

WEAPONS THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: REBUILDING AN UNRAVELED CONSENSUS

SUSTAINABILITY OF NONPROLIFERATION IN A TWO-TIERED WORLD

NOLAN: Thank you very much. This is the final session of this very excellent conference. I'd like to start by thanking the Century Foundation and Richard Leone and the Center for American Progress and Joe Cirincione, who has been so effective and as always both brilliant and entertaining. And certainly the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It's a very distinguished panel, and I really want to commend all of you for coming back after lunch. There's only one other time it's worse, which is after dinner. Each of the panelists was given homework, not by me, but by the organizers, to produce a question that they would like to be asked in the context of this broader discussion of whether it's possible to sustain global non-proliferation in a two-tiered world.

So I have to say that only Mr. Dhanapala actually produced a question, but I have another question from Hans Blix. But Henry attempted to explain to me what he was going to say but I have absolutely no idea what he was talking about.

I think we should start in sequence. Hans Blix is definitely going to have to address the question of what kind of sustainability one can expect looking from the starting point of the NPT in 1968 and what has happened subsequently to create an order which is certainly unequal.

We will then turn to Mr. Dhanapala, who specifically will talk about whether, under his leadership, the successful negotiation of indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was a good idea. This is a very interesting question coming from the person who did the most to negotiate this agreement.

And then finally Henry Sokolski, who will talk about –

SOKOLSKI: Inequalities.

NOLAN: We'll see.

(laughter)

NOLAN: So thank you very much. Hans Blix.

BLIX: Well, I first accepted coming here on the assumption that I would be giving a talk about half an hour. But the format has changed as we have gone along, and there is more now of interactive. Nevertheless, I think I would like to start with what I sat

in my chamber at home and thought out on the question of how sustainable or unsustainable it would be to have a two-tiered world, nuclear and non-nuclear.

And my starting point is 1968 and the NPT. At the time the non-nuclear weapons states of the world were asked to commit themselves to non-nuclear weapons and the others were committing themselves to negotiators' nuclear disarmament. And taken together, this would envisage getting to a nuclear weapon-free world. The double bargain that is used to talk about.

Now, the nuclear weapons states that existed in 1968 could only have had support for a treaty that aimed, in effect, at a nuclear-weapon free world. The others would not have gone along with the treaty if that clause had not been in it. It wouldn't have been enough simply to promise facilitating transfer of technology. Nor would the treaty have been prolonged, in 1995, without a final date, if the nuclear weapons states had not, at the time, at the review conference, confirmed their commitment to the very concrete measures of nuclear disarmament, and even further elaborated in the year 2000.

Today the situation is that many non-nuclear weapons states feel that the failure of the nuclear weapons states to move decisively to nuclear disarmament amounts to breach of faith on their part. And the five NPT nuclear weapons states seem to have abandoned, in the view of many non-nuclear states, the effort – abandoned the effort to which they were committed to move to a nuclear weapon-free world through the unilateral and bilateral and multilateral agreements to a common system of global rules -- and aim now, only through P5 power, to stop the number of nuclear weapons states at eight.

That is perceived as the present aim of the five original nuclear weapons states. And the reduction that has occurred in the number of nuclear weapons in the nuclear weapons states, from 55,000 to some 27,000, is seen by these states mainly as doing away with a lot of redundancy that existed, not really as a significant nuclear disarmament.

The Cold War has ended, and in the view of a growing number of governments, the way to restore faith in the system that was jointly established in '68 and confirmed in '95 would be for the nuclear weapons states to take the lead in moving to significant disarmament measures. And I see the article by Kissinger and others as one swallow in the hopefully imminent spring. Maybe also some words in the UK white paper about the prolongation of the Trident Program as another one. And the growing interest in disarmament as a new spring possibly coming. But it's too early, really, to be real optimistic.

Now, in the light of the events in Iraq, and also perhaps in light of the events of Lebanon, there is I think also growing public recognition, including recognition in the U.S., that military means used to tackle proliferation and terrorism have

incurred horrible costs in lives and resources, and that time may have come for disarmament and diplomacy.

And the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which I chaired – and I'm happy that Dhanapala is here – we offered a long list of items for – of some measure to the public and to nongovernmental organizations and to legislatures which could call for early action. Actually such a list I think is not difficult at all to draw up. There are some obvious and, in all this, I have seen there are some obvious candidates. It's the bringing into force of the CTBT of course. It is the FMCT, the ban on production of more highly enriched uranium and plutonium, withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the center of Europe into deep into Russia and back in over to the U.S., etc. Treaty-based security guarantees. The list can be made very long. And Mr. Kissinger and his colleagues also included a number of them, some of them more modest. You can pick and choose. But the main thing I think is the turn of the tide. And we have not seen that yet. But there is some little hope in there.

There is also, apart from the dissatisfaction with the nuclear weapons states' conduct, or lack of going to disarmament, dissatisfaction among many non-nuclear weapons states – I am not speaking about all of them, but many of them – that while the NPT nuclear weapons states seems to ignore their own commitments to go to disarmament, they want to tie the non-nuclear weapons states to ever more commitments. And some are obvious, and I agree with some of them myself. The acceptance of additional safeguard protocol of the IAEA, which seems an obvious candidate and perhaps wouldn't have been so difficult if there hadn't been a clash, a general clash between the two groups at the review conference. And now subsequent to that, they're to renounce their right to enrich uranium and reprocess fuel. And this is the acute one where this much discussion about the fuel cycle and various schemes to prevent that, or to prevent somehow to – the best place induce and the worst place to force non-nuclear weapons states to renounce enrichment. Which I think will not work with, say, Australia or Canada. And there will be several others. Like Brazil, I think, will also probably not go along with that.

But this is seen as yet another thing demanding more of the non-nuclear weapons states. While the nuclear weapons states themselves are not going for disarmament, they are asking more of the other side?

And another one which certainly deserves discussion is the question of the right to withdrawal laid down in the NPT. And we all talk about making it more difficult for states to get out of it, and we discuss it in the report and say that, well, at the least one could ask that a withdrawal should be discussed and considered in the Security Council. But at the same time the – and the Security Council has demanded that North Korea, if I remember rightly, should go back to the NPT. Now, what is that but a renunciation or denial of the right to withdrawal? So is that coming as well? It may be welcome to some, but nevertheless it is something that imposes stronger obligations on the non-nuclear weapons states.

So this is where we are, and I think that it will be difficult to turn the tide unless there is, as we talked about this morning, some change of attitude in the nuclear weapons states. They should take the lead for some significant disarmament, and what would immediately help the best would be moving forward on a ratification of the CTBT.

There is something a little odd about a condemnation of North Korea for testing a weapon. And among the states that condemn North Korea for this in the Security Council are the United States and China, which themselves have not signed onto a prohibition of that ratification. They retain the freedom – in this country they even, some groups there, want to go for further tests. But they are perfectly free to condemn North Korea for doing it. And I also regret that they did it. I think the world is not helped by it at all. But I can see the feeling of inequality and the underlying two-tier system that we have.

NOLAN: Thank you very much. That raises a lot of issues. We'll open the floor after the first statements, Mr. Dhanapala.

DHANAPALA: Let me address the title of our particular session, "Sustainability of Nonproliferation in a Two-Tiered World." It is in fact a political reality that we live in a two-tiered world. An upstairs and a downstairs global residence. I have lived in the downstairs, so I'm very well aware of the two tiers. Climbing the stairs is always very difficult.

