

## WEAPONS THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: REBUILDING AN UNRAVELED CONSENSUS

### *OPENING REMARKS: NEW PERSPECTIVES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES*

LAURENTI: – We are about to hear from three very distinguished participants in our conference today. My name, by the way – and I’m not among the distinguished participants – is Jeff Laurenti, Senior Fellow at The Century Foundation. And it is The Century Foundation -- with the close collaboration of the Center for American Progress -- that has organized today’s conference.

And our welcome for the Century Foundation will be given by one of our long-time Trustees, Jim Leach. But Jim Leach is a distinguished figure not merely by dint of being a Trustee of the Century Foundation, but also for a third of the century’s representation of Iowa in the United States House of Representatives.

So Jim Leach is going to be doing double-duty for us this morning, because not only will he extend the welcome of the Century Foundation, but he will also give us some sense of what the new perspectives and perhaps new opportunities on issues of weapons of deadly impact, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons in particular and chemical weapons, may be in the new Congress.

Unfortunately, we have a Congress that today decided this year, to work five days a week – unprecedented – and it has made it very difficult to be able to lure figures who are required in Washington for votes, even today, to be able to participate directly with us. But Representative Leach, now Professor Leach at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton, will be able to give us some sense of what the change in the Congress may mean in terms of a redirection of U.S. policy.

We will then turn to Filippo Formica, who is the Director of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in the Italian Foreign Ministry, to give us, together with his welcome on behalf of the Italian Foreign Ministry – which is, of course, a major underwriter of our conference – a sense of a European perspective on where the new opportunities may lie.

Then we will turn to Jayantha Dhanapala, who was, as you know, Secretary General of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1995, and then was Under-Secretary General of the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs for many years, for his sense of the new perspectives and new opportunities that we may see before us from the perspective of the developing world, and the world at large.

So if we may turn first, Jim, may we turn over the rostrum to you?

LEACH: Well, thank you, very much, Jeff. It's my duty to first welcome everybody on behalf of The Century Foundation to this conference which we've titled, "Weapons, Threats and International Security." The subtitle of the conference, which is "Rebuilding an Unraveled Consensus," is telling. The premise of the conference is that the sense of common purpose about the methodology of containing and rolling back the world's most deadly arsenals has come unraveled in recent years, and it's the purpose of this conference to try to give some impetus to the process of reviving a common purpose.

Before getting into the substance, I would like to express particular appreciation and respect to the Foreign Ministry of the government of Italy, which quite uniquely is supporting this conference.

At the risk of presumption, it appears from the outside that the government in Rome has concluded that the moment is ripe to reopen the conversation about how countries can halt and reverse the spread of the most appalling weapons.

At the Century Foundation we are pleased to have been asked to work with the Foreign Ministry to help launch this debate, at what from an American perspective is a particularly relevant time because the presidential campaigns in both political parties will be looking to new approaches to issues of this and many other kinds of nature.

Secondly, I want to express my appreciation to the Center for American Progress, which is headed by the very thoughtful John Podesta, for co-convening this conference with The Century Foundation. Century and the Center have worked on a number of foreign policy initiatives in recent years. In fact, John Podesta is a fellow board member of The Century Foundation.

I also, in this regard, want to thank the Senior Vice-President of the Center, Joe Cirincione, for his expertise and work on this particular conference. Joe is one of America's leading experts on nuclear proliferation issues.

With regard to the problem that's being addressed, let me begin first with what I think is the most profound political science comment of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and that comes from a scientist. Einstein once suggested that splitting the atom had changed everything except our way of thinking.

Secondly, out of deference to our host co-convenor, the government of Italy, I'd like to make reference to the work of two 19<sup>th</sup> century Italian political theorists, a chap named Vito and one named Pareto who, aping Aristotle, attempted to catalogue and then, at the same time, point out commonalities and differences in the political systems then existent in the world. One of the conclusions that each reached is an extraordinarily obvious thought that unwisely we take for granted: that in any political system it is astonishing how a sparse number of people – sometimes one alone – can make decisions that affect multitudes, and these

decisions can be for good or for naught. In this circumstance, one has to realize that in all politics we're dealing with human nature, which in Einstein's terms is a constant. This is an aspect of international relations that is continually underappreciated.

As we all understand, in our country an awful lot of attention has been extended to the Iraq and Afghan issues. Washington asserts with some degree of legitimacy – as evidenced by 9/11 – that there are elements of Islam that appear to be hijacked in one or another way. Likewise, from a civil libertarian, old-fashioned individual rights perspective, the possibility also has to be contemplated whether limited government conservatism has been hijacked by a group of ideological posturers.

