

WEAPONS THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: REBUILDING AN UNRAVELED CONSENSUS

LOOKING TO 2020: PROLIFERATING THREATS, STATIC REGIMES?

CIRINCIONE: ... at The Century Foundation to produce and host this conference. I also want to thank the over 20 nonproliferation experts who met with us down in Washington in December at the Center for American Progress and helped us formulate the concept for this conference and the questions that should be asked. We will be writing up a full report on the proceedings, which we will of course distribute to all of you and make available through the good offices of both The Century Foundation and the Center for American Progress.

We are now going to have the first of the substantive panels on this, and we're going to do this a little differently from the first panel. We're going to have a short introduction of the main points by each of the panelists up here, and then I'm going to facilitate a dialogue, more of a discussion up here, that we will then enlarge to involve all of you. We very much want this conference to be a participatory conference. It's not just about asking questions of the people up here. It's about sharing your knowledge, sharing your views. Every one of you in this audience is an expert that could be up on the panel in slightly different circumstances. So we very much want this to be a discussion, and we'll try to set that example in the very first panel.

I'm very pleased to be joined by three world-recognized experts on this subject. Michael Krepon and I have been friends for over 25 years, when we first met back in the mid-'80s at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I went on to become a staffer on Capitol Hill and he went on to found the Henry L. Stimson Center and serve as its president. He is still at the Stimson Center and spends most of his work these days working on issues of South Asia, nuclear arms, and space security.

Also, my friend Paolo Cotta-Ramusino is the secretary-general of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. As many of you know, the Pugwash Conference brings together from around the world influential scholars and public figures concerned with the very issues we're discussing here at the conference. Paolo is a theoretical physicist, for many years worked as a mathematical physicist in Italy. He's written extensively about global politics, strategies of missile defense, the causes of war, and nuclear stability.

And finally, Sergey Batsanov at the very last minute had some visa troubles and could not get to the United States. We found out about this just on Saturday. We very much regret not having his expertise here. And I'm very grateful that Chris Chyba has jumped into the breach at the very last minute. I asked him, I think, an

hour ago whether he would do this, and that's a sign of the kind of person he is that he readily agreed. And also, I promised to hold up a copy of his new book.

(laughter)

CHYBA: I did not request that.

CIRINCIONE: He didn't. He didn't. I insisted. Chris Chyba is a professor of astrophysical science and international affairs at Princeton University – I'd like a title like that – where he directs the program on science and global security at the Woodrow Wilson School. He was a member of the White House [staff] from 1993 to 1995, and of course many of you know him from his previous assignment at CISAC at the University of Stanford.

His new book is called *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today's Treats*. It's just out. His co-editor on this is Ambassador George Bunn, who many of you know is also at Stanford University and was one of the original negotiators of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

So let's get started. Gentlemen, I pose a question to each of you. Michael, I'd like you to start, followed by Paolo and then Chris. And the question is, how bad is it? How bad is the crisis in the nonproliferation regime, and what specific steps can we do to restore the nonproliferation regime? How bad is it and what can we do about it? Michael.

KREPON: It's been worse. It's been a lot worse, and we bounced back, and we can bounce back again. The proliferation problem was looking terrible in 1945. And the nuclear danger issues were looking terrible in 1949 when the H-bomb joined the A-bomb and we were clearly headed to a terrible arms race with a sworn ideological foe. It was a whole lot worse in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. And post-dating the nonproliferation treaty system, it was a whole lot worse, I think, in 1983 when both the United States and the Soviet Union put a premium on new quick-strike weapons, when talks had broken down, and when Soviet intelligence agents were wandering around the State Department and certain hospitals in Washington DC seeing if the lights were on late at night and the United States was stocking up on blood for a potential first strike. So we've seen worse than this.

The nuclear danger of the past was more intense, but it's more complicated now, and we all know why it's more complicated now. I think the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system has made things harder to fix. It's easier to stop proliferation when you have two superpowers working hand-in-hand to prevent new cases. It's a lot harder when there's just one superpower, a lot harder when there's nuclear terrorism, when the problem extends beyond and within states. So we all understand that the problem has changed. It's a whole lot more complex.

I don't think we're going to rebound until we take stock, honest stock, about our conceptualization of the problem. We need to reconceptualize. I think we need new strategies, and I think we need new tactics. And I think we can do all of this. Let me give you an example before I get to proposed remedies. Joe, how much time – what's the clock?

CIRINCIONE: You're doing good.

KREPON: Arms control. This is a 1960s term. This was a term that came into being as an alternative to disarmament, because disarmament was going nowhere. Arms control was the response to arms racing, and arms control and arms racing are distinct Cold War phenomena. Do they still apply?

We still talk about an arms race in space. The Chinese have just proven beyond a reasonable doubt that all it takes is a couple of crude weapons to mess up space. You don't need an arms race in space to mess up space, and it's not going to happen, because we now live in a world of asymmetric warfare, not in a world of arms racing. Nations do not need to arms race in order to serve their national security interests. They just need to be smart about asymmetric warfare.

But yet – and I think Congressman Leach is somebody we've got to listen to very carefully. I wish he was still in the Congress. But I think we can get caught up in language that no longer serves us. We do have enduring principles and enduring ideals, but no enterprise can succeed without reconceptualization. We need to reconceptualize in order to get on top of this problem. I think we can. We need new strategies. I think we can do this. I think we need new tactics. I think we can do that, too.

CIRINCIONE: Give me a couple of them.

KREPON: One thing, while we are awaiting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's entry into force, I would propose that the international community insist that all countries that have nuclear weapons now adhere to a no-first-test pledge. No-first-test. We've gone eight years between tests. That's the longest period between tests in the history of the nuclear age. We need to go a whole lot more than eight years between tests.

Number two. I think we need to expand the mandate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. I know the CTBTO now works on the side, just to prove its utility, on tsunami prediction and civil disaster warnings and indication. I think that's wonderful. But why do we have a narrow organization focused on the CTBTO? Why don't we have a much larger mission for this organization that relates to global concerns that are prompted by seismographic disturbances? We can do that. Why should we have a narrow, pigeonholed organization that's easy to beat up on from certain circles?

Number three. Proliferation, then as now and in the future, is driven by insecurity. Many nations are going to feel insecure if space weapons are tested, if space becomes weaponized. Now, we're never going to agree. None of us in this room are going to agree on what constitutes a space weapon, because a marble can constitute a space weapon. A marble can be a hell of a space weapon when it's traveling at ten times the speed of a rifle bullet in low Earth orbit. So if we want to continue as in the past in trying to define a space weapon and get a treaty to prevent an arms race in space when an arms race in space is not the problem, a marble in space is the problem, that is directed against a satellite, that saves lives and is indispensable.