It's two tiers in more respects than one. In our own context, discussing matters here, it is the nuclear and the non-nuclear. But we also have the developed and the developing. We have the North and the South. And of course there are other divisions, which Samuel Huntington talks about, which he would regard as permanent fault lines – the Islamic world, Western Christendom, and so on.

What is important, I think, however, is that we can overcome this two-tiers through having a uniform set of norms. And norms internationally are created through a rule of law and through a rule-based society in which treaties perform an important function. And this is why the NPT becomes an important norm, because it is a norm that has to be bridged as far as both the nuclear and the non-nuclear are concerned.

And we have to look at the treaty in its entirety. I have problems with those who only find nonproliferation a breach of the treaty, while a breach of Article VI is ignored and brushed aside. I also have problems with those who enthrone Article IV, about the inalienable right of a member state to have access to nuclear power and nuclear energy, ignoring other aspects of the treaty. So the treaty has to be conformed to in its entirety and not piecemeal.

Now, the question was asked about 1995. The fact of the matter is that the NPT was unique in not being a treaty that was entered into ad infinitum. It had a defined period of 25 years. And at the end of that, Article 10.2 did not say that it was going to be automatically extended. But it asked that a majority exist among the treaty parties to decide for how long the treaty would be extended.

There were several discussions that took place at the time, including among the non-aligned, and many ideas as to periodic extensions, a rollover period of 25 years, and so on. Unfortunately – and I think this is a great inadequacy on the part of the non-aligned movement at the time – they never settled on one particular formula. And in the absence of that, the nuclear weapons states, particularly of the West, had set their objective as being an indefinite extension. And they were able to marshal the forces for this. Now, personally I myself felt that this was going to be a *carte blanche* for the nuclear weapons states. And I wanted very much to see that there were some checks and balances on them. But when South Africa, as the latest entrant into the NPT regime, with its credentials as being a country which had transformed itself from an apartheid country into a non-racial democracy – but more importantly as a country which already had seven nuclear devices, and had destroyed them in order to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state – when they decided that they would go along with the desire on the part of the nuclear weapons states to have an indefinite extension -- subject, however, to certain checks and balances -- the die was cast as far as the indefinite extension was concerned.

It was then left to the presidential consultations under my chairmanship to negotiate what those checks and balances would be. And for that, in addition to the crucial legal decision under the terms of the treaty to extend the treaty indefinitely, we had two other decisions. One, a set of benchmarks under which the behavior of every state party would be judged. Secondly, we had a strengthened review process. So that review conferences would be more than five-year exercises to discuss how the treaty had been functioning, but would in fact be a means of ensuring that all parties would be judged on their performance under the treaty. We also then had the resolution on the Middle East added because of certain concerns that the Middle East countries had, over Israel in particular.

Together, the three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East formed a package, which was adopted without a vote. I think that is very different from saying that there was a consensus, because in fact after the adoption of the package without a vote, there were many countries who expressed their deep concern about the way in which the nuclear weapons states were going to be let off the hook.

I think the ink was scarcely dry on that when we had a number of statements made by some of the nuclear weapons states indicating they were going back to business as usual. The argument was made to us in the non-nuclear states that the nuclear weapons states needed to have the guarantee of the longevity of this treaty in order

to perform their nuclear disarmament tasks under Article VI. Well, we know what happened after that.

And so we must feel a sense of grave betrayal. However, in 2005, when the Review Conference was held, and thanks to the New Agenda Coalition, who were the main drivers of that particular conference, they were able to get agreement from the nuclear weapons states on 13 steps.

BLIX: The 2000 conference.

DHANAPALA: The 2000 conference, I beg your pardon. This, I think, in many ways helped to ensure that the 1995 legacy was being consolidated and extended. But with 2005 and the failure of that conference to adopt a final declaration – and also, in the larger context last year, when the outcome document of the 60th UN General Assembly Session also was unable to reach consensus on anything on disarmament, we found there was a major regression.

And so I think we find ourselves very much back to having to sustain the whole concept of the balance, the bargain that was there inherently when the treaty was signed and was reiterated in 1995 when the treaty was extended. And there has therefore been a very serious undermining of these undertakings that were given. And to that extent, you can see that there has been a cynical approach to this NPT being adopted by some countries, including the non-nuclear weapons states. And although proliferation is certainly not to be condoned, it is taking place under these circumstances. And so we do need to have a reinforcement of the essential bargain of the NPT, of the essential commitments that were made both by the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states.

We also need to ensure that these norms are being maintained. Reference was made earlier today about the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation and the managed proliferation with which the proliferation of some countries, including Israel, is being viewed. Now, clearly this also adds to the erosion of the norms that we are talking about. And it is no longer sustainable to have this.

Let me also quote what the Canberra Commission in 1996 said, and I was a member of that commission. “Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable. It cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.”

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission ten years later, chaired by Hans Blix, said something similar, and I quote: “So long as any such weapons remain in any state’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic.”

What is important is that we need to devalue nuclear weapons as the ultimate currency of power. That can only be achieved by their elimination. And so, as I said earlier in the day when I quoted the article in the *Wall Street Journal* of 4th January by George Schultz and others, we do need to undertake the whole question of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation as a joint enterprise between the two tiers of this world. Thank you.

NOLAN: Thank you very much.

(applause)

NOLAN: I think there's wild approval. Henry?

SOKOLSKI: Well, I think we're making a logical progression from a focus on disarmament to a balance. I think I want to stay on that balance point, but perhaps put a little more influence on the syllable of inequalities that we might want to actually promote. This kind of is jarring to the ear of anyone here in a facility near the UN, but I think we've got to make a distinction between the kinds of inequalities which I've always been taught we're supposed to celebrate. And those are inequalities – for an example, if you're very bright and you do well in school, we tend to honor you. There are other inequalities, though, that are undesirable, unnecessary, and harmful. The best one I know, studying constitutional law, would be slavery. Those kinds of inequalities you have to fight and be willing actually to die to prevent.

And so these distinctions between desirable, unnecessary, and harmful inequalities and their opposite are the ones we need to focus on when we talk about nuclear weapons. Because it seems to me it's pretty clear we want to deemphasize these things, just as was stated. We want to make sure that we do not rely on them for our security. But to do that, it may actually be necessary to promote certain desirable inequalities.

And this is where the Article IV problem comes in. First, I think it's been said before that nuclear weapons were celebrated, and I think too much, as a result of the utility. In dealing with the Nazi problem, people thought that the use of the weapon actually was not only necessary but desirable in taking care of the conclusion of the war. And you found people justifying weapons in keeping the peace. And so we ended up with almost 100,000 of these things deployed, which is mildly insane. And we ended up having a number of close brushes with catastrophe during the Cold War. Contrary to all the theoreticians who say that deterrence was balanced and all of that, I think there's a counterfactual history, based on documentation, indicating we had some close brushes.

In any case, with the end of the Cold War – it's already been noted – you don't hear so much of that celebration. In fact, even the people who are promoting the development, or at least retention, of nuclear weapons frankly are fairly apologetic.

They argue that their programs are necessary to reduce the number of deployed weapons, to downsize the nuclear production base, or to eliminate nuclear testing. Now, I think this defensiveness is not just simply driven by a desire to please the public. I mean, it partly is. But I think there's also a genuine comprehension, if not a comprehension that's spoken out loud, that the number of countries that have nuclear weapons has not gone down. It's gone up. And that the desire to have that weapon has not decreased. I don't see the major countries saying, well, we want to get rid of ours. Maybe downsize. But not get rid of. And that there's likely to be more countries in the wings that want to get these weapons.