I would stress this dilemma from several perspectives. One relates to domestic policy. A small group of what are called Federalist Society legal advisors have prevailed in insisting that a strong Executive should put signing statements with laws as they are passed that indicate the provisions that a President might not only disagree with, but not implement. Which means that if the Executive disapproves of a particular aspect of a particular law the Executive does not have to enforce the law. In a government of laws that is a rather extraordinary conceptualization.

I was talking with Hans Blix earlier on this subject and suggested that this is taking anti-French sentiment to an extreme. It is rejection of Montesquieu who Madison borrowed so extensively from in framing the Constitution. The French didn't adopt the Montesquieuan balance of power system; we did. Now, apparently, if an imperial modern day Executive feels chaffed, he may think he has the right to take it out on French philosophy.

The analog in international relations is the neocon notion that international law related to arms control neither needs to be expanded, nor needs to apply to a superpower whose obligations to itself and the world should be considered above the law. That is a rather extraordinary phenomenon in international affairs. Hence, prior to 9/11, this administration became the first since Dwight David Eisenhower to announce opposition to a Comprehensive Test Ban. It also announced withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Convention and rejection of newly negotiated verification provisions for the Biological Weapons Convention, a treaty the United States had led in negotiating in 1972. This convention is close to my heart, because early in my public career as a young Foreign Service Officer I was a member of the United States delegation which negotiated this seminal commitment to refrain from development of biological and toxin weapons in Geneva. To refuse to approve upgraded verification provisions of this treaty because of an ideological distaste for arms control and concern it might have intrusive implications for American industry denotes inexplicable priorities.

During the entire administration of Dwight David Eisenhower, the United States was not on the losing side of any U.N. vote. By contrast, in this administration, on ten articles relating to arms control, the United States was the only vote in

opposition at the U.N. On the resolution on illicit trade in small arms, the vote was 176-to-1; on practical disarmament measures, 179-to-1; on environmental norms in disarmament, 175-to-1; on assurances to non-nuclear weapons states, 119-to-1; on arms trade treaty, 153-to-1; on preventing an arms race in outer space, 178-to-1; on telecommunications international security, 176-to-1; on disarmament and development, 178-to-1; on surplus ammunition, 175-to-1; on the Fourth Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, 175-to-1. That is, we were the one and only state in opposition to attempts to rein in the arms race.

The background of the Biological Weapons Convention was that President Nixon established a National Science Foundation Commission to study problems associated with biological weapons research. It concluded that proceeding with such research in the most sophisticated scientific country in the world involved perilous risk and recommended we immediately stop, which we did. Based uniquely upon a unilateral act of the United States government, we proceeded to a treaty.

In the lexicon of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical, and biological -- it's a horse race whether nuclear or biological is the more dangerous. Chemical weapons are substantially less dangerous than the other two because they involve non-living organisms that dissipate in the air. Biological weapons, on the other hand, involve the possible creation of diseases for which there may not be an antidote. And disease knows no borders. It can go from person-to-person, region-to-region, rapidly and rapaciously.

In the background of 9/11, it is thus imperative to ask the question whether it was compelling to reject applying tougher verification provisions to the Biological Weapons Convention. Was it compelling to reject a test ban? And in the wake of the recent Chinese test on satellite destruction, the question must be pondered whether it is not compelling to proceed with trying to stop an arms race in space. Is there not a sense of history that has to be applied to a sense of philosophy?

In terms of philosophy, at this juncture in history it would appear that advancing the rule of law should be the highest priority. Yet Washington has advanced a doctrine of American exceptionalism, which is not about embellishing a city on a hill; it's about denying respect for those living in the valley. Indeed, one respected American scholar waggishly suggested it's misleading to refer to a doctrine of exceptionalism -- which, after all, denotes pride of a nationalist nature; rather, more precisely, it should be considered the doctrine of American *exemptionalism*, which is a very different concept, although the word is not, to my knowledge, in any dictionary.

What America needs today is a reference to philosophical more than ideological guideposts. Jefferson was the philosophical godson of John Locke, who borrowed a metaphor from Hobbes about a state of nature, where life, in Hobbes's terms, was "nasty, brutish, and short." Locke defined civil society -- and this is the distinction

between a state of nature and civil society – as being a place where there would be rules governing disputes and third-party arbitration.

So the fundamental definition of civilization in American heritage involves rules governing disputes with third-party arbitration. The challenge of our times is to figure out how to bring civilized values to international affairs in areas such as the environment, arms control, and trade? From the world's perspective, this administration is parochial in its opposition to the expansion of international law on arms control. But your Congress is increasingly parochial – i.e., protectionist -- in terms of trade. For many societies trade is not only more important than politics, but commercial disputes can be a cause for war. One should therefore be cautious about assuming that one American political party or the other has a monopoly on the best judgment in international policy.