Why go there? Why don't we have a code of conduct for responsible space-faring nations that provides do's and don'ts? Creating persistent – deliberately creating persistent debris in space is clearly a don't, because it threatens vital satellites of the entire international community, and it takes decades to make its way out of low Earth orbit. And if you put persistent deliberate debris in geosynchronous orbit, then you're talking millennia.

So there are three ideas.

CIRINCIONE: Let me hold you to those three. Keep some more in your pocket. Leave them wanting more. We'll stop with those three. Paolo, how bad is it? What can we do about it?

COTTA-RAMUSINO: Well, let's see. Let's assume that instead of being in 2007, we are here in 1949, '48, what the conference would look like. We would certainly be worried about the future, the nuclear future. We were thinking that we need, as many people felt at that time, an international organization that would control all nuclear weapons. Otherwise, in the future, everybody will get his own small number of devices, and war will be inevitably nuclear war and we'll be all destroyed.

That's what was the thinking of 1949. Nothing of that happened, which in fact is just confirming what Yogi Berra says, that prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.

(laughter)

M: Did he just quote Yogi Berra?

COTTA-RAMUSINO: Forget about Yogi Berra.

M: Was he Italian?

COTTA-RAMUSINO: Berra was Italian? He was.

M: He was Italian American.

COTTA-RAMUSINO: But let's understand now what were positive elements that did not allow us to go over the brink, and I essentially can point out two.

First of all, all the leaderships of the nuclear power states behaved as rational decision makers. That's not guaranteed. Possession of nuclear weapons doesn't give you the wisdom of being all the time a rational decision maker, but it happened.

And the second point, which is complementary to that, is the number of nuclear weapons and states has been limited, very low, and this is the Nonproliferation Treaty, essentially. So we gain time. We gain lots of time. But maybe we're not gaining an infinite amount of time. Will not always be smooth in the future.

But let's look at the NPT. Before throwing out the NPT, before substituting the NPT, before thinking that the NPT is in crisis and should be replaced by something else, let's look a little bit closer at what the NPT is. First of all, it's not an agreement between friends. It's an agreement between countries that are potentially antagonistic. The U.S. and Russia, USSR, were antagonistic. Imperialistic country, Evil Empire, the other one, but still, they agreed, and the NPT system worked. There were plus and minus, risk, difficulties, but altogether the NPT survived.

And the main success, I think, of the NPT system, if you want, came at the beginning of the '90s. Disarmament was going forward, nonproliferation was enforced, no new nuclear weapons. There was a sense that, in fact, there were no concerns about improper use of nuclear energy, so you could see that there was a sense of positive direction, positive growth in the area of security, international security.

Then things changed. After the middle of the '90s, you had the situation where new countries became nuclear, India, Pakistan, and then North Korea made the test more recently, and so on. Disarmament stopped all of a sudden.

Remember, NPT has three legs, nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and assistance for nuclear energy development. The disarmament leg has been cut off abruptly. No more. What was done at the beginning of the '90s, that was it.

Now, we are in a sense witnessing the consequence of the dreadful mistakes that were made in that period, and there is now the conceptualization, a different conceptualization. "No, we don't want really to stick to NPT. We have a different framework." The different framework is more unilateral, more one-sided. Disarmament – point one. "Disarmament is not really relevant for maintaining nonproliferation. There is no direct correlation between disarmament and lack of disarmament and proliferation." Obviously, there is not a direct correlation in the

sense that one follows immediately after the other one. But there is a climate in which, if you don't disarm, then you still keep the nuclear weapons important in the mind of people in countries, then you will sooner or later expect nuclear proliferation.

Second point. Nonproliferation is enforced by means including repression and war by some more powerful countries (inaudible) other ones.

And third point is that, after all, there are good and bad proliferators. There is the – India – Israel is very good proliferator, of course. No question about it. It doesn't even say that they are proliferators, so they're perfect. India was bad at the beginning, but then it became a more likely companion. Pakistan, well, there are questions about, but still, it's – North Korea is the worst. But you see, after all, proliferation is rewarded one way or the other one. So in this international club, you can justify, you can analyze every single step, but the international climate is that proliferation, in fact, at the end is rewarded.

And who is not rewarded? People that maybe want to be proliferators but don't succeed. Look at Iraq. The war in Iraq has many, many faces. I don't want to discuss the war in Iraq at all. But there is one important consequence for the nonproliferation regime. It is that the war in Iraq made a mockery of the desire to stop proliferation, since there was no proliferation there. A war has been launched after that, and the result is what? A mess. So I think that in the imagination of the global environment, the global community, international community, the war against proliferation became a partisan war, a war to impose something which is totally different, not a value of its own.

CIRINCIONE: So give me some suggestions, some steps that we might take now to repair this damage.

COTTA-RAMUSINO: The concrete suggestion are if you want to go back to the NPT. The NPT has three legs, and they should be respected. So, first, the one, the leg of disarmament. We have to talk about disarmament. Disarmament means what are you going to do, what you are going to do – “you” meaning American, Russian – with the strategic weapons after 2012? What is the future of SORT? What after that? Is disarmament meaning that you want to keep 2000 strategic nuclear weapons each? First.

Second point. What are we doing with tactical nuclear weapons? There are lots of tactical nuclear weapons, some of them retired, some of them in place. This is something which we are not going to talk. There are orders. CTBT has been mentioned. FMCT. CTBT is a fundamental point if you want to address other countries including India, Pakistan, and so on. You want to get them on board, and in fact, go back to a situation where you don't praise development of new nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapon-free zones. That's something which has not been mentioned. Nuclear weapon-free zones are not necessarily facilitated by the nuclear powers. Look what happened in Central Asia. People are reluctant in pushing in that direction. So we have lots of ideas where disarmament can really be put back at the center stage. You can have de-alerting and so on.

Another question. Deployment of nuclear weapons on other countries' soil. This is something that should be forbidden. It's now only practiced by the Americans, and I'm sorry to say, Italy. The only really serious disarmament initiative they could take for the elimination of nuclear weapons was to give up the possession of American nuclear weapons on their soil. Left or Right, no government did that.

But anyway, things should be pushed in that direction (inaudible).

CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much. Let's leave it at those five suggestions and follow onto the SORT Treaty, reduction of tactical, nuclear weapons-free zone, de-alerting, and withdrawing all tactical weapons back to the country of origin. Thank you. And keep some more for the discussion. Chris Chyba, thank you for your thoughts, please.

CHYBA: Thank you. We do not want to create a perception that it's already too late for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and I'm concerned that there could be a kind of unintentional alliance between those who disagree with the fundamental bargain of the NPT and don't wish certain countries to be constrained by it, and who therefore emphasize its failures, and those who are strong advocates of the NPT, but emphasize its failures as a means of pointing out how near we are to the abyss of the collapse of the NPT.

I hear from my students at Princeton a kind of given that the NPT has failed and that we need something to replace it. In my view, we want to go down kicking and screaming with respect to trying to preserve the NPT. I think it's very much in every country's interests.

My comments today are going to be directed at the United States. The approach I would take with respect to the U.S. is to emphasize that the U.S. needs a nuclear weapons policy that provides a comprehensive approach to managing nuclear risk. What's difficult is that there are many risks, and to some extent these risks trade off against one another. Those tradeoffs have to be faced and thought through.

Those risks obviously include dangers left over from the Cold War, including the existing nuclear arsenals of the P5, nuclear powers outside the NPT regime, further nuclear proliferation, the evolution and spread of technology relevant to nuclear weapons, nuclear theft and smuggling, and finally, the way that these factors interact and relate to the threat of nuclear terrorism. All of these risks have to be addressed in an interrelated way by a comprehensive U.S. nuclear weapons policy.

Now, there's a longstanding set of policy tools to address these risks, but the balance among those tools needs to be different in the coming decades than it was during the Cold War, or, for that matter, during the past six years. In particular, we need to rethink the interactions and changing balance among strategies of dissuasion, deterrence, defense, preemptive attack, preventive war, and the nonproliferation regime.

Having emphasized those changes, one thing, nevertheless, has not changed, and that is that we still inhabit a world of nuclear offensive dominance. That is, it remains the case that those possessing nuclear weapons are disturbingly likely to be able to deliver them to their intended targets.

So what's to be done? Well, of course, some things are easy to say. Of course the United States should continue to strengthen as a high priority the security of nuclear weapons and materials worldwide. And the U.S. and other members of the nonproliferation regime should continue to take steps to tighten supply-side measures of the regime. We've already heard about a number of those this morning, the additional protocols, Resolution 1540, and so on. But we also need to recognize that in the long run, nonproliferation success depends on the demand-side drivers for nuclear weapons. And in that sense, the supply-side steps provide time during which demand-side pressures for nuclear weapons can be addressed. We need to use that time.

We also need to consider how United States actions influence the demand for nuclear weapons. And to that end, the U.S. should work to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in foreign affairs. To achieve that, the United States should, at a minimum, show discipline, first, show discipline in its discussions of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. With such big sticks as U.S. conventional dominance and the implicit threat within nuclear deterrence, the U.S. can afford to speak more softly publicly with respect to potential nuclear use, or in its policy documents.

Second, the U.S. should affirm that the core mission of nuclear weapons remains deterrence.

Third, the U.S. should reaffirm central past nonproliferation commitments, in particular, to be quite specific, the Reliable Replacement Warhead must not be allowed to lead to new nuclear testing for the purpose of verifying the reliability of a new warhead design. And the U.S. should reaffirm its commitment to the CTBT as a long-term goal. Similarly, an FM – a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty -- should be pursued.

Fourth, the U.S. and Russia should continue to work to reduce the chances of mistaken launch.

And fifth, the U.S. should work to decrease the number of nuclear weapons held by all nuclear weapons states, starting, of course, with the U.S. and Russia.

One could spend some time contrasting these points of view with the views of the current administration. I can leave that to discussion. Thank you.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much. I want to ask a few follow-up questions, but I also want to just take a minute. I've been doing a lot of research over the last couple of years for a new book that I just published, and one of the things I uncovered was that the very first National Intelligence Estimate done by the United States on proliferation was during the Eisenhower Administration, and it was very clear to the intelligence services there that there was a direct link between disarmament and nonproliferation. And they spelled it out for us, and they said that there were about at that time some 14 countries that they thought could make nuclear weapons and were considering whether to do so. And these were not rogue states. These were our allies, West Germany, Japan, or others such as Switzerland – Sweden had programs underway.

And they said that those countries' decisions on whether to proceed with nuclear weapons would be heavily impacted by what they thought were the intentions of those countries that already had nuclear weapons. And if we were going to a world where there was a comprehensive test ban regime, which was under discussion in those days, and reductions in nuclear arsenals, then it was highly likely those countries would not proceed with programs. But if it was going the other way, if it was seen that there was a nuclear arms race underway, then those countries likely would feel compelled to join that arms race, or at least to hedge their nuclear bets. And NIEs done in the 1960s reaffirmed that. We no longer seem to ask that question in our National Intelligence Estimates, but I bet if we did one on the causes of nonproliferation at this point, any objective observer would find the connection that each of the panelists has mentioned here, but so many others seem to deny.

Let me follow up with a question that springs from Ambassador Dhanapala's observation, one that I really hadn't realized, that we are in a transitional period. You cannot avoid the American presidential race, which is underway, but there will also be, in the next couple of years, transitions of executive leadership in Russia, in leading states of the European Union, and you might add Iran.

So we're entering a period where there's going to be a transition of the leaders who have been involved in tying us up in knots over the last decade or so, and I was wondering, Michael, what you thought about that. What does that mean for the prospects of implementing some of these steps that have been detailed for many years? You can go back to the 13 steps of the NPT Review Conference back in 2000. What does this political transition mean? Do we have a moment here that we have to be ready to seize?

KREPON: A new opportunity. If we are also able to reconceptualize, strategize anew, and adopt new tactics. If we come back with the same agenda and the same lists of

shoulds and musts and take them to new leaders, new leaders will have difficulty getting public acceptance of agendas that seem frozen in amber. So I would put that cautionary note out. But there is new opportunity.

Let me stress the positive, because I totally agree with Chris's point that if we view a negative as inevitable, we're giving up the game. And there's nothing inevitable about failure. Nothing inevitable about failure. Let me give you a couple of positives that may seem very odd to some of you, but I think I can defend these assertions. Nuclear weapons have never been less useful for major powers, and they have never been less useful for the most powerful major power. The value that has been attached to nuclear weapons in the United States is the lowest I have ever observed. It is the lowest I have ever observed.