Basically there also is an understanding that the idea that you can deter your way out of having to worry about war is pretty much an article of faith that may not really be warranted. In fact, you find this amongst hawks, which is very interesting, even more so than among doves. They say, well, deterrence can't be relied upon. That being so, it seems to me that the celebration of nuclear weapons is not something that you're really seeing that much in the United States, despite all the noise and upset about what's going on in Washington.

This then brings us to the alternative perspective, which is let's just get rid of them. That the way to take care of this problem is to disarm. I think pushing hard on this, however, is a mistake. And certainly we have pushed hard on it in certain quarters. I think actually it's an international perspective that if we can just get the countries that have nuclear weapons to give them up, the road's clear to clear skies and happy days. I think that's not a balanced view. And the reason I say that is while I think pressure has to be kept up to reduce the importance of these weapons, I think if you press too hard you're going to run into a number of difficulties.

The first of these is one of the things that we've done to persuade a good number of countries not to acquire nuclear weapons is to say well we'll take care of that problem for you. So these alliances, unfortunately, in the background have these nuclear weapons as guarantees. Now, I think they're overemphasized as the glue for alliances. I think we can transition away from that. But you can't do that overnight. I'm thinking here of specific countries. Consider Turkey, South Korea, Japan, or Australia's response to us saying, well, we're getting rid of all of our nuclear weapons. Forget the nuclear guarantee portion of our alliance relationship. What that might do with regard to their own weapons intentions is worth considering. So you might want to think about timing there, at a minimum.

Second, arguments for nuclear disarmament tend to spill over to objecting to military scientific advances in general. I don't know how many times when I worked on the Hill there were objections raised to increased missile accuracies. And even now the effort to substitute conventional warheads for nuclear warheads on missiles is considered to be risqué. That seems a little odd to me, because I do think numbers matter. And if you can get the numbers down, I think that's a good thing. And I don't think we should be pushing disarmament to the exclusion of the objection of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.

Finally – and the most important, and what I want to emphasize – pushing for progress on disarmament should not come to the exclusion of focusing on other key nuclear inequalities. And I think the key one that I know of is that there are nations that have nuclear power plants, and nuclear fuel-making plants, and there are nations that don't. Currently the conventional wisdom, and I suspect it's the wisdom of many of us here, is that nuclear powers that have weapons must share all that is conceivable under the banner of civilian nuclear energy as a down payment towards their ultimate disarmament of their arsenals.

In other words, since the United States and other nuclear weapons powers have original sin at having these things, the only way we can atone in the immediate is to offer and push as much as we can and assure nuclear fuel, access to nuclear technology for power, etc. And that eventually we have to get rid of our weapons, too. I think the problem with this kind of enthusiasm for this line of reasoning, and the idea that we should at least eliminate the inequalities with regard to nuclear power and nuclear fuel-making – or at least access nuclear fuel – is that it really does risk – and I think it's already been raised – the specter of a world full of nuclear weapons-ready states.

Now, in the past we've already done this with Iran, Brazil, Taiwan, Iraq, North Korea, South Korea, I can keep going. But we have future candidates. This year alone, 12 states said that they wanted to get reactors. Now, our response to this has been to applaud, and to celebrate it. Actually one country pointed out that, oh, this was just simply a great piece of news because it meant that these countries would be a counterbalance to Iran. That is that these countries really weren't getting peaceful nuclear programs, they were getting a bomb option. This is the world that Kofi Annan, I think correctly, warned against.

And I suspect that the way out, so that we can get those country-neutral norms which I think we all want, is probably to allow two inequalities actually to increase. One of them I think is that we must let military science show us the way away from reliance on indiscriminate weaponry. It's been doing this gradually year after year. It does produce an inequality. The United States is the country that will probably outstrip others, and the advanced world will outstrip less developed countries in developing these military-scientific developments. However it will allow alliances, which have been the key non-proliferation tool – one of them – to be fortified with something more non-nuclear. And I think we should favor that. Also as a tip in this direction, I do think these suggestions about tactical nuclear weapons, and at least moving away over time from having them, overseas, make perfect sense. We should immediately just state for the record all countries should not make any further deployments, and we should press to get rid of them over time when they are overseas deployed.

The second inequality's the most important one, though. And that's the one I'll end on. And I think that is that we really should not be required to spread

unnecessary uneconomical nuclear technology for so-called civil purposes that might increase the prospects for a world with ever more nuclear weapons-ready states. This will require three things. I think a saner reading of the NPT and the so-called inalienable right. You know, actually in the preamble it says we have the right as members to share and receive the benefits of the applications of peaceful nuclear energy. And as was pointed out earlier today, in Article V there's similar language with regard to sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosives. By the way, we have shared this much in the way of peaceful nuclear explosives because there are no benefits.

That leads me to the second point. It might be useful to measure what these benefits are. I think we need to actually identify all the costs of nuclear power and nuclear fuel-making and make sure that they're internalized as much as possible. The cost of physical security. Identifying government subsidies. The cost of IAEA safeguards, which frankly are way under-budgeted. The full cost of real insurance, not capped insurance at \$10 billion. The real cost of decommissioning, waste management, etc. – all should be identified.

And I think we need to move towards open markets, where nuclear power will enjoy no more unique subsidies than any other type of electrical generation fuel type. And if we do, without telling people what to do and not to do, we can see when people do things that are uneconomical when they're doing it, and it should raise suspicions. Something commonsensical like that might allow us to get back to the norms that we need to get back to. Thank you.

(applause)

NOLAN: Thank you, Henry. I'm going to assert the Cirincione chair principle and ask a couple of questions, if I could, to each of the panelists and then –

M: (inaudible) –

NOLAN: I beg your pardon? What did you say?

M: He's talking (inaudible).

NOLAN: Oh.

(laughter)

NOLAN: I thought it was John objecting to my asking questions.

M: Chairman's prerogative.

NOLAN: (inaudible). Just quickly, to Hans Blix, the question about this – all of us, I think, were very interested, if not startled by the article in the *Wall Street Journal*,

which combined the views of George Schultz and Sam Nunn, Bill Perry and Henry Kissinger, calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Why now might it be a more propitious time to move towards that goal, however gradually, as they suggest, compared to, in 1991, previous efforts to move in this direction? There were certainly, in addition to the Canberra Commission, a number of American study groups that involved military people, senior commanders and statesmen. One was chaired by General (inaudible) that I was part of. I'm just curious why this might be a better tipping point than in the past.

Second, to Mr. Dhanapala, the question of devaluation – the general issue is, I think, is whether it's possible to wage a campaign of systematic devaluation of nuclear weapons short of achieving the disarmament pledges that you are calling for. Including, particularly, an effort to devalue the status of nuclear weapons by explaining their operational hazards and constraints. And having really detailed discussions about the legacy of accidents and near-accidents that the United States faced and other countries have faced, about the absolute loathing that the U.S. Army had for having tactical nuclear weapons integrated with conventional forces. And to talk – certainly that's not a dramatic step. But to talk really about why nuclear weapons are not, as a practical matter, in your interest.

Finally to Henry, I'm curious, as in the discussions that we've had earlier, of substituting conventional forces for reliance on nuclear weapons, at what point do you really have to take into account the enormous disparity of American conventional military capabilities, especially long-distance extremely accurate strike weapons, in the calculation of other countries seeking whatever they can to deter their fear of disproportionate power. Including, especially, weapons of mass destruction.

