that should the United States of America decide in the future to bring RDE to the Kiev point of entry, such RDE will be examined and will undergo an operability check, and if necessary, the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and type of inspection will be delayed pending completion of such examination and operability check in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of Annex 15 to the Inspection Protocol.

United States Department of State

Respectfully,

[S]
Konstantin Hrishchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON
ASSISTING INSPECTORS IN CONFIRMING THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF
LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMS FOR WHICH THE B-52H HEAVY BOMBER
IS EQUIPPED**

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Mr. Anton V. Vasil'yev
Representative of the Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The United States of America notes that the Russian Federation will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 21 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if applicable, and if during that year such viewing has not been conducted on the territory of Ukraine.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections.

United States Department of State

- (a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
- (b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
- (c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
- (d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

If inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Mr. Konstantin I. Hrishchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

United States Department of State

of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The United States of America notes that Ukraine will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 21 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if applicable, and if during that year such viewing has not been conducted on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

- (a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
- (b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
- (c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
- (d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

If inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Stanislav S. Ogurtsov
Representative of the Republic of Belarus
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

- (a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
- (b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
- (c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
- (d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

United States Department of State

If inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Dr. Kairtay K. Zhanbatyrov
Deputy Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

United States Department of State

- (a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
- (b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
- (c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
- (d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

If inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

**STATEMENTS OF POLICY BY BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN, THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, AND UKRAINE ON ASSISTING INSPECTORS IN
CONFIRMING THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR
ALCMS FOR WHICH THE BEAR H-6, BEAR H-16, OR BLACKJACK HEAVY
BOMBER IS EQUIPPED**

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

United States Department of State

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the Republic of Belarus notes that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

- (a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
- (b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
- (c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
- (d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The Republic of Belarus notes that if inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, the Republic of Belarus notes your assurance that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Ambassador Stanislav S. Ogurtsov
Representative of the
Republic of Belarus
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the Republic of Kazakhstan notes that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

- (a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
- (b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
- (c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
- (d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The Republic of Kazakhstan notes that if inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will

United States Department of State

demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, the Republic of Kazakhstan notes your assurance that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Kairtay K. Zhanbatyrov
Representative of the
Republic of Kazakhstan
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the Russian Federation will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 21 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if applicable, and if during that year such viewing has not been conducted on the territory of Ukraine.

The Russian Federation notes that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is

United States Department of State

equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

- (a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
- (b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
- (c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
- (d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The Russian Federation notes that if inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, the Russian Federation notes your assurance that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Anton V. Vasil'yev
Representative of the
Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of Ukraine, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that Ukraine will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 21 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if applicable, and if during that year such viewing has not been conducted on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Ukraine notes that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

- (a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
- (b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
- (c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
- (d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Ukraine notes that if inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, Ukraine notes your assurance that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Ambassador Konstantin I. Hrishchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

**SIGNED LETTERS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF GROUND
TRANSPORTATION FOR THE RESUPPLY OF VOTKINSK, MARCH 20, 2002¹**

Letter from the U.S. Representative to the Belarusian Representative

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

Mr. Aleksandr M. Baichorov
Representative of the Government of the
Republic of Belarus to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

In connection with the discussions held in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission regarding the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, I have the honor to propose the following.

¹ For brevity, the attachment to the letters of exchange on the "Use of Ground Transportation for the Resupply of Votkinsk" is printed only at the end of the letter from the Representative of the Russian Federation to the U.S. Representative.

The Russian Federation, acting in a spirit of good will and cooperation, and without prejudice to its legal position regarding the provisions on transportation of cargo to a monitored facility under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, shall provide the United States of America with support and assistance in using ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, or to remove such cargo from that facility to locations outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

Such support and assistance shall include the provision, at the request of the United States of America, of ground transportation vehicles and related services necessary for transport of the cargo provided for in the START Treaty, by a cargo carrier selected by the Russian Federation. Procedures regarding payment of costs, and other issues related to the provision of vehicles for transporting the aforementioned cargo and of related services shall be specified in a contract concluded between the cargo carrier and an authorized representative of the United States Government.

The Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America agree, within the framework of the document attached to the letters of exchange, on the specific procedures to be applied during the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk. The aforementioned attachment to the letters of exchange shall be an integral part of this agreement.

The transportation of such cargo to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk by ground transportation vehicles shall not affect the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between our Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of our letters, and shall remain in force until cessation of continuous monitoring activities at the monitored facility at Votkinsk under Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty. This agreement may be terminated 12 months after notification to that effect by one of the Parties to the agreement.

Please accept, Mr. Representative, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[S]
Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment:

"Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk"

Letter from the Belarusian Representative to the U.S. Representative

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In connection with the discussions held in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission regarding the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, I have the honor to accept the proposal set forth in your letter of today's date to conclude an agreement on this issue, whose principal provisions are set forth below.