Some of you who are very worried about the bunker-busting nuclear warhead, you know where that program is now? It's dead. There was no bounce, there was no resonance, and there was no need.

Some of you are now very worried about the Reliable Replacement Warhead. My sense is that the nuclear weapons establishment in the United States is in dire straits. You heard me correct. You heard me correct. They don't have a mission. The design community is retiring and leaving. They're very disturbed because they have no transmission built. I'm not clear that there will be three nuclear weapons establishments, design bureaus, if you will.

CIRINCIONE: You mean the three labs.

KREPON: The three labs.

CIRINCIONE: Los Alamos, Livermore, Sandia.

KREPON: For the indefinite future. I am clear that these labs are shifting their mission to cooperative threat reduction, to energy, to climate. This is happening. You may not believe it. It's happening. And I can tell you, or I can predict for you that if a couple of years from now the Reliable Replacement Warhead is viewed as the saving instrument of the nuclear weapons laboratories to keep them in business, there will be – and there can be – an extraordinary price demanded in return for that.

CIRINCIONE: You mean if Congress – and Chris, weigh in on this, please. If the Congress is to approve the Reliable Replacement Warhead program – I think everyone knows what that means as a push. This was a fringe idea in the labs that has been promoted by the administration that is now before Congress, to have a new generation weapon, one that would replace all or most of the existing U.S. nuclear warheads. And the idea is that it could be designed, give the design teams some new work to do – and validated without testing. So the idea, the claim is, the

promise is, that you could do this without testing, and this is a very controversial program in the Congress. You're saying there'd be a price?

KREPON: There ought to be.

CIRINCIONE: You mean approval of the Reliable Replacement Warhead coupled with ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?

KREPON: That's just de minimus.

CIRINCIONE: Chris?

KREPON: Let me just continue on the positive side, because I know we've got a lot of negative vibes out there, and I want to confuse you. One of the best things that has ever happened to devalue nuclear weapons in my lifetime has been to give the U.S. Strategic Command control over conventional weapons, long strike, precise strike conventional arms. When this happened, the folks in that command gravitated swiftly to usable weapons, and not to unusable weapons. Some of you, as an article of faith, I believe have held to the position that we have to keep nuclear weapons separate, because if we connected them with conventional weapons, then the nuclear weapons would become more usable. The exact opposite has happened. Don't trust me on this. Investigate it.

And I will give you one other positive thing to consider. We now have two wonderful toolboxes to apply to problems of proliferation and to prevent further proliferation and to roll back proliferation. We have a toolbox from the arms control era, including intrusive verification – and Joe, we have to put on our list the extension of the intrusive verification provisions that are set to expire in December of 2009.

CIRINCIONE: This is the START II Treaty. Those verification procedures end at that point, and if they did, then Russians would no longer come to our facilities. We would no longer come to theirs. There'd be no exchange of data. The whole verification regime that Ronald Reagan invented would come to an end.

KREPON: We have a big toolbox, confidence-building measures, intrusive inspections. Many of you have been involved in this from the arms control era. We have a second toolbox from the second nuclear era, the post-'91 era, cooperative threat reduction. Very creative techniques used to help prevent the worst weapons and materials from getting in the worst hands. We have two wonderful toolboxes that we can now apply.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you. Chris, Reliable Replacement Warhead? That's a hot issue in Congress. Is there some sort of package deal that might be arranged?

CHYBA: Let me say two things in response to that and then respond to Michael's comments. First a broader comment and then specifically to that question, Joe.

I agree with Michael that we can't -- that those who are interested in arms control can't -- simply seem to be pursuing the same old arms control agenda. I think one of the effects of the past six years in the United States has been that there is a perception that those favoring arms control have predicted repeatedly that the sky is falling as the U.S. has stepped away from various agreements, and the sky has continued not to fall. Now, I know many in the audience feel that we've kind of edged up right to the point of the sky falling, but yet, it keeps not falling. I think that's in particular a view of the current administration.

And therefore, I think that one way one wants to approach this is that the U.S. needs a kind of comprehensive assessment of its risks. That assessment, that approach, will bring along with it a number of steps that are necessary to reinforce the nonproliferation regime, including adherence to the CTBT.

I do think that if we're going to pursue the Reliable Replacement Warhead that we should insist that it come along with support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After all, that is the claim that's being made for that warhead. I think that such a package would have to be extremely carefully sculpted, and in particular I would suggest that it has to be done on the basis of action for action.

CIRINCIONE: Paolo, let me ask you about tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Many of the representatives in some of the states that house U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are here in the audience. Estimates are there's somewhere between 150 to 450 nuclear weapons in eight states. Should the U.S. unilaterally withdraw those weapons now? There's been some indication that the U.S. actually is interested in that. Or should it be a package arrangement? Should it be a negotiation involving the Russians and getting at the issues of their thousands of tactical weapons, now all stored in Russia, but still stored, still existing? What do you think?

COTTA-RAMUSINO: I would personally prefer a package, in the sense that they are two different -- two different important issues. One, I think is the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons on other countries' soil, which is a precedent, because you don't want in the future to have older nuclear weapons states, even de facto nuclear weapons states to go down the same route. And then there is the big problem of controlling Russian tactical nuclear weapons. So I think that they should be put together in a way which is constructive, not wait too much for one to be solved in order to solve the other one.

But if I may, since the discussion before was, I think, a very interesting one, I would like to point out that you have to see what Michael was saying from the point of view of an external observer outside the United States. I think I agree very much with what Michael was saying, that there is less need of nuclear weapons inside the U.S. military structure, but this is not perceived outside. So you have at

the same time, the reality that Michael was mentioning before, and that ideology, if you want, the rhetoric which is the opposite. Nuclear weapons are more important, we need to – we don't want to disarm, we don't want the CTBT, even though it is not necessary to make nuclear tests in order to go on with the level of nuclear weapons development.

So here we have a disconnection between reality and appearance, which is very important. If you're sitting someplace in Tehran or in other countries and you consider what's going on, and you see that nuclear weapons are highly considered in this country, in the nuclear weapon state countries, and then you have to adjust for that.

Second point, and it's also a question which I would like to ask in general. He is pointing out, Michael, that in fact, there is a lot to do with conventional weapons. But from the point of view of lesser technological society, this is not necessarily assuring, since they see that they are smashed by technological inferiority and they may think that the only way they can get around that is to have some kind of simpler, in fact, technologically much simpler instrument, which is nuclear weapons.