So if we just do that quickly and then we can open the floor.

BLIX: All right. Thank you very much. Well, you are asking me why do I think that Kissinger and the others came out with this call for an abolition of nuclear weapons, and I have my own theories, colored perhaps by my own wishes. But I look back then to 1991, when the IAEA inspectors, for whom I were responsible at the time, we went in and we found already the first inspection that the Iraqis had been cheating and that they were enriching uranium. And I think that this was a shock to us, and we immediately came forward then a proposal for strengthening of the safeguard system, eventually got the additional protocol.

But this was in 1991. And I think that to many people in the U.S., and the military side in particular felt that, well, the multilateral system is not working. Here was a treaty, the NPT, which was respected by the good guys but was not respected by the bad guys. Here you had an inspection system set up under the nonproliferation treaty and it didn't work. The IAEA was the watchdog. They didn't see what was happening in the '80s, and that's true. We hadn't seen what happened, because the system was not sufficient. Nor had it been seen by the Israelis, nor had it been seen

by the CIA, so we were in pretty good company, or bad company. But in any case it hadn't been seen. So international inspection doesn't work. We'd better look – and this coincided, then, with the end of the Cold War and the enormous increase in the military strength of the U.S. And they said, well, let's take care of it ourselves. And that was, in my view, the theory or the doctrine of the counter-proliferation, where – which was the prime example of that was the Israeli attack on the Iraq reactor in 1981. Do it. One way or the other. I don't think that a counter-proliferation excluded diplomacy. But it certainly didn't exclude something like going to war or hitting (inaudible) Iraq or today hitting Iran or, in 2003, going for Iraq. This was counter-proliferation.

And so it was a ad hoc way, relying upon the tremendous muscle of the U.S. military. And then came the Iraq war. And with the disappointment that there were no weapons of mass destruction. The intelligence was wrong. Our intel was better, international inspectors came closer to the truth than they did. And eventually there were no weapons. So it was a whole war and tragedy and horror that followed upon this military use. And then came Lebanon affair – well, again, showing the limitations of the use of the military. And I think that this – Kissinger and others have said that, well, this leads us into tremendous dangers and tremendous bloodshed and that we have to try diplomacy again.

Now, I'd like to add to that that I don't want to dramatize the unraveling of the NPT. These very popular papers come to call that this is falling apart, etc. Yes, there are strains in the NPT, but let's also face it, it's been a very successful treaty. We've got the Ukraine, we've got Belorussia, we got Kazakhstan, and South Africa walked back. These are tremendous successes. And Henry mentioned some countries like Turkey and South Korea and Japan, etc., who had joined. There has been tremendous success.

The failures have been – two of them were remedied. One was Iraq. The other one that was remedied was Libya. And the U.S. (inaudible) with two that are not yet settled but are subject to international negotiations now – Iran and North Korea. But this is an ad-hoc-ery. This is going in with various economic means and pressures, etc., and diplomatic negotiation.

And I think that the situation is crying for, as Jayantha says, a rule of law, norms again, looking back to the NPT, say this was after all something that was successful and that we need to come back to. The contempt. It was not just disdain. It was contempt for international law, contempt for treaties. Contempt for international institutions that we have seen in the last two years. That this has not helped us very much and that we had better get back to that.

I think that was what's partly behind it and I, of course, applaud – like many others, I applauded it. I think Kofi Annan used to say that diplomacy may need to be backed up by strength. And that is true. But we have had over the last period a

very tremendous reliance, over-reliance on the military, and that we need to get back to an organized system.

There is one final consideration that I would like to mention to you. Perhaps I said something about it in the morning. It's that I don't quite see why, after the détente and after the end of the Cold War, we should need such an enormous amount of military equipment. Last year was \$1200 billion spent on military expenses. About half of it is the United States. And Mr. Cheney is chiding the Chinese for not – for rearming too much. Well, everybody is. And certainly the United States is still paying an awful lot of money. And what are they fighting about? In the past centuries we always used to fight about territory or about borders or about church, about faith, about ideology. But we are not now. And isn't there some absurdity about thinking that we might have nuclear war about exchange rates or (inaudible) or immigration. Or – Taiwan is a substantial issue, a dangerous one, I would recognize. But apart from that I don't really see the big one. There's civil wars. Wars in the Middle East, in Africa, etc. But apart from that, this is a fight about who can have what weapons. In the past it used to be you were free to build any number of aircraft carriers you liked, but there was something you saw as a source of conflict. I don't quite see the big sources of conflict today.

NOLAN: Thank you very much.

DHANAPALA: Well, the question addressed to me was regarded – was already addressed by Michael Krepon in the morning when he talked about the U.S. army in his view having no confidence in the utilitarian value of nuclear weapons as a war-fighting weapon because they had already acquired control of conventional weapons, and certainly with the application of ICT and the revolution in military affairs, there was a greater potential to achieve the political ends of warfighting through conventional weapons than with nuclear weapons, considering the huge destructive nature of weapons of mass destruction. And that is precisely why the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission talked about nuclear, biological, and chemical arms being the most inhumane of all weapons, and weapons of terror as such. And consequently, since we have already got a biological weapons convention and a chemical weapons convention – neither of which have disinvested biological weapons or chemical weapons, but have delegitimized them.

And so what is being proposed by a number of countries is that we should delegitimize nuclear weapons through a nuclear weapons convention. And that would not leave Turkey and other countries without their nuclear umbrella because *nobody* in fact would have nuclear weapons, because there would be a very stringent verification system. And these verification systems have already been outlined by a number of organizations, including the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, and earlier the Canberra Commission. It's doable and we can do something like what the chemical weapons convention has. So I think that the devaluation of nuclear weapons as a tool in warfare has certainly got to be done as soon as possible.

To go back to the question you asked Hans Blix, the article by George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn does not, of course, rule out the utility value of nuclear weapons for all time. They do justify its presence during the Cold War period as a means of deterrence. But they say that at the end of the Cold War, this doctrine is obsolete and its continuation with many states makes it increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective. And today of course with the real problem of global terrorism and non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons, I think it's all the more reason why we should devalue its importance.

NOLAN: Thank you. Henry.

SOKOLSKI: Well, I think the other speakers have answered in part or in whole the question you raised. I don't think, after the experience Israel had in Lebanon, or the experience the U.S. is having in Iraq, the idea of picking a fight with a conventional ICBM looks very interesting. Unless there really is a specific thing that needs to be hit. And my hunch is that a country might be upset about this and surely angry. The question is, would the United States start a conventional war with this leverage thinking it was going to be a cakewalk? I don't think that's going to be in the culture for quite a while. Maybe we'll return to that attitude, but it's going to take several decades, at least.

So if as a result of pushing military science you can really get significant reductions in one's reliance on nuclear weapons, I would favor it. And I think actually you'll find that most of the key reductions – and here you can track from Albert Wohlstetter's work on Ford – most of the key nuclear reductions that we've experienced with the Soviets, and then the Russians, were a result of this military science. So it's not an either/or. I think it's a both.