The Russian Federation, acting in a spirit of good will and cooperation, and without prejudice to its legal position regarding the provisions on transportation of cargo to a monitored facility under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, shall provide the United States of America with support and assistance in using ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, or to remove such cargo from that facility to locations outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

Such support and assistance shall include the provision, at the request of the United States of America, of ground transportation vehicles and related services necessary for transport of the cargo provided for in the START Treaty, by a cargo carrier selected by the Russian Federation. Procedures regarding payment of costs, and other issues related to the provision of vehicles for transporting the aforementioned cargo and of related services shall be specified in a contract concluded between the cargo carrier and an authorized representative of the United States Government.

The Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America agree, within the framework of the document attached to the letters of exchange, on the specific procedures to be applied during the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to or from the monitored facility at

Votkinsk. The aforementioned attachment to the letters of exchange shall be an integral part of this agreement.

The transportation of such cargo to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk by ground transportation vehicles shall not affect the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty.

This reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between our Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of our letters, and shall remain in force until cessation of continuous monitoring activities at the monitored facility at Votkinsk under Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty. This agreement may be terminated 12 months after notification to that effect by one of the Parties to the agreement.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[S]
Aleksandr M. Baichorov
Representative of Government of the
Republic of Belarus to the
Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment:

"Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk"

Letter from the U.S. Representative to the Russian Representative

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

Mr. Anton V. Vasil'yev
Representative of the Russian Federation to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

In connection with the discussions held in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission regarding the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, I have the honor to propose the following.

The Russian Federation, acting in a spirit of good will and cooperation, and without prejudice to its legal position regarding the provisions on transportation of

cargo to a monitored facility under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, shall provide the United States of America with support and assistance in using ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, or to remove such cargo from that facility to locations outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

Such support and assistance shall include the provision, at the request of the United States of America, of ground transportation vehicles and related services necessary for transport of the cargo provided for in the START Treaty, by a cargo carrier selected by the Russian Federation. Procedures regarding payment of costs, and other issues related to the provision of vehicles for transporting the aforementioned cargo and of related services shall be specified in a contract concluded between the cargo carrier and an authorized representative of the United States Government.

The Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America agree, within the framework of the document attached to the letters of exchange, on the specific procedures to be applied during the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk. The aforementioned attachment to the letters of exchange shall be an integral part of this agreement.

The transportation of such cargo to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk by ground transportation vehicles shall not affect the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between our Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of our letters, and shall remain in force until cessation of continuous monitoring activities at the monitored facility at Votkinsk under Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty. This agreement may be terminated 12 months after notification to that effect by one of the Parties to the agreement.

Please accept, Mr. Representative, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[S]
Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment:

"Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk"

**Letter from the Representative of the Russian Federation to the U.S.
Representative**

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In connection with the discussions held in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission regarding the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, I have the honor to accept the proposal set forth in your letter of today's date to conclude an agreement on this issue, whose principal provisions are set forth below.

The Russian Federation, acting in a spirit of good will and cooperation, and without prejudice to its legal position regarding the provisions on transportation of cargo to a monitored facility under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, shall provide the United States of America with support and assistance in using ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, or to remove such cargo from that facility to locations outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

Such support and assistance shall include the provision, at the request of the United States of America, of ground transportation vehicles and related services necessary for transport of the cargo provided for in the START Treaty, by a cargo carrier selected by the Russian Federation. Procedures regarding payment of costs, and other issues related to the provision of vehicles for transporting the aforementioned cargo and of related services shall be specified in a contract concluded between the cargo carrier and an authorized representative of the United States Government.

The Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America agree, within the framework of the document attached to the letters of exchange, on the specific procedures to be applied during the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to or from the monitored facility at

Votkinsk. The aforementioned attachment to the letters of exchange shall be an integral part of this agreement.

The transportation of such cargo to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk by ground transportation vehicles shall not affect the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between our Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of our letters, and shall remain in force until cessation of continuous monitoring activities at the monitored facility at Votkinsk under Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty. This agreement may be terminated 12 months after notification to that effect by one of the Parties to the agreement.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Anton V. Vasil'yev
Representative of the
Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment:

"Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk"

Attachment to the Letter Dated March 20, 2002

**Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the
Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from
the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk**

In connection with the exchange of letters of March 20, 2002, the representatives of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the United States of America have agreed on the following procedures for the use of ground transportation vehicles by the United States of America for the transportation of cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation.

1. Ground transportation vehicles and related services necessary for transporting cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to the monitored facility at Votkinsk or removing such cargo from that facility to locations outside the territory of the Russian Federation shall be provided by the Russian Federation at the request of the United States of America. Such vehicles may transport only equipment, only supplies, or both at one and the same time.

2. The Votkinsk Plant State Production Association, a Federal State Unitary Enterprise, or other cargo carrier selected by the Russian Federation, and the authorized representative of the United States of America will conclude a contract for the provision of ground transportation vehicles and related services necessary for the cargo transportation referred to in paragraph 1 of these Procedures. This contract shall specify, inter alia:

- (i) the vehicles and services requested of the cargo carrier;
- (ii) procedures used by the cargo carrier, the leader of the monitoring team and the leader of the in-country escorts to coordinate the transportation of cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk; and
- (iii) procedures for settlement of accounts for all vehicles and services provided, including any mutually-agreed services provided as a result of unforeseen circumstances.