KREPON: Joe, can I –

CIRINCIONE: Yes, and then we're going to open it up, so go.

KREPON: I totally agree with Paolo's points. The issue now, unlike the first nuclear age, pre-1991, is horizontal, not vertical proliferation. It's horizontal proliferation for precisely the reason that Paolo mentioned. And it's necessary but not sufficient, obviously, that the most powerful country has the least need for nuclear weapons. It's a place we can start to craft wise policies. Necessary, but not sufficient.

CIRINCIONE: Great. Thank you. If we could bring a microphone up front right away please, we have several questions up front. And in fact, if you want to just put your placards up, it might be easier than raising your hands, and if you could just – I know many of you are very well-known, but if you could just briefly identify yourself. Thank you.

DUARTE: Is this working?

CIRINCIONE: There we go.

DUARTE: Yes, now?

CIRINCIONE: Yes.

DUARTE: Yes, OK. Thank you. Well, I identified myself before. I don't think I have to do it twice. One thing that has always troubled me in this debate, and I've been participating in this since I was a young officer in the old ENDC in the – that was when the NPT was proposed by the two superpowers at the time – is that to the possessors of nuclear weapons, it seems that – and I take this in response maybe, or in follow-up of the idea of what is felt outside of the main possessors of weapons. They seem to start from the premise that the problem of proliferation started after the NPT was crafted and accepted. They were the ones who proliferated before. There was one who took the step to produce weapons and then four others proliferated. They are the proliferators, and they continue to proliferate.

Mr. Krepon mentioned a concept that has fallen more or less in oblivion about vertical and horizontal proliferation. What concerns us outside the nuclear weapon powers and their allies is the continuing proliferation by the possessors of nuclear weapons and their stated aim to continue to retain these weapons. I don't want to prolong this, but I could quote between quotation marks statements from the leaders of the five – not from China – of the four nuclear weapon states according to the NPT, saying that they will continue to retain their weapons. That's the intention that they have.

Now, how can the rest of the world react to that except with utmost concern and (inaudible)? Thank you.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much. And give the microphone to Stephen Schwartz right behind you. Thank you, Ambassador Duarte.

SCHWARTZ: If you've just introduced me, Joe, do I have to introduce myself?

CIRINCIONE: Yes.

SCHWARTZ: I do? OK. Stephen Schwartz, I'm the editor of the *Nonproliferation Review*, published by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Great panel. Congratulations, especially to Chris for filling in so ably, after being thrown out on the playing field.

I agree with almost everything everyone said except for the comments about the tradeoff on the CTBT versus the RRW, which is something I've been following for a while, and the reason is this. And since Michael was playing counterintuitive, I will too. I say this to a lot of people, and it usually gets laughs, but if you don't want new nuclear weapons in this country, give the job to the Department of Energy, because it has proven itself to be incapable of fulfilling – to figuring out what its mission is and also then fulfilling it for the last 15 years. And it's spent a lot of money and done a lot of bad things in the process, but we aren't much closer to getting stuff. So I'm not a big fan of wasting money, but leave it in the hands of the Department of Energy as opposed to moving it to the Defense Department, and nothing – or at least nothing will happen very quickly.

CIRINCIONE: OK, that's a facetious answer, and a funny one, but do you think that there's a need for a new warhead in the U.S. arsenal?

SCHWARTZ: No, I don't, and that's why I wanted to comment on this one point and take us back to 13 or 14 years ago. The reason that we're talking about the Reliable Replacement Warhead today is because a number of us directly or indirectly signed up to an agreement to get the Stockpile Stewardship Program back during the Clinton Administration. The deal was the labs would go for extending the nuclear testing moratorium as long as they were given a lot of money to do things that would allow them to assure themselves and assure the President our weapons would continue to work without blowing them up underneath the Nevada desert.

And the program that started out being originally a \$4 billion program for ten years had now extended indefinitely and is over \$6.5 billion a year, and led the labs, as they are wont to do, to come up with a new idea, which is now in the right political climate, found some dirt in which it can grow.

I'm not convinced that you need an RRW, but if you do, I don't think that going for that and saying, OK, we're going to get the test ban and X, Y, and Z as well, because at some point down the road, unless it's ironclad, and maybe we can do something like that, you wind up with a bigger problem, which is where we find ourselves today.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much. Up front. By the way, Steve is the editor of *The Atomic Audit*, still one of the most comprehensive books out there on the history of nuclear weapons.

HARTUNG: Yes, Bill Hartung, World Policy Institute. I was wondering if the panel could evaluate the SORT Treaty. Does it matter? Could it be a building block? Does the rest of the world take it into account, or is it just kind of a U.S.-Russian initiative?

CIRINCIONE: Thanks. Let's hold that question for – let's ask Jeff Laurenti, and then we'll go back and we'll pick up others.

LAURENTI: I wonder if the members of the panel could comment on the seriousness of what has become the issue of the decade, which is terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction, and whether the international institutions we have now are capable of managing that kind of threat. How serious a threat is it, and how do you handle it?

CIRINCIONE: Anybody who wants to answer those, and for the audience who might not know, the START treaty is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty negotiated by President Bush and intended to be the last negotiated agreement with Russia on

nuclear weapons. It says that by 2012, the U.S. and Russia should reduce down to between 1700 and 2200 operationally deployable strategic weapons. It's silent on the issue of storage weapons. Both sides will keep several thousands in storage. And it's silent on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. Russia at least has several thousand of those, the U.S. about 2000. On START.

COTTA-RAMUSINO: I will say something. I think that the issue of U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons is a fundamental issue. It's been forgotten since the days – not anymore – for the time being, I would say, this kind of antagonistic relation was in the past. But there is cracks here. The INF (inaudible) attitude of Russia is one type of crack. I think talking about –

CIRINCIONE: You mean the suggestions that Russia might pull out of the INF Treaty and actually redeploy medium-range ballistic missiles.

COTTA-RAMUSINO: Exactly. And I think that – so cracks is one. The second one, even if there are no cracks, you cannot call disarmament a situation where we have 4000 strategic nuclear weapons in the two countries, plus a number of unspecified tactical and so on. So I think the issue of Russian-American dialogue should be taken back into the front stage, in my opinion, and there should be an international pressure for this to happen.

CIRINCIONE: Chris.