One last comment, if I can take some liberty here. I would not be as sanguine about how healthy the NPT is. I really think it's a little bit too self-congratulatory to be thinking that we're on a great vector here. I think we're in trouble. I think we're in trouble because, as we heard from our Iranian friend today, compliance really is a non-issue now. The idea that we can technically keep track of materials through IAEA safeguards, with regard to nuclear fuel-making in particular, I think is something at least Mr. ElBaradei is candid about. He says you can't do it. And if that's the case, I think we need to take stock. We've got a problem. And it has to do with Article IV as much as Article VI. And we are not focusing on it very well.

NOLAN: Well, with that remark I think there might be quite a lot of questions and comments. I just thought I'd clarify quickly for Henry, the context is, as predicted back in 1990, I think Bill Perry writing about the conventional capabilities of the United States, what the Soviets used to call the "reconnaissance-strike complex" – if the United States did not conduct itself in a way that was seen widely to be judicious and serving in a broad interest, and serving in a way that was perceived to

be widely legitimate, that the likelihood of small states who could not match the U.S. militarily, seeking unconventional countermeasures was very likely. And that that was the key danger that we should be wary of.

SOKOLKI: Can't agree more, but I don't know that that takes us out of the game. The idea that we should simply go Hamlet wouldn't make sense.

NOLAN: No, no, no. OK. Let's (inaudible). The floor is open.

GRANOFF: I was impressed by Ambassador Dhanapala's opening up with and talking about the global threat of climate change. And I want to put that in the context of a two-tiered world. And it appears to me that the common security premises of the UN system, which are largely embodied in the norm-setting of the arms control non-proliferation regime of the NPT – if that corrodes, if those principals of norms corrode and we accept a two-tiered security world of haves and have-nots for security, it appears unlikely to me that countries will forsake short-term economic opportunity for long-term environmental responsibility. And thus the universal cooperation that will be needed to address global warming will not be forthcoming.

So I see the issue of common security trumping national security as an ongoing imperative as we start to look at a series of global environmental threats, not to mention the cooperation that will be needed to deal with the gross disparities of wealth on the planet. So as long as we look at nuclear weapons purely through the prism of national interest, out of context, I think our perception will be distorted. But if we look at it as a global security issue in the context of the whole set of global challenges, the answers appear far clearer.

NOLAN: Thank you. Does anyone want to comment? That's a good statement. Yes, here. There's a question right there.

HASHMI: Thank you. My name is Khalil Hashmi, I'm from the Pakistan Mission to the UN. Just a quick word on the theme or the topic of discussion today. We were very gratified and satisfied ourselves as a delegation that the Century Foundation has chosen to address an issue which is very important and topical. Our delegation has been, in the last two years, at the highest level has been proposing that the time has come to evolve a new consensus.

Having said that, I just noticed that the two questions which remain unaddressed – one of them was in fact related to the earlier panel. And I was curious if somebody from this panel could address that. And that was – in the context of the states which are outside the NPT, how far and how do you think that their remaining outside would contribute to the strengthening or the weakening of the NPT regime?

And the second was about the model of a chemical weapons convention serving as an effective nonproliferation model in terms of the nuclear weapons.

And finally, I think this is a good beginning in the sense that people have started talking about rebuilding or evolving a new consensus. But as we move along, how do you envisage where and exactly how the elements of such consensus would be evolved? I mean, you have to have a framework. That is one thing to be discussing about these things. But at the end of the day, you would need a framework or a platform where to put in these elements into a framework and evolving (inaudible). Thank you.

NOLAN: Thank you. Do you want to respond to him?

BLIX: All right I can respond to Jonathan's question first. I agree with him very much. That one has to look at the common security – and it's not only on the weaponry side, it's also on the climate side, it's also on the development and health and so forth. The world is – it's not we have become any, human beings have become any nicer or any wiser over the years. I don't think that's the case. But there is a big change, and that is that we have come much closer to each other. The proximity is much greater. There is – everybody will recognize that we cannot fight SARS or avian flu or any of these things, except through international cooperation. And that is whether you like the countries or you don't like the countries. You have to involve everybody in a global cooperation. And the same applies to a lot of other areas, in distribution of wavelength, or what have you.

Those who do not want to accept international organization and a global system of norms, they will have to be dragged into the 21st century, screaming and kicking, as Adlai Stevenson said once. This is inevitable. And that also applies, I think, to the question of armaments. That we have to look together at this. And as I raised, and you may think that I am blue-eyed, Blix says he doesn't see any great dangers today, why do you need \$1200 billion a year for this? Well, we need to look at that together. And I think it's crying for solidarity for everybody coming in. And that the beginnings are evident. Where we should start is just to pick and choose.

And for my part and for the commission that I work for, we felt that the CTBT is the evident one. In the morning I heard, it was Mr. Krepon who said he thought one could have a non-first use. Non-first testing. Well, isn't that what we have now, a moratorium, actually? And a moratorium is not sufficiently reliable, so we would like to go one step further.

(inaudible), we had the question now about the states outside the NPT, and the model of the CWC. Well, the model of the CWC is the beauty that everybody's there. They all committed themselves. But of course it will be a lot of time before we get to a similar convention on the nuclear. We realize that. The commission, we advocate some convention, but we are not having illusions that it's coming overnight. But there are so many things can be done overnight if there were to be the political will to do so.

And as to these states that are outside the NPT, Pakistan, Israel, and India, well, they did not commit any breach of the NPT. They never joined it. The NPT invited all nuclear weapons states, non-nuclear weapons states who wanted to join. They did not. Don't do it, they said. They developed nuclear weapons. And the background was security. India looked at China, Pakistan looked at India, and Israel looked at all the Arab states. It was security that was behind it. They have not breached the NPT. But the result is nevertheless lamentable. It's an increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. And as we look for possibility to get out of these situations, well, then I think that one has to ask all those who have nuclear weapons – and that's not just the five, it's the others. And I think we've heard the answer from India for a long time that they are willing to go ahead with disarmament, joining the others if they take the lead. And the ones who are biggest in the stockpiles, the U.S. and Russia, should take the lead. And we heard recently, I think Sonia Gandhi said that India stays with this, that yes, they are also willing to come back to disarmament, but they will look to some to start. So I think (inaudible) three years they need to be back into this fold. But we need to look at the leading ones, the big ones first.

SOKOLSKI: Janne?

NOLAN: Yes?

SOKOLSKI: I have a different take on it. India, Pakistan, have declared, have tested. I think at a minimum, before we wait on the United States to give up all of its nuclear weapons, it would be probably a great thing if those countries at least followed the nuclear restraint principles that the nuclear weapons states – with the possible exception of China, because it hasn't publicly declared it – have done. That is, at least they've declared a moratorium on testing. And number two, they've said that they will not and do not make fissile for military purposes.

I would go further. If we can find any country-neutral ideas where Pakistan and India can do something along with the nuclear weapons states – maybe it's a commitment not to re-deploy outside of their borders in peacetime – that would bind not only them, but the United States and others, fine. Let's work on that.

I think the worry with the Indian deal, and it's been voiced before today, is that basically we've opened our arms to the new reality of them having weapons without asking for very much. And now Pakistan finds itself in the situation of trying to make lemonade out of this. I've heard the Pakistani officials go 180 degrees, saying, OK, it's not that bad. Now give us the same treatment. Same with Israel.

I think when that happens – and I think Mr. Potter has raised this – it's the beginning of more of the end. Now, I don't know whether the sky falls, but it's no way strengthening any country-neutral norms. It's making it very difficult. That's the reason why I would hope that Pakistan would at least diplomatically torment

the Indians by offering to do something at least for six months just to see how it plays out. Why not have some fun at it, OK? Your job is to try to keep them in balance, right? And vice-versa. I think China also is the missing ingredient here as well.