If I were to give advice to anyone at this time, it would be for the Republicans to think more positively about expanding international law in the arms control arena and for Democrats to think more positively about the role of trade rules in international commerce.

Let me briefly conclude with three observations. One relates to literature, not philosophy. When I was at university a few decades back, the fashionable set of books was a group of four written by Alexander Durrell, called *The Alexandria Quartet*. What Durrell did was take a story placed in inter-war Egypt in the town of Alexandria, and he described the same set of events four separate times from the eyes of four separate participants. The plot doesn't matter. What matters is why one would read about the same events four times over? The reason is that there are four totally different stories. The moral of these books is that to have any sense of perspective, any sense of truth, you can not depend on only one set of eyes. Only by looking at events from different sets of eyes can an individual develop a full sense of reality.

By analogy, in international relations, when we think of things the United States does in the world, they can, from an American perspective, seem quite reasonable, but they look very differently from a European, an African, a Middle Eastern, or an Asian perspective. Wisdom comes from listening, and from seeing the world from a multiplicity of views.

The second point I'd like to make is that a decade ago in the United States Congress, we elected a Speaker whose first name was Newt, and as kind of a jocular observation I suggested that in social physics I had discovered a fourth "Newt-onian" law. You may recall that Sir Isaac Newton once suggested that there were three laws of nature, the second of which was that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. That is, action equals reaction. In social physics, it is my view that good deeds and good thoughts can sometimes be reciprocated and remembered, but bad thoughts and bad deeds are seldom forgotten, and that for

every negative action there is a greater reaction. Instead of action equaling reaction as in nature, in social physics reaction can often be greater than action.

Finally, let me say that if there's any period in history when the case for advancing international laws could conceivably be greater, I don't know when it would be. The import of these issues, in many ways, is related to the conventional warfare happening around the globe. It's also separate from it. The lessons, literally of the last decade, in international affairs are a magnification of the notion that nationalism is powerful; it is clear that individual groups and individuals acting alone can do powerfully anarchistic things. The old-fashioned concern for what appeared to be a Hobbesian philosophy of abstraction is now becoming dramatically relevant.

We thus have two contrasting circumstances: a small person acting desperately can have surprisingly large consequences, and at more sophisticated levels of military technology and science, awesome damage can be inflicted which in retrospect might never be justified by the original actions that started a chain of events. A domino theory not of governments toppling – as we were concerned about in Vietnam – but of decision making can be dangerous in a world both of small weapons, and the more sophisticated variety.

With that, I welcome everybody, and thank you very much.

(applause)

LAURENTI: Filippo?

FORMICA: I just would like to thank, first of all, the Century Foundation, for sponsoring this conference, and also the Center for American Progress, for its collaboration. In particular, I wish to thank Jeff Laurenti and Joe Cirincione. Without their efforts, this event wouldn't have been possible.

It's a timely initiative, as we are about to start a new review cycle of the NPT, and this time we are not allowed to fail. This conference also demonstrates the quality of our cooperation. Let me thank all of the distinguished participants as well.

Disarmament and non-proliferation are a political priority for the Italian government. This is why we decided to support this event. And in this spirit, Foreign Minister D'Alema has requested me to convey to all of you his warmest regards.

Disarmament and non-proliferation are more than ever matters of serious concern to the public opinion. On both sides of the Atlantic there is a growing identity of views on the danger created by proliferation of WMDs. At least we agree on something sometimes.

This last year, the international situation has not been marked by much success. The NPT review conference in New York in 2005 ended without any recommendation, notwithstanding the efforts of its president, Ambassador Duarte, and our efforts. Neither was the September, 2005 United Nations summit able to hold any tangible prospects. Yet despite these disappointments, the principles which underpin the general non-proliferation regime have never actually been challenged, and no one doubts on the validity of the NPT. This indicates that the NPT continues to be considered the cornerstone of international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

In addition, in my opinion, many positive elements emerged. First of all, let me mention the role played by the European Union at the NPT review conference, and the balance and comprehensive nature of the European (inaudible) position.

Another positive element was the scope of the debate in New York, in which many important issues were introduced. These include the need for new rules governing the nuclear fuel cycle and access to these capabilities, a more restrictive interpretation of the right of withdrawal from the NPT, and international cooperation for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.

But the debates in New York were marked by the sharply divergent position of countries that give absolute priority to non-proliferation, and others that make nuclear disarmament a pre-condition.