3. The United States of America shall provide a notification to the Russian Federation of its intention to use ground transportation vehicles. Such notification shall be provided no less than 40 days in advance of the estimated date of provision of the vehicles at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo at Frankfurt am Main, or Darmstadt, Federal Republic of Germany, and shall include the following information:

- (i) the type of ground transportation vehicles requested and the number of vehicles of each type;
- (ii) the estimated date of arrival of the ground transportation vehicles at the monitored facility or point of departure of the cargo;
- (iii) the point of departure of the cargo;
- (iv) the approximate number of separate palletized or oversize units of cargo, including modular structures, and the approximate weight and dimensions of each such unit of cargo;
- (v) the type and approximate amount of any hazardous materials to be carried by the ground transportation vehicles that require special safety measures during transportation and handling; and
- (vi) services requested of the Russian Federation.

4. The United States of America shall provide a notification to the Russian Federation confirming its intention to use ground transportation vehicles and services in accordance with paragraph 3 of these Procedures. Such notification shall be provided no less than 20 days in advance of the estimated date of provision of the ground transportation vehicles at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo at Frankfurt am Main or Darmstadt, and shall include the following information:

- (i) the number, time and date of the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of these Procedures; and
- (ii) any changes to the information contained in such notification.

5. The Russian Federation shall provide a notification to the United States of America confirming that the ground transportation vehicles and services requested by the United States of America in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of these Procedures will be provided. Such notification shall be provided no less than ten days in advance of the estimated date of provision of the ground transportation vehicles at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo at Frankfurt am Main or Darmstadt, and shall include the following information:

- (i) the type of ground transportation vehicles and the number of vehicles of each type that will be provided;
- (ii) the estimated date of provision of the ground transportation vehicles at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo;
- (iii) the estimated date of arrival of the ground transportation vehicles with cargo at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo;
- (iv) the services that will be provided by the Russian Federation; and
- (v) passport information for the drivers of the ground transportation vehicles and other individuals accompanying such vehicles.

6. The Russian Federation shall provide a notification to the Republic of Belarus, whose territory the ground transportation vehicles traveling from Votkinsk will transit, no less than ten days in advance of the estimated date of their arrival on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Such notification shall include the following information:

- (i) the type of transiting ground transportation vehicles and the number of vehicles of each type;
- (ii) the estimated date of arrival of the ground transportation vehicles on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and of their departure from the territory of the Republic of Belarus;
- (iii) the type and approximate amount of any hazardous materials to be carried by the ground transportation vehicles that require special safety measures during transportation and handling; and
- (iv) passport information for the drivers of the ground transportation vehicles and other individuals accompanying such vehicles.

7. The United States of America shall provide a notification to the Republic of Belarus, whose territory the ground transportation vehicles traveling to Votkinsk will transit, no less than ten days in advance of the estimated date of

their arrival on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Such notification shall include the following information:

- (i) the type of transiting ground transportation vehicles and the number of vehicles of each type;
- (ii) the estimated date of arrival of the ground transportation vehicles on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and of their departure from the territory of the Republic of Belarus; and
- (iii) the type and approximate amount of any hazardous materials to be carried by the ground transportation vehicles that require special safety measures during transportation and handling.

8. The notifications referred to in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of these Procedures shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and through the National Agency for Verification and Inspection - Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, using START Treaty message Format number 144 (additional START message).

9. The United States of America shall provide the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation with an inventory of the cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to be delivered to the monitored facility at Votkinsk or removed from that facility, using the procedures set forth in Annex 7 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. The United States of America shall provide such inventory through its embassy no less than ten days prior to the arrival of the vehicles on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and prior to their arrival on (or departure from) the territory of the Russian Federation.

10. Cargo consisting of equipment and supplies shall be transported to and from the monitored facility at Votkinsk using ground transportation vehicles no more than five times a year.

11. The following route will be used for transporting cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk using ground transportation vehicles: Frankfurt am Main or Darmstadt (Federal Republic of Germany) - Minsk (Republic of Belarus) - Izhevsk - Votkinsk (Russian Federation). Such cargo shall be examined by the Russian Federation at the monitored facility at Votkinsk using the relevant provisions set forth in Annex 7 to the Inspection Protocol.

12. The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation shall ensure that equipment and supplies delivered to or removed from the monitored facility at Votkinsk are exempt from all customs duties and are expeditiously processed as provided for in paragraph 7 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol.

13. Changes and additions may be made to these Procedures by agreement among the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

**UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT
THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT REGARDING THE USE OF GROUND
TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES TO TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT AND
SUPPLIES TO OR FROM THE MONITORED FACILITY AT VOTKINSK**

Barring unforeseen circumstances, the United States of America does not intend, under routine circumstances, to exercise its START Treaty right to use inspection airplanes for the transportation of equipment and supplies to and from the monitored facility at Votkinsk.

The United States of America proceeds from the premise that the overall weight of equipment and supplies transported annually to and from the monitored facility at Votkinsk using ground transportation vehicles will be approximately the same as the overall weight of equipment and supplies that have been previously transported annually to and from such facility by the United States of America using inspection airplanes.