So I would actually not just beat on the United States and Russia. It's OK to beat on them. But I would find some other new folks to beat on as well. And I think we've gotten a little intellectually exhausted by just focusing on those two. To be honest, I think the Indians actually have said that they would very much be interested in something that did pertain, if it included China and Pakistan. And something tells me the Pakistanis and Chinese have the capacity to talk to one another about this. So I would be more playful.

NOLAN: Thank you. More questions?

DHANAPALA: If I may.

NOLAN: Oh, I'm sorry (inaudible).

DHANAPALA: When the U.S. and Russia have about 20,000 nuclear warheads between them out of the 27,000 that are in the world, I think we have to start with them. And it's not, I think –

SOKOLSKI: All right, here we go.

DHANAPALA: – reasonable to go to other countries with smaller weapons systems. I think in any case it tends to be a universal system. To go back to the CWC, if I may – it is unfortunately not as universal as it should be because there are some holdout states who are unfortunately using Israel's nuclear weapon possession as a reason why they are not coming on to joining the CWC. I wish it was universal. But there is something very important in the way it was negotiated, in the way in which the chemical industry was brought in as a stakeholder. I think that's a very good example of how a treaty-making should be, and how various countries have then adopted in their own national legislatures. And finally of course the challenge inspection provision, which I think is – although it has not been exercised, it is there in the statute books, and it is possible to activate it if and when necessary. And that gives countries the confidence that chemical weapons, the ban is a credible ban.

How does one achieve the consensus towards having a nuclear weapon convention? Well, some of the parties that were mentioned by Henry, the CTBT, and its entry into force through the ratifications that are required under Article XIV, the Fissile Material Treaty, negative security assurances – all that could be a prelude to the actual negotiation of a nuclear weapon convention. But I go back to the recommendation made in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, and that is for a world summit that will consider this question of weapons of mass

destruction. It's the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, their proliferation, and terrorist uses.

BLIX: Perhaps I could add to what Henry was suggesting, that Pakistan might declare, and India, too, that they would join the moratorium on testing. Perhaps you could do something even more daring. Perhaps India and Pakistan, in their newfound cooperation, could turn to the U.S. and to China and say that if you are ratifying the CTBT, we will also do it.

SOKOLSKI: Look, I don't know that the game is played well by taunting someone to do something so you don't have to do something. I mean, I really think that there's got to be a step backwards from this. It'd be wonderful to have a global ban on nuclear weapons, and to have the level of verification be no more than a chemical weapons ban inspection. It's fantastic in all respects. That will not happen tomorrow.

Similarly, I can think of a number of positions that could be taken by each country so that they can excuse themselves from doing anything. I didn't say you shouldn't put pressure on the United States. But it seems to me there's got to be some other responsible parties.

NOLAN: There's a question back there, (inaudible).

WILLIAMS: Ian Williams, editor of the *Congressional Quarterly Guide to the UN*. There's several questions. I was interested – I was going to say there are three things that haven't been mentioned, but everyone on the panel actually mentioned Israel this time. And one almost began to suspect that, despite the protestations of AIPAC and the ADL, that there might have been an Israel lobby that was frightening people into silence. But even then there's no – I haven't had any serious questions about how do you go to the Israelis and persuade them to give up a nuclear weaponry that's probably more warheads than the British and possibly the French at the moment.

And everyone's been skirting round the issue and assuming, well, if the Americans allow it, no one else is going to do anything. And of course this is the excuse that everybody else in the world is using, that the weapons state was built up with – initially French – I don't know if our colleagues here – support, and eventually American support. And the reason that they don't mention it is of course because the U.S. isn't supposed to be giving them aid, as far as I remember, under U.S. domestic legislation, if they have nuclear weapons.

But there's a following – another issue that no one seems to have mentioned, and I would like you to comment on the efficacy of the International Court of Justice ruling on nuclear weapons. Because I don't think – I didn't hear it mentioned at all. The court came down with a ruling that the use of nuclear weapons was illegal except in the case of existential threat to a state. I mean, I would have thought this

was fairly convincing legally, but nobody seems to have mentioned it. Is it because we all share Washington's contempt for contemporary international law?

SOKOLSKI: No. It's because they didn't have you on the panel. Then you'd be able to

–

(laughter)

WILLIAMS: But the final one, if I can pile them up before you (inaudible) –

SOKOLSKI: Well, wait a minute, can we answer that one question?

WILLIAMS: No, because (inaudible)

SOKOLSKI: And you can get the second question.

NOLAN: Let him finish.

SOKOLSKI: Oh, he has another one. All right.

WILLIAMS: I'm the heckler here.

(laughter)

WILLIAMS: There's an anomaly here, which was briefly mentioned. And I actually interviewed the Taiwanese ambassador on television just before Christmas. And I sort of half-playfully said, well, Taiwan is under threat, existential threat from China, with 900-plus missiles pointing towards it. Taiwan either doesn't exist, so it's not part of the NPT, or it's part of China, in which case it's covered by the NPT and it's allowed to have nuclear weapons. How would you reconcile this? Of course he disavowed it, but I must say I was a bit worried by the way the Taiwanese press corps ran out saying what a good idea, (inaudible) start something.

But it does strike me that you have a genuine source of tension, you have a country which has an existential threat. A rich, affluent, and technologically skilled country. And I think that some attention to that as at least an outside possibility might well be considered.

SOKOLSKI: Well, do you doubt for a moment, having prevented them twice from getting nuclear weapons, the United States isn't attentive at all? Clearly they've got worries there, and you've highlighted it.

With regard to Israel, my own center put out a report about two and a half years ago suggesting – not that they admit they have nuclear weapons, because that would probably drive the Egyptians through the ceiling. The Egyptians are here. They probably wouldn't be happy about that. But it seems to me that at minimum, they

need to start pushing their comparative advantage, perhaps offering to mothball Dimona, followed by additional steps if at least two other countries – that would be Algeria and Egypt in my mind right now – followed in suit with their large reactor. And they could take progressive steps. They would need the support of Europe so that they wouldn't be undermined by hecklers, if you would. And they could lead the way.

Now, when this was suggested to the Israelis, they were very unhappy. Now they're thinking a bit more about this, I'm told. But it will take time. But I do think you're right, you've got to start in each case somewhere.

NOLAN: Jay, do you want to respond to this?

DHANAPALA: On the ICJ, the advisory opinion is quite distinct from a ruling of the ICJ. And this is the argument that is being used by some of the nuclear weapons states to disregard the ICJ and downgrade the weight of that opinion. But it is, in fact, actively used by a lot of the members of the non-aligned movement, as well as by NGOs in their campaign to abolish nuclear weapons. And also to widen the scope of interpretation of Article VI. Because I think it was very clear that the whole idea of negotiating – which is required under Article VI – is not negotiating for its own sake, but negotiating towards a conclusion. And that was a very important addition that the advisory opinion made.

Now, there were some inadequacies about the opinion. It did not rule, for example, that nuclear weapons cannot be used under any circumstances, because it begged the question as to whether in the event of national survival being at stake, could you or could you not use nuclear weapons? And there have been suggestions by some member states that we should renew the call to the ICJ to revisit this advisory opinion. But I think wiser counsel has prevailed because the composition of the court has changed.