The basis of the international non-proliferation regime is at risk of being undermined. Not only two major crisis are far from being solved, but also increasing tensions are jeopardizing the stability of the regime. I refer in particular to the perception that obligations under the treaties, or at least their implementation, are not balanced. Non-proliferation versus disarmament versus peaceful uses: We must break this vicious circle and take concrete actions. We need a forward-looking approach, a new commitment on the international community, and a fresh start. It's important now to show the political will to make concrete progress. It's time to take action and to bridge the gaps.

Let me focus on a few points. First of all, Italy is engaged in enhancing the role of the European Union, and make it more dynamic. The action of the European Union is based on a strategy of non-proliferation, which was adopted under the Italian presidency in 2003. And among other things, this strategy says that cooperation with the U.S. and other key partners is necessary to ensure a successful outcome of the global fight against proliferation. I look forward to the strengthening of this cooperation, and Jeff told me to stress this aspect.

(laughter)

Which brings me to the second point – it could seem bureaucratic, but it is not – the additional protocol of the IAEA. Without the additional protocol in force, the effectiveness of the agency is seriously constrained. The universalization of the additional protocol will guarantee more effective verification and inspections. Together with the comprehensive safeguards, the additional protocol must be held as the standard of the IAEA verification. In addition, the additional protocol should become a condition for the supply of nuclear material. We have not yet reached an agreement on this measure, and this issue must be taken up in the relevant international fora in the future. We need to make a further step, and to examine the possibility of making mandatory the conclusion of an additional protocol.

Third, negotiation of FMCT is yet another concrete action I would like to draw your attention on. It is significant that for over ten years there has been a substantial agreement in the main international fora on the value-added that the FMCT would give to the nuclear non-proliferation cause. The debate on FMCT held in the (inaudible) during last year proved extremely constructive, and was marked by very promising developments. The draft prepared by the United States on FMCT and on the mandate for the (inaudible) to negotiate it, while not entirely consistent with our approach to this issue, constitutes a significant contribution to the discussion. We are actively engaged in Geneva, and the Italian Parliament representative, Ambassador Trazza, has been appointed as coordinator for FMCT. We believe the time has come to upgrade the level of international commitment toward an FMCT.

Finally, I would like just to mention the entry into force of the CTBT. This objective must remain high on our agenda. Eight years after the nuclear tests in 1998, the North Korean nuclear tests drew sharp criticism from the international community. While it was a major setback for the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament, this event only added a sense of urgency to the entering into force of the treaty. CTBT entering to force would be an important contribution to international peace and security. I hope that our debate will allow us to identify the roadmap, and stimulate concrete answers to the problems that are still in front of us. Thank you very much.

(applause)

DHANAPALA: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The moral I drew from last night's Oscar Award ceremony on the West Coast is that inconvenient truths, or rather the purveyors of inconvenient truths, win Oscars.

(laughter)

They do not win elections. And having lost my own little election last year, I feel quite comfortable in being the purveyor of some inconvenient truths this morning.

The first is that the doomsday clock maintained by the Chicago-based Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists recently moved the clock two minutes closer to midnight, the horrendous symbolic time of the end of the world. And they did so not only because of the threat from weapons of mass destruction that overhangs us all without any redeeming features, but also because of the problems of climate change.

The second inconvenient truth is, of course, the contents of the Stern Report in the UK with regard to climate change, and the IPCC report which came out not so long ago, which told us, incontrovertibly, based on scientific evidence, that by the end of this century, because of human action, temperatures would rise between 1.8 centigrade and 4 centigrade, and that sea levels would most likely rise by 28 to 43 centimeters. Coming from Sri Lanka, which had to suffer the tsunami, I shudder at that particular prospect, more so because in the southwest of the Sri Lanka's Indian Ocean, we have the Maldives, which would be totally inundated by climate change. The Arctic summer sea ice disappears in the second-half of the century. There will be increases in heat waves very likely, and increase in tropical storm intensity, and so on.

The third inconvenient truth is that we live in a world which spends \$1,118 billion U.S. per annum on military expenditure. We have 27,000 nuclear warheads, about 12,000 of them actively deployed amongst the eight known nuclear weapon states, five of them within the NPT, three of them outside, and not counting DPRK.

Now, the moral that I drew from Jared Diamond's formidable work *Collapse* is that while many societies have in the past collapsed faced with these challenges, there are many who have succeeded, and they have succeeded through long-term planning and through a willingness to reconsider core values. We have the opportunity, therefore, to collectively try to rid the world at least of weapons of mass destruction, and of course make the necessary corrective measures with regard to climate change.

I think we have seen perhaps the end of the agenda which brought us to this crisis in our society, which today is so interdependent that any act of nuclear proliferation or any use of nuclear weapons is going to engulf us all in a total catastrophe. The DPRK deal which was concluded recently is a sign that practical, meaningful diplomacy does yield results. Of course, they are results that are six years too late, but still, they are results, results that are a pointer to what can be achieved in other areas of nuclear disarmament and nuclear proliferation.