CHYBA: One of the reasons that I think it's so important for the United States to affirm core deterrence as the role of its existing nuclear weapons is that that, I think, is an important component in building down towards lower numbers of weapons. I strongly believe that there needs to be a successor to the SORT Treaty. Sidney Drell and Ambassador Goodby have proposed that a next step might be to move down to 1000 weapons, of which 500 would be deployed and 500 would be in storage.

Once we move much below that number, then it seems to me that the challenges become much greater, not only because the process would need to become multilateral with other nuclear powers involved, but ultimately, if we want to build down – as we're required by law to do under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a ratified treaty of the United States – Article VI of the U.S. Constitution says that it is the supreme law of the land. So as we build down to very low numbers, we're going to need, I think, a remarkably transparent verification regime. Remember that Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty doesn't say that disarmament is the requirement of the P5, of the nuclear weapon states. It says that all states party to the treaty have that responsibility. And indeed, to build down to very low numbers, there's going to have to be a kind of transparency and verification that operates globally with respect to any stockpiles of substantial nuclear explosive material, emphasizing also, I think, the importance of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

CIRINCIONE: You say that the core mission is deterrence. Are there other missions for existing nuclear weapons?

CHYBA: My view is that –

M: Good question.

CHYBA: Yeah, that's a perfectly fine question.

CIRINCIONE: We just don't want you to wiggle out of this.

(laughter)

CHYBA: Joe, I think that one of the dilemmas that our community faces or can face is to let the world that we all want to see us move towards and the ideal of ultimate, complete disarmament get in the way of practical steps that can be taken now that in fact move us importantly towards that goal. So I would distinguish between what I think is possible for the United States to declare as a policy at this time and what our particular desires might be. So that's my response to your question.

CIRINCIONE: Excellent. Thank you.

KREPON: Can I –

CIRINCIONE: Yeah, please.

KREPON: Real quickly. I talked earlier about enduring ideals and principles and adaptation. Disarmament is an enduring ideal and principle. It's central to any success in stopping proliferation. So follow-on to the SORT Treaty obviously matters. It speaks to that enduring principle and ideal.

Number two, vertical versus horizontal. Why is the second nuclear age about horizontal and not vertical? Not only because arms racing is passé. Countries are smarter than before. They will not arms race. But the only vertical growth on the axis today that I'm aware of, India, Pakistan, China. There's this question about North Korea, and maybe that one's going to be turned. We don't know. But we do know that three countries are growing vertically. Only three. And they're growing at a very moderate rate.

That's a different situation than before. United States, Russia, France, UK are heading into – they have been in contraction. That's very positive.

Next point, Reliable Replacement Warhead. The case has not yet been made. I'm not endorsing it. I need to study this. But part of our problem has traditionally been, in my opinion, that we are all about shoulds and musts, and we're not about

how. The Reliable Replacement Warhead presents an opportunity to answer the question how. How do we get these things we want?

The big difference between now and the Stockpile Stewardship Program, Steve, is that the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the Clinton Administration was the requester, and the nuclear labs were the demanders. This has flipped, if my analysis is correct. Now the labs are the demanders, which gives us some purchase on answering the question how. Moving from shoulds and musts to how is key.

Nuclear terrorism. One of the most puzzling questions in front of us is why hasn't it happened yet. The material is so prevalent, so susceptible to insider threats. And maybe Bill Potter can talk to us about that during his time up here, because the question, why hasn't it happened already, and then why hasn't there been copycat attacks? Part of it attests to the Cooperative Threat Reduction, the Nunn-Lugar program, better intelligence sharing. There are reasons. But I don't think, Bill, they fully answer the question, so I'm going to put that one on you.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much. While you have the microphone, there's a gentleman in back. Thank you. Then we'll come up here.

SCHLESINGER: Stephen Schlesinger from the New School University. We all agree that Pakistan and India, it's terrible that they have nuclear weapons. But what about the argument that it is the historic balance of terror that has led to negotiations between those two countries that might not have happened otherwise? I'd like the comment of anybody on the panel.

CIRINCIONE: Hold that, and then come up. Nicolas.

ROCHE: Hello. Thank you. My name is Nicolas Roche, and I work in the Embassy of France in Washington. Just one quick comment and a question. We have discussed a lot this morning about disarmament, and this is perfectly understandable and fair, and I would like to emphasize what Michael has said, that the picture is not as gloomy as somebody have said this morning. And when considering this disarmament issue, I think we should not just forget what has been done until today.

And I will obviously speak only for my country, France. But we have taken some irreversible steps towards disarmament. We have not only put in place a moratorium on nuclear testing. We have dismantled our facilities. We have not only put in place a moratorium on fissile material protection. We have dismantled our facilities there. We have not only required that we would use our nuclear forces. We have done so. We have dismantled our ground-based nuclear forces in Plateau de (inaudible). And that was not far away from now. That was just a decision were taken in the middle of the '90s. So just don't forget these issues.

But coming back to the core issue of that panel. The title of that panel was Looking to 2020: Proliferation Threats. And I think that of course disarmament as such is one key, an important issue, but this is not the only one when we look at 2020. And one of the main issues we'll face is proliferation. And in that regard, I will have just one remark and one question.

The remark is to emphasize what has been said, that there is no direct link between disarmament and proliferation. The simple fact is that the very decade where major nuclear countries have taken these major disarmament steps, the middle of the '90s, these were exactly the years and the decade where we saw, we witnessed, many countries proliferating around the world. Just a few examples, Iran, North Korea, Libya. When did they, not started, but increased their nuclear program and (inaudible) program. And just at the very same time that our countries, my country, took this decision. That's the very same moment. So this is the remark. There is no direct link. In the real world, there is no direct link between nonproliferation and disarmament.

My question, what are the root causes of proliferators? Why does a proliferator proliferate? This is a key question if we want to put in place the right policies so as in 2020 we do not face a world with many more nuclear powers. And I think that when you address this question, you will see that this is not about disarmament. This is about regime protection, this is about regional environment, many, many possible causes, root causes, but definitely not disarmament. In the real world, at least. Maybe in the world of perception this is different, but in the real world this is not about that.

But let's address that key question, why do proliferators proliferate? Thank you.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much. Jonathan.

GRANOFF: Speaking as an American, the first proliferator proliferated as a deterrent against the possible first proliferator of Nazi Germany. So the first proliferator was the United States, so we have a series of other proliferators. It's when you begin the concept of nonproliferation that determines whether you're talking about establishing a global norm of disarmament or a global norm of several states legitimately having the weapons in perpetuity.