(laughter)

DHANAPALA: Certainly Justice Weeramantry from Sri Lanka is no longer there. He was one of the strongest advocates of this advisory opinion. So you might get something that is very different from what you had in the past. So I think – at the moment I think we need to look at the advisory opinion as it is and argue that any actual use or threat of use of nuclear weapons will be contrary to all the humanitarian principles of war. That was one of the issues that was very clearly stated and which received consensus in the court. And of course several other points, including the elaboration of Article VI.

BLIX: (inaudible) add on the ICJ. Being an international lawyer, it would be far from me to underestimate the value. It was an advisory opinion. And the court relied upon the conventional and customary international law, such as it is. And in particular, rules against indiscriminate warfare. And I think they did a very good job in

describing how narrow a field they could see for a legal use of the weapons. But it was more of a moral judgment that was given than a judgment that was binding. And I think Jayantha was absolutely right in pointing to a very important part of it, namely that the obligation under Article VI of the NPT negotiation was not just for the sake of negotiations but to reach results. And that I think really tackles what the nuclear weapons states, where they had been in these years. They had not been all that intent on results.

But I want to say something about Israel as well, and that was that the – you often hear from the Arab side that the first thing is that Israel should join the NPT and thereafter one might try to get to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. I think that's totally unrealistic. The NPT is something that is much – the zone free of weapons of mass destruction is much broader and might have a greater chance of satisfying the Israelis than just signing on the dotted line on the NPT today. I think that's a pretty hopeless proposition to come with.

There are other constructive things that have been discussed, such as getting Israel into NATO, because we know that at the basis of all nuclear weapons possession is defeating the perception of security. And if they were a part of NATO, well then there would be a strong security guarantee on their part. I think that's a constructive idea. How realistic it is, I can't say.

But in our report we had another idea, which also may not be a realistic one, and that is to say that, look here, we have Iran now, and everybody is singling them out and say that you must stop enrichment. And Israel above all is scared about what could happen in the future if the Iranians were to get a weapon. So they have a great stake in this. Now, what about saying that perhaps Israel also could contribute to a renunciation or a suspension of enrichment by Iran through some measure of their own? And we came up with the idea of a nuclear fuel cycle-free zone which, seeing that the Gulf states want to go for nuclear power – Jordan says the same thing, Egypt says the same. And will these countries, having said that they want nuclear power, will they go on to say they also want to have enrichment, all of them? And if so, maybe one should already now begin to think that maybe all these countries should, like North and South Korea, renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Which would mean that Israel would have to stop making more plutonium.

It would not affect the bombs they have, and that certainly would be the Arab objection, that look, you are leaving Israel with 200 nuclear bombs. But nevertheless when you see how things are getting very tough now, you ask yourself whether this would not be better. They would keep, at least for the time being, what they regard as a life insurance. But nevertheless, preventing a building of more enrichment plants in an area, in a region that is sensitive. I'm not talking about the world at large, because I do not share all the views here that we should stifle and stop the fuel cycle activities. But in that region, where the confidence is so thin, maybe it would be, could be, a useful idea.

NOLAN: Thank you. We just have a few more minutes. We have a question here. Go ahead.

M: Well, it's really a comment. I was finding very intriguing your comment, Henry, about you don't need to look for others doing it, you should start yourself. And I agree with you, but I think that there is a general sense of unfairness that we should address. The last part of this debate has been really dealing with this kind of unfairness.

The example of Israel is not only that they have nuclear weapons, but they are not part of any arms control agreement. They are not part of the chemical weapons. They are not part of biological weapons. They don't – they did not sign a regional protocol. And they did not ratify the CTBT. All of this. And they have no pressure whatsoever to make any step forward in that direction. Egypt did not sign the additional protocol. Again, there is no pressure on them. And they are starting – so I think that there a degree at which pressure is calibrated according to how it is perceived, the antagonist who was the United States, and generally the West.

So in this sense I think that one has to address this sense of unbalance and unfairness. And I think that if something is to be done in this area, I think it is that a uniform pressure of certain things should be done. On every country. It's really impossible that the European Union, to make an example, has a nonproliferation policy which forbids certain kind of commercial (inaudible) countries that have a very bad record in terms of proliferation – namely have not signed a specific treaty. And they waive all these kind of constraints in the case of Israel, for instance. And there again is very much differentiated policy.

I think the Pakistan and India is again another case. (inaudible) that has been mentioned here is very different from (inaudible) Pakistan. And again, scaling down North Korea. So my suggestion is that really if we consider all of these things together, and there is a sort of code of conduct in terms of what kind of agreement (inaudible) should be signed, we leave this uncertain (inaudible) outside the NPT now, but there is lots that can be done outside by requiring the membership of the NPT. And why this is not done?

SOKOLSKI: And actually I'm going to agree with you.

NOLAN: Henry, I –

SOKOLSKI: Oh, you need another question. OK.

NOLAN: No. We're going to give each of the panel members a minute and some to both respond to this question if you'd like to and to just give your concluding remarks. Thank you. Go ahead, Henry.

SOKOLSKI: Well, why don't I just agree with what was just said, in this sense. You want the application of the enforcement of whatever rules you have to be consistent. You don't want special cutouts. I'm with you. It's not just Israel. You know, we winked at Egypt, too. We winked at South Korea recently, too. We've winked at a lot of things. And when I say we – even Italy. So what you want is at least each one of these cases to come before the authorities for consideration. They may not choose to do things but they should always come forward. Frequently they don't even come forward, as you point out.

Second, I think you do want to use economics much, much, much more to help guide us away from things that God's invisible hand have pointed out to be dangerous and uneconomical to boot. This could help us in the case of nuclear. Because I think it's very hard to dictate how to view this whole question of rights. But it's not so difficulty to talk about a ledger sheet. We ought to get on with it. If nuclear is so beneficial, they should have nothing to worry about.

Finally, I do think, with regard to nuclear weapons, yeah, we have to reduce everybody's reliance on them. But that goes not just against the United States. I know you love meeting with me to talk about that. But also you can't see these things spread, virtually or literally. Because if they do, you're going to see a big market to increase existing stockpiles. Which would be a step backwards for everybody.

NOLAN: Thank you. Ambassador Dhanapala.

DHANAPALA: I pass.

NOLAN: Well, that's amazing.

DHANAPALA: There are two more people in the audience who would like to speak.

NOLAN: I will have to ask the indulgence of the commanders. So you've been given 30 seconds each.

SOKOLSKI: Now, they're all shy. Oh, there they are.

KIM: Hi. My name is John Kim. I'm from Fellowship of Reconciliation, an NGO organization. Thank you for all the presentation. And my question to Mr. Sokolski is why is the U.S. so reluctant to give (inaudible) security assurances to a non-nuclear weapons state when it is such a military superpower in the world, with so many weapons systems?

And the other question that I would like to ask the panel is, there is currently -- the Bush Administration maintains the first nuclear strike option as a nuclear policy. How does this affect the sustainability of nonproliferation policy in the world?

Wouldn't this encourage the other states to develop nuclear weapons? And how the UN is going to address this issue at some level? Thank you.

NOLAN: A nice simple question for the final – is there one other person who had a comment?

M: Khaled Shamaa.

SHAMAA: Thank you and I'll be very, very brief. First, with regard to what was mentioned by Dr. Blix –

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SHAMAA: – in such a policy. The preemptive use of nuclear weapons or a first use of nuclear weapons, particularly against non-nuclear weapons states, is a gross violation of the rule of proportionality, and also I think of Article 51, because what is contemplated in Article 51 is an act of self-defense when there is in fact an armed attack taking place.