I'd like to very quickly go through the negative aspects, the bad news, about nuclear weapons in particular, move on then to some of the good news that we can identify as a possible harbinger as a change of circumstance, and finally to conclude with what needs to be done.

As far as the bad news is concerned, we know that nuclear doctrines continue to be held by most of the possessors of nuclear weapons – except perhaps China and India, which have a no-first-use doctrine – which postulate a preemptive use, which have significantly lowered the threshold of the actual use of nuclear weapons, when hitherto there has been a taboo against the use of weapons. So weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular, are described as being vital and essential to the security of these nuclear weapons states. Even in South Asia, the region that I come from, there is a talk of minimum deterrence. There is no attempt to devalue the importance of nuclear weapons. NATO still has nuclear weapons as part of its war fighting doctrine, and indeed there have been no disarmament measures that have been concluded amongst the nuclear weapons states for quite some years. Instead of which we had the rolling back, the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, which is linked of course to the use of nuclear weapons. And now we have the threat of the leader of the Russian Federation not only to withdraw from the CFE, but to withdraw from the INF treaty, which was one of the great products after the end of the Cold War. We also have the United Kingdom advocating the need to replace its Trident. And this, again, is an opportunity that we may lose.

I regard nuclear disarmament and nuclear proliferation as having a symbiotic relationship. And as I have said frequently, and as the Canberra Commission and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission have also repeated, there is an interconnection between the two, and we cannot have progress in one without progress in the other. This has to be a joint venture.

We have had setbacks with regard to non-proliferation. One setback is on the way to being corrected, I hope, if the DPRK follows the agreement that has been recently reached, and if Mr. Mohammed Elbaradei's visit to DPRK is successful in pursuing the agreement further, rather than what happened to the agreed framework.

We however, have on the negative side, Iran's non-compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1737, and its IAEA safeguards agreement. And here, one hopes that the success of diplomacy with the DPRK will encourage all concerned to persist with the diplomatic option.

We have also negative results from the 2005 NPT review conference that was mentioned earlier, the fact that the outcome document at the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary UN General Assembly session last year contained nary a word on disarmament. We've had, also, the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament with regard to a fissile material treaty, as well as all the other agenda items that have been on that single multilateral negotiating body for so long, without any action being taken.

One could go on like that about the various negative aspects, the fact that so many nuclear weapon-free zone protocols have not yet been signed, and that we still don't have any indication that a prevention of a space race in outer space will ever be a reality. But in contrast to that we have, as I said earlier, have had some

indication that there is likely to be an upturn in the fortunes of weapons of mass destruction disarmament and non-proliferation.

There was the recent *Wall Street Journal* Op Ed piece by Mr. Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, all of whom at one time or another have been closely connected with the formulation of policy with regard to weapons of mass destruction for the United States. And their views as expressed in that article do represent a very significant change in the thinking at that level of influential policy makers and decision makers, even though they may have long retired from their official positions.

We have also had all but China and the U.S. ratifying the CTBT, and as the vote indicates in the first committee, an overwhelming number of countries in favor of the entry into force of the CTBT.

There appears to be, despite the lack of transparency regarding nuclear arsenals, certainly a substantial reduction from the Cold War heights of nuclear weapon holdings. And on non-proliferation, we have the Security Council Resolution 1540. The Security Council met yesterday to review the way in which that resolution has been implemented, so that weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of non-state actors. We also have a large sum of money being pledged for nuclear non-proliferation, and for the cooperative threat reduction program that was so ably piloted by Senators Nunn and Lugar.

Another little-known positive advance was when the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone was concluded in September of last year, by the five central Asian countries. This was an enterprise in which the Department of Disarmament Affairs was able to assist the five countries in negotiating, and notwithstanding the fact that there was very strong opposition to their final decision to conclude this nuclear weapon free zone by the three nuclear states from the West, they went ahead and signed this treaty in (inaudible). I think that is a great step forward, and I would hope now that there would be greater efforts with regard to other areas also, to conclude nuclear weapon-free zones.

Let me come to the final phase of my presentation, and that is what needs to be done. We talked about the consensus that has been unraveled. And it is useful to go back to when we did have a consensus. We did have a multilateral consensus, and perhaps the highest watermark of that was the final document of SSOD1 [First Special Session on Disarmament] in 1978. We have never had such widespread agreement across the entire range of disarmament issues, whether it was weapons of mass destruction or conventional, after that.

We also had remarkable consensus when the CTBT, with India opting out, was signed in 1996. We had a bilateral consensus between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union when Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik. We also had, on the Chemical Weapons Convention, a remarkable consensus.