And it is exactly that contradiction that prevents us from creating the political will in the populace that will push the issue. In other words, on the one hand, we all – everybody wants to stop proliferation. So when the focus is on nonproliferation, then you can have the bad guy du jour in the newspaper, and the focus is on taking the National Rifle Association paradigm writ large. It's not the weapons that kill people, it's bad people. And therefore you can keep changing the dialogue and keep changing the framework, and there's no political momentum.

On the other hand, if people were to think of nuclear weapons in the same way as we think of the plague, as an illegitimate, immoral weapon because of its indiscriminate effect, because of its contravention of general principles of humanitarian law, that it can't be controlled in space and time, that you will affect states that are not party to the conflict, that it is so horrific it's unacceptable – if that were the focus, because that is what the law says – that's what the NPT says, that's what the norm is. If that were the focus, I believe we wouldn't always be discussing the issue in the basement at the United Nations, but it would percolate up the political ladder where you would have some degree of political pressure.

Now, as a practical matter, when we were at a crisis at this level at the height of the Cold War, six heads of state – the Six Nation Initiative – six heads of state went to Moscow and Washington and pushed for progress, so it percolated up in the political reality. Right now, we don't have that political will at that level.

CIRINCIONE: Do you see any signs that we might be able to generate that political –

GRANOFF: Yes. I believe that the clearest sign is that if you look at the practical consensus that – there's almost a total consensus on the practical steps that need to be taken: FMCT with verification, a CTBT, de-alert, downgrading the political currency of nuclear weapons, strengthen nuclear weapons-free zones.

When you look at the voting in the General Assembly on a CTBT in the last vote, only two countries within the red light district, the United States and North Korea together. That was it. So you have a consensus practical agenda. What you don't have is the clarity of political will, and that's what I think we have to provide. I think that's what civil society has to provide is that clarity to galvanize the political force.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much. And bring it up here for Colum Lynch, then we'll take a pause.

LYNCH: Hello. Colum Lynch from *The Washington Post*. I was hoping some of the speakers could just give their assessments of the of the North Korea and Iran diplomacy –

CIRINCIONE: Ah-ha, at the panel do you want to do this?

(laughter)

LYNCH: Pardon me?

CIRINCIONE: Just sum it up.

LYNCH: Just in terms of the softer kind of diplomacy, the agree – the fact that they could reach an agreement with the North Koreans, and softer tone on Iran. Nick

Burns has been talking about not going for really tough sanctions, something that he can sell to the Russians and the Chinese. Does this sort of make sense? And also the departure of John Bolton. Do you think that that's had any impact on this sort of change in tone?

CIRINCIONE: Great. We have Henrik Salander over there and then we'll – and Randy Rydell and then we'll stop there.

SALANDER: Thanks, Joe. I'm Henrik Salander, head of the department in Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I think my question was a bit preempted by Stephen Schwartz and Michael's response, but let me ask Michael.

As I understand it, there are two competing designs for the Reliable Replacement Warhead, and it looks like one of them will be chosen and designed, fine-tuned, and then the new weapons built, I think, in a few years from now. So are you saying that this development could be reversed or it might not happen? If you answer yes, this to me is perhaps the most promising development in many, many years. Thank you.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you. And finally, the back. Randy just raise your hand. Thank you.

RYDELL: Thank you. Randy Rydell with the UN's Department for Disarmament Affairs. We've heard a lot of history today, going from 1946 on, but one thing that was missing was the General Assembly's first resolution in January of 1946, which called for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. And I think sometimes, fanaticism consists of redoubling your effort when you've forgotten your aim, and I think the aim has been very clear ever since 1946, which is the elimination of these weapons.

My question is, the history of those efforts has been to delegitimize weapons, nuclear weapons, per se, to delegitimize their possession, to delegitimize their use. My question to Chris and to Michael is, how will your prescriptions for a Reliable – a new nuclear weapon program, combined with a reaffirmation of the core value of deterrence, which incidentally, is a doctrine now espoused by eight countries, how will these two approaches serve that fundamental goal? Thank you.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you. I'm going to turn it over – thank you, Randy, for reminding us. That was the very first resolution that the new United Nations confronted. We'll take one more from Janne Nolan in the back, way in the back. And it was introduced by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, the three countries that had been involved in the Manhattan Project. Janne.

NOLAN: Thank you, Joe. I just wanted to add one more, if not dispiriting at least important element of the debate here, which is the concept of deterrence as it stands is not defined, and particularly for the United States, the fact that deterrence is

derivative of war-fighting plans that are based on specific targeting criteria, so-called target coverage, is a huge impediment to thinking of deterrence as “the solution.” And maybe to add to Chris’ agenda of a comprehensive strategy, though this has been tried, the question of sort of how much deterrence is enough based on what criteria has really never been subject to political oversight, as I think everyone knows that. It certainly distinguishes the United States from its key allies, including France, with respect to the receptivity of ideas to reduce the emphasis on nuclear weapons, including strategic forces. Thank you.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you. One more question over here and then we’ll close it out. Janne Nolan is a professor at Georgetown University, by the way, and the author of a wonderful book on the failure of the Clinton Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, called *The Elusive Consensus*.

SHAMAA: Thank you. I’ll be very brief.

CIRINCIONE: Can you identify yourself, please?

SHAMAA: Khaled Shamaa.

CIRINCIONE: From?

SHAMAA: Egypt. I did already in the first session.

CIRINCIONE: Oh, I’m sorry. Thank you very much. Well, there’s a different crowd.

(laughter)

SHAMAA: I’m not so sure about that. Anyway, before my main question, I just wanted to refer to what was mentioned by our colleague from France on the nonconnection between disarmament and nonproliferation. And I will not venture into a response to that. I think Jonathan did that job already. But maybe one other element when you have to look at the relationship between the two is when there are threats of use of nuclear weapons, and we have already seen such recent threats of use of nuclear weapons against unidentified persons in case of a terrorist attack. So this is an element that has to be taken into consideration, especially where there might be bystanders in such a scenario.

But actually my question was to Christopher Chyba with regard to what he said that his students were saying at Princeton, that if it has failed, let’s try and look at something else. And he said no, we should save the NPT and that is in everybody’s interest to do so. How do you explain it to your Princeton students? Why should we save the NPT? And if by a turn of events, a weird turn of events, you are lecturing at the Baghdad University and there are still some students there, how would you explain to them why we should save the NPT? Thanks.