We have of course seen that there have been talk about a preemptive attack, but there hasn't been a qualification of that in any real sense except in the posture reviews that have come out of the Bush White House. And there hasn't been sufficient discussion here in the United States, particularly in Congress on this issue. I would hope that other countries would not adopt such a policy.

But meanwhile in the Conference on Disarmament, the whole idea of having a negotiation on the negative security assurances is very much on the cards, and I think we need to make more progress on that.

NOLAN: You have the last word.

BLIX: Well, I'll touch a point that have been very superficially touched several times during the day, and that's the status of peaceful nuclear power. In the arms control community, if I may call it that way, I think I often find that there is more of a skeptical attitude. They don't care very much whether nuclear power will continue or not. The main thing is nonproliferation and disarmament in arms control.

I belong to the school that, like the Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace. And I think that nuclear power, peaceful nuclear power has a great role to play. Already now it provides the world with about as much electricity as does hydropower, and it does so without practically any carbon dioxide emissions, no emissions to the greenhouse. And I think there are a lot of things good that can be said for it.

The other – all energy sources have some problems. And I think that the hydrocarbons have very – not only the dangers of the greenhouse emissions, but

also the dangers of the competition about the oil resources. Most of the tense regions of the world are, it's because of the hydrocarbons. The Middle East and now the Central Asia. So a less of use of hydrocarbons, of oil and gas, coal as well, I think is an important thing.

I don't deny that nuclear, like hydro and the others, that is has its risk. But I do think that perhaps proliferation is not the biggest one. I would think that the question of security in everyday operation is the greater one. I think that the question of waste can be handled. And as I pointed out earlier today, it seems to me that those states that have gone for nuclear weapons, they have gone for security reasons. It's not that they've been tempted, as naughty children, to pass the border from the peaceful nuclear into the military.

NOLAN: Thank you very much. Please join me in thanking these distinguished panelists for this discussion.

(applause)

CIRINCIONE: Thank you. We are now in the last ten minutes of this conference. I want to thank you very much for staying for this conference. We've had 110 participant here, not counting the camera crews and some of the other media. And almost everyone is still here. So either we'll doing something right, or there's something very, very wrong in the nuclear that you are all worried about. I just want to take five minutes – not to offer any new ideas, but to sum up what I thought we've accomplished here today.

I was struck by the balance of this encounter, in several respects. I though there was – the speakers and the questions were about evenly divided between pessimists and optimists, for example. I thought there was pretty much a 50/50 split between those who were more focused on disarmament and those who were more concerned about the nonproliferation aspects of the problems we face.

I also thought it was about evenly divided over those who were focused on the U.S. and American policy and those who were focused on the policy or the actions of the rest of the world combined. Although I think most of the suggestions for action were focused on the United States. There seems to be this recognition that the U.S. is the main driver and that it's the U.S. that has to change its policies, or at least be in the lead of changing these policies. I may have that wrong. But that's how I saw the discussion.

And finally, it was bout evenly divided on those who focused on concrete steps that could be taken in the near future and those who emphasized the need for a new vision, obviously indicating that we needed to do a little bit of both.

And here's where I might just put my thumb down on the scale on the side of the optimist. Because I do think that a number of people expressed a hope for the

future, a new hope. The first *Star Wars* movie, which I was just watching with my son – it's just been released in high definition TV. And it's Chapter 4, *A New Hope*. And it takes place sort of in the middle of the *Star Wars* story, and that's how I feel about where we are in the history of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It's taken us about 60 years to get to this point and I feel we're about in the middle.

And I feel that hope. I think there is a new hope for us turning a corner. At least this is the sense of the crowd here, that we are at a pivot point. That the decisions we make over the next few years are going to make a dramatic difference. If we solve some of the problems you just heard the panelist talking about, if we work on a resolution of the Iran problem that we heard at lunch, or the North Korea problem we were discussing this morning, then that could tip the balance towards a continuation of the successes we've had on nonproliferation. Reducing the number of weapons, reducing the number of programs, reducing the number of countries with weapons or programs.

But if we fail, then it tips the other way. Then we could be looking at a new wave of proliferation. A return to that nightmare world that President John F. Kennedy saw in 1960, where they might be not four nuclear weapons states in 1960 or even the nine now, but 15, 20, 25 nuclear weapons states with all the world's unresolved political, territorial, and ethnic disputes.

I think clearly the members of this conference want to tip it towards a reduction of tension, a reduction of weapons, and – harking back to something Ambassador Dhanapala said – we're at this transition point in a number of national governments where new governments are coming in. And there's that chance to influence the policies of those new governments.

I know of at least a half dozen efforts underway here in the United States working on the next nonproliferation strategy. I'm involved in two of them. There is a sense that the next President, whoever that is, Republican or Democratic – McCain, Hegel, Clinton, Obama is going to have a very different nonproliferation policy. This administration came in with a very different nonproliferation strategy. It hasn't worked. There is a broad recognition that that has to change. This conference was put together with that recognition that that strategy is going to change, and we have had a rich menu of ideas and suggestions from the assembled crowd that will now go into informing, I know, in my own work, the Century Foundation's work, and we hope your work. We're counting down to those changes, that transition in the United States, in Russia, in the European Union, in Iran, in other countries. We want to be there with that next strategy for those new executives, for those new Congresses and Parliaments to take up.

I thank you for coming. I thank the government of Italy for giving us the opportunity to have this conference. And I thank my colleague Jeff Laurenti for

organizing this masterful event. And I want to give him just a few minutes to extend the congratulations and thank yous. Jeff.

(applause)

LAURENTI: Thank you, Joe. First of all, thanks to all of you participants. Let me repeat Joe's thanks to you. Because it is you who have carried the ball in today's daylong set of discussions. And without you this would not be the kind of what we think is a first-rate discussion to relaunch the national and international debate on where we go with nuclear weapons, with other weapons in that category of weapons of mass destruction.

Joe is going to be compiling a report, together with Carl Robichaud of the Century Foundation, who is the rapporteur for the event – Joe will be compiling a report that is future-oriented, where we go from here. And so any thoughts you may have that either occur to you after today's discussion, when you wake up in the middle of the night tonight, or sometime down the road, please be in touch with Joe and/or Carl to get those ideas so that they can be reflected in that report.

As Joe has just done, I too, Filippo, want to extend to you and your colleagues in the Foreign Ministry the thanks of the Century Foundation and of our collaborators at the Center for American progress for the Ministry's idea for this event and for thinking to come to us as possible organizers of it.

And finally I ask your joining me in expressing appreciation, not only to the panelists of our last session, distinguished as they have been, but those who have helped provoke and inform our discussion at each session throughout the day.

(applause)

LAURENTI: And finally, I would ask you also to join me in expressing appreciation to the people who have organized this conference, doing all that work from the day the proposal was first made to us to 5:00 PM – a little bit before 5:00 – you're getting out early today – on the Century Foundation staff, Carl Robichaud, Emerson Sykes, and Alex Kendall.

(applause)

LAURENTI: On the Center for American Progress staff, Andy Grotto, Victoria Palomo-Suarez, and Paige Fitzgerald. And then my other colleagues at Century who have become involved in this in bringing it to fruition: Christy Hicks, Lori Ahlrich, Aisha Ali, Michael Auerbach, and Cynthia Merricks (sp?). Thank you all for having made this a great event. Thank you and we look forward to seeing you again very soon.

END OF DISK