Now, how can we get back to that consensus? I think in getting back to that consensus we need to have a new political leadership. And perhaps there are signs that that new political leadership may emerge. Because if you look ahead, the United States is facing a presidential election in 2008. Mr. Blair is going to leave by June this year, they say. Mr. Putin will face his end of term in 2008, and there will be a new president elected there. And of course, in France there is a very interesting contest for the presidency in April, this year. With this leadership change in four of the five nuclear weapon states in the Security Council, one can hope for a new agenda with regard to weapons of mass destruction. And it is, for us in civil society, to try to urge new perspectives and new opportunities for them to seize so that we all make the right choices at the right time.

We are facing a situation where we have globalization in economics throughout the world and a general upsurge in economic development, particularly with China and India being the main drivers in the G77, and in the developing world. The question will arise as to whether the politics of nationalism will benefit from that, and whether we can democratize the benefits of globalization, and whether the political instability that we see in the world can be in some way subordinated to the economic growth that we have.

The Kissinger, Shultz, Perry, and Nunn article described several steps that could be taken, and I will go through them very briefly. First, and foremost, they talk of intensive work with the leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a giant enterprise. And that is precisely what it must be, a joint enterprise between the haves and the have-nots, so that this double-standard, this apartheid two-tier system must end. If the Security Council can just today discuss 1514 in the context of preventing nuclear weapons reaching non-state actors, it could also discuss nuclear disarmament so that the five countries in the Security Council who have nuclear weapons could discuss ways and means of getting rid of these weapons in order that we may have this world without nuclear weapons.

They talk about a series of agreed and urgent steps which would lay the groundwork for a world free of nuclear threat. This would include changing the cold war posture of deployed nuclear weapons, to increase warning time and thereby reducing the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon – in other words, de-alerting. To continue to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them. Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed. Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence, and provide for periodic review to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was alluded to by the Ambassador of Italy a little while ago. Taking advantage of recent technical advantages, and working to secure ratification by other key states. Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons and weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.

Getting control of the uranium enrichment process combined with a guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the IAEA. Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally, in other words, proceeding with the negotiation of the Fissile Material Treaty. Redoubling efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers. That is a question of addressing the sense of political insecurity that drives some nations to seek nuclear weapons, because nuclear weapons have got this great currency in the international system by virtue of it being held by the five permanent members of the Security Council.

I think another important set of recommendations with regard to the steps we must take is contained in the report of the Weapons of Mass Construction Commission sponsored by the government of Sweden, and chaired by Dr. Hans Blix, who is with us today. He will, no doubt, tell us more about this in the afternoon session in which he will speak. But all of you who have had access to that report know that in the 68 recommendations, that are a number which not only reflect the 13 steps of the 2000 NPT review conference, but also are adopted by the article which I referred to in the *Wall Street Journal*, by the mandarins of U.S. defense policy.

It is also important for me to conclude by recommending one of those recommendations, and that is the World Summit that has been proposed to discuss weapons of mass destruction. I think if we look at the possibility of a well-prepared world summit on the possession, proliferation, and terrorist uses of weapons of mass destruction at a date in 2009, we may be able to achieve the major change that will prevent the collapse of our global society. Thank you very much.

(applause)

LAURENTI: We will take a few minutes, let us say four, five comments/questions, and I will abuse the role of moderator of the opening remarks section by posing a first one, and it's to Jim Leach, based on two observations he made -- one about the many resolutions on which the U.S. has been a solitary spokesman for a unique vision of good relative to the rest of the international community and the General Assembly, and the other about presidential candidates. Does it matter in Washington -- to members of Congress, to others -- that the U.S. has a solitary view and solitary status on matters of arms control and disarmament in the global community, as manifested here? And what may prompt presidential candidates actually to address these issues in the next 18 months? So that's one. I see Sérgio Duarte. Can we have a mike?

DUARTE: Thank you very much. My name is Sérgio Duarte. I'm a retired officer of the Brazilian Foreign Service. My question is also to Congressman Leach. You said in the beginning of your very profound statement that you somehow hoped that in the next couple of years there would be a change of course in the United States policy regarding these matters. You know that the word disarmament has slowly

disappeared from the lexicon of the multilateral world – mainly in the United States, but in other places, too. I recognize that in Italy they still keep that word officially in the Foreign Ministry. This is heartening that some countries still do so.

But my question is, do you see the possibility that with a change of course there will be more attention paid in the United States, and in the other nuclear weapon states, to that part of the equation which also Mr. Dhanapala mentioned? It's not a question of making one thing conditional on the other, because that will never work, and we know that. The contention is that one thing should go in parallel with the other. So my question is, do you think that there is the possibility in the next couple of years that the course will change in that direction? Thank you.