CIRINCIONE: Thank you. We are now going to have closing comments from the panelists and then we're going to take a short coffee break before the 12:15 session. Gentlemen, any? Chris?

CHYBA: Well, there are so many questions on the table, so forgive me if I spend no more than a couple sentences on a large number of them. With respect to the RRW, I was not advocating the Reliable Replacement Warhead. I was, however, suggesting that if it goes forward, that there should be a deal made as a requirement of it going forward. Perhaps I was too subtle, Stephen, in using the slogan from the Six Party Talks, action for action, to emphasize how strict I think that deal needs to be for reasons that have been alluded to.

Rather than talking about the core role of nuclear weapons being deterrence, John, probably I should have said that the role is core deterrence, that the role should be deterring the use of nuclear or possibly biological weapons against the United States.

My view of how that plays a role with respect to preserving the NPT is first and foremost as an element in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in foreign policy, and in particular, after some of the rhetoric of the last six years, in particular, the leaked portions of the Nuclear Posture Review, I think that even that kind of reaffirmation, granted that it's a reaffirmation that perhaps reaches back 60 years to things that have been long affirmed, is nevertheless a useful first step for the United States to take.

With respect to the demand side of nuclear proliferation, why the countries proliferate, there is an extensive and I think not entirely convincing academic literature on that topic, particularly since certain case studies remain very obscure. Having said that, I think it's clear that regional security, or more broadly, security, is an important factor. I think that in some cases, prestige is an important factor. I believe that the nuclear weapons of the P5, indeed any – the nuclear weapons of any country that have regional or global reach therefore are going to play a role in that, but I would suggest that the influence of disarmament on nonproliferation is not primarily as a direct driver. I agree with you that often it is not a direct driver, but rather that disarmament is essential if what we want to accomplish in the nonproliferation regime are steps that control proliferation. I think that there is a bargain there and that if we want, for example, a successful additional protocol, if we want Resolution 1540 to be taken seriously, that the P5 have to be seen as living up to their side of the bargain.

So it's not a simple cause and effect, and I agree that the decade of the 1990s demonstrates that. But I nevertheless think that disarmament in keeping with Article VI is an essential part of the nuclear nonproliferation bargain if we want to achieve these other goals.

CIRINCIONE: I would like the other two panelists to talk primarily about diplomacy, Colum Lynch's question on North Korea and Iran, and I just want to point out that since the end of the Cold War, no new country has started a nuclear weapons program. An interesting fact. So the North Korea and Iran programs started before the end of the Cold War. And in fact, in the last 15 years, more countries have given up nuclear weapons and programs than have tried to acquire them.

KREPON: You're putting a happy face on this panel.

CIRINCIONE: There's a lot of good news about proliferation.

KREPON: I owe Henrik an answer, a direct answer. My sense of the Reliable Replacement Warhead is that it's not on the fast track. There are still lots of questions about it. And what was one of the principal drivers behind this program, the status of the pits, the plutonium pits of the old arsenal, seems to have – that concern has been alleviated. So I think we're in no hurry here.

CIRINCIONE: That is, the plutonium studies indicate that it's going to last longer than we thought, looking out to about 90 years now that we could count on that plutonium.

KREPON: We're in no hurry here, and for those of you – and I deeply respect Randy and I know where he's coming from, and others in the room I know feel the same way. I want you to focus on the question how. How do we drive down the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal? How do we further diminish the salience of these weapons? How do we get in place a comprehensive test ban treaty and a fissile material cutoff treaty, which are core elements of a successful regime? Tell me how. Give me – what leverage have we got here?

Maybe the trends that I have pointed to, which are positive trends, will continue whether or not the Reliable Replacement Warhead happens. That would be good. I'm looking for ways to accelerate a process without, as Paolo has said, giving the wrong impression to the world that we are reaccentuating the role of nuclear weapons.

In addition to the drivers that Chris has mentioned for proliferation, we haven't talked about domestic drivers, powerful constituencies within a country, and domestic politics. And the domestic politics driver is probably the least well-appreciated, because it makes it hardest to reverse proliferation in democratic societies. The successful cases of reversal – not entirely, but key cases of reversal. Reversal's easier when countries are not democratic.

The pivot for the future – and this is the negative problem – is the Iranian program, because as I look out at the drivers of proliferation and the things that worry me most, if the bomb fits into or comes astride the Sunni/Shia divide, Colum, we have a huge problem, because that will reverberate in so many places in the Islamic

world that that could be just an awful scenario, and all the more reason to really focus on this Iranian program.

CIRINCIONE: Paolo, focus on Iran.

COTTA-RAMUSINO: Yeah, that's what I will do. I'm sorry. There were so many interesting comments. In fact, our French colleague made a point that needed to be addressed, but since the floor is on Iran, let's go to Iran.

I think that there are a few points that should be made very clear. I think first of all, this is a situation which is potentially very dreadful and with very dire consequences, so I think that we are not talking about some abstract idea, concept. We are talking about, really, a collapse of a system and physical collapse of a country if things go in the wrong direction, so we should be very careful.

I would say about Iran, point number one, don't assume that Iran is necessarily on the path of nuclear weapons acquisition. There is a borderline – technical borderline – between civilian and military activities, and if you learn enough about civilian, then you can shift on the other side. That is what has been used by many countries, including Japan and Belgium, for that matter. And the Iranian program gives every indication it was not very much different from that.

Second point. I think that the (inaudible) are pushing for a more direct interest in (inaudible) application of nuclear energy in Iran. So increasing the threat has always this kind of backfire that should be considered.

Third point. And so, things can be duplicated, so you have places, you have a situation in which – you have a place like Natanz where you have enrichment. This can be duplicated somewhere else, if the pressure, outside pressure, is very strong.

Third point. If there is a war, it's very unlikely this kind of war will be limited to some selected nuclear installation, exactly for the reasons that were said before. This will be more extensive, including potential undercover nuclear installation, and would be also military centers, and this will create a situation in Iran that will be very difficult to control.

Fifth point. Fourth point. I think if we go back to the solution, possible negotiated solution, I think that we have to understand there is a big issue of face-saving devices for everybody around here, including the Iranians. We know for the West, face-saving should be, but the Iranians should also take into consideration. You should not push – you should assume that civilian nuclear energy program in Iran will go on. Control, lots of questions to be debated, but you cannot just say no to some part of nuclear energy programs.

Fifth point, rhetorics. That's something which the Iranians should be really thinking very seriously about that.

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