LAURENTI: Any other comments, or questions? All right, Bill Potter?

POTTER: Thank you very much, Jeff. This question is to Filippo, who I think made a very persuasive case for the importance of the additional protocol, and also the concept that the protocol should be a condition for nuclear exports, which I embrace. I'm curious, though, how you reconcile that concept with what I understand to be Italian support for the U.S./India nuclear deal, which would seem to create an exception within the Nuclear Supplier's Group directly contrary to the principle that you've just articulated.

LAURENTI: OK, it's getting lively. Any other comments, or questions? Yes, sir?

SHAMAA: Thank you. My name is Khaled Shamaa from the mission of Egypt.

LAURENTI: I'm sorry. Do you want to stand up please?

SHAMAA: Yeah, sure. Just some very quick remarks. First, I would like to thank all the panelists for the introductory remarks that they made. And I'm very much thankful for James Leach for his reference to *The Alexandria Quartet*, and I think this is the basic element from which we need to start.

What Ambassador Formica mentioned that we are not allowed to fail, I think, does not lead to a positive result if we do not take into consideration the basic element that led us to failure away from the consensus, the unraveling of the consensus. And with regard to the unraveling of the consensus, I would like to add to that that was referred to by Ambassador Dhanapala in terms of the NPT, the consensus of '95 and 2000. A forward-looking approach does not mean, in essence, skipping what was agreed previously. Therefore, the statement by Ambassador Formica that a major part of the failure of the 2005 NPT was due to those who still insist on nuclear disarmament, which obviously is not anymore an objective held dearly by the Italian government – as obvious from the words of Ambassador Formica – is actually reason for concern. Because without that, and without going back to the

basic balance of the NPT, we are actually putting the seeds that might lead to us moving closer to the midnight clock referred to by Ambassador Dhanapala.

Therefore, indeed, we need a forward-looking approach, but we need a forward-looking approach that is balanced. It does not suffice to say or describe the steps that are needed by others to do, but we have also to look at the steps that we need to do ourselves. We cannot only state the steps needed to do by the non-nuclear weapon states, while you shy away from stating the steps that need to be done urgently by the nuclear weapon states.

Therefore, once again, I'd like to thank very much James Leach for his reference to *The Alexandria Quartet*. We need to look at the other versions of the reality of the world. Not that any one of them holds the absolute truth, but there are definitely more than one.

I'm sure this issue will come along today, but maybe just quickly to ask a question to start up discussion on this issue, with reference to the issue of Iran and North Korea – indeed, it's a positive development, the deal that was done with regard to North Korea. But I would just like to refer quickly to a statement that was made by the British Foreign Prime Minister when he was asked about the difference between the danger posed by Iran and the danger posed by North Korea. In his response he mentioned that, well, North Korea is more dangerous because it's not a democratic system, while Iran, it is a democratic system, although we might not agree with their policies, but after all, it is accountable. If an agreement is possible with North Korea, do you think one would be possible with Iran? Thank you.

LAURENTI: OK. And Dr. Blix?

BLIX: I've often been thinking how is it and how did it come that our national societies – or most of them – have come to peace, and that they are not using weapons against each other all the time. And looking back then into the wild history of my own Nordic countries, found that yes, in the early days you had the clans and you had the families fight each other. You had blood revenge as a way of mutually-assured deterrence. And how did we get out of that? And Jim Leach was citing Locke here. I was very intrigued by that, Locke saying that the criteria of a civilized society are their rules regarding disputes of third-party arbitration. Well, it's perfectly true that in the early Middle Ages one tried to use conciliation and arbitration in order to get away from the vendettas and from the blood revenges.

But there was another element, and I always thought that real criterion of civilized society is the monopoly on the possession and use of weapons. Now, that can come about in several ways, and the most common way, in the national societies, was that one thug or one big chief grabbed control of the whole thing, and gradually it evolved into the king's peace. He said that anyone that disturbs the peace is acting against me, and I will take action. You submit to me. You give your weapons to me, and I will control and give you peace. It was not much a

democracy. It was much more a tyranny, but tyranny perhaps was better than anarchy. Democracy came much later. And the use of this force, and possession of these weapons, well, that was submitted to rules in society, and that's what we want to have now.

Now, looking at the international community today, I see some parallel – maybe I shouldn't be intoxicated by this – but some parallel, nevertheless, in which I see that philosophers in the Pentagon evidently think that yes, they might be some sort of sheriff. Their power – I've seen their national strategy, they say that the U.S. power, and détente, end of the war, this will give the possibility not only for a more peaceful but for a better world. I cite it now out of memory. And I think the tremendous military power of the U.S. that came after the end of the Cold War has tempted them to this rather benevolent view that I think is erroneous. And I think that the Iraq war and other things show that they cannot. The Romans did not succeed, and the Americans will not. And the great learning, I think, of the Iraq war, and also the Lebanon experience, is that no, this does not work. It is not Mars, it is the Venus, it is the European Union model that I think will work, that we will agree, and we will gradually – we'll still keep our weapons in different European countries, but we are getting away from any use of weapons between each other.

So that's the little thought I would like to add to Jim Leach's excellent introduction. Thank you.

LAURENTI: Very quickly, Jonathan, and then we will go to our opening presenters for a brief response to our comments.

M: Yes, Ambassador, is there any possibility that any of the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group might say, the India deal is fine, but it doesn't go into effect until the entry into force of a CTBT and an FMCT? Since almost all the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group are formally on record as supporting both an FMCT with verification and a CTBT, would this not be the time to exercise your political leverage and make a difference?

LAURENTI: I have a feeling we're biting the hand that's feeding us here, but OK. So we have questions for our initial presenters about the Washington scene, and presidential candidates, and the taboo word, that "D" word, disarmament, whether it can become pronounceable in American political discourse again. Questions from both Bill, and now Jonathan about Italy and the EU more generally backing the U.S.-India deal, or conditioning it. Mr. Shamaa about agreement being possible with Iran, as well as Quartets, Alexandrian and otherwise. And of course, Mars versus Venus.

LEACH: Well, let me just begin briefly with some comments for Jeff, the Ambassador of Brazil, and Mr. Blix. First, what we have in America today is a President wanting to be a Gaullist, and the Congress, instead of taking too much responsibility as the Executive is trying to do, is vacating responsibility. Whenever you get an

unbalance like this, you're likely to have a reaction. The new Democratic Congress is going to get more active, certainly in oversight, and then the question is whether there will be a dangerous Congressional overreaction. After all, it's Congress that historically blocked our entry into the League of Nations. It's Congress that's blocked common sense treaties in the past. It's Congress that gave us the Smoot-Hawley tariffs.

My personal fear – and I want to underscore this – is that in the American constitutional framework Article I gives Congress, not the Executive, primacy over commerce and it is here where Congress may exercise its greatest intrusiveness. A flip side of the parochialism which the Executive is advancing politically with its doctrine of American exceptionalism is economic protectionism. And I am very concerned that a new round of American protectionism may be spawned by Congress.

With regard to the issue that the Ambassador of Brazil raised, I think it would be fair to say that the word “disarmament” is not considered a common sense term in the American vocabulary today, but arms control is. There is no reason whatsoever that very significant steps in arms control cannot be taken. They could be received well by the American body politic.

What has happened is that one political party in America has gotten influenced by an incredibly narrow set of ideologues, and the other has been scared by them. Here I want to say, as a Republican, I am appalled at the Democratic lack of spine in stepping up on strategic issues where Republicans have floundered. Whether it be defense of the United Nations or defense of arms control, Democrats have been surprisingly timid. Hopefully reasonable people will raise these issues in this presidential campaign.

Finally, let me just say to Mr. Blix, whose comments I think are extremely historically interesting, every educated American is aware of the comment of Lord Acton that power corrupts and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. A corollary, in my view, of Acton's dictum should be that military power tempts and excessive power tempts excessively. If you look at the lessons of recent times – and by recent, I mean the last half-decade – it would appear that military power isn't as relevant to certain circumstances as many thought it might be and that interventionist use of force can too easily become counterproductive.

One of the great questions of our time is what is the relevance of military power in particular circumstances. We are at a point in which from an American perspective we have to maintain a substantial defense capability, but we must be cautious about exercising our power. How you combine the two imperatives – preparedness and restraint -- is going to be the great judgment call for American leadership in the near future. Thank you.

LAURENTI: Filippo?

FORMICA: Yes, thank you very much. The two questions on the U.S./India deal are very good ones, but I cannot speak on behalf of the NSG, of course, members, because there does not exist an NSG position. I could just refer to how we see this agreement.

Well, we don't have a final position on this issue. We haven't made a final statement, official statement, on this issue. First, because we are waiting for the conclusion of the U.S./India deal, and second, because we are waiting for the conclusion of the India/IAEA deal. Those are two important elements of the picture. So we look forward to seeing those two agreements before taking a final position on this.

But what you said about the FMCT is true. We believe, and we've always said this to our Indian colleagues and to our American friends, that an FMCT could make merge the net benefit for the non-proliferation regime of the U.S./India deal. That's why we're insisting in the FMCT in particular. On the other hand, we understand that once those two agreements will be concluded, they will be an important precedent we should consider with care. And we've also said to the Indians that we understand very much their energy needs.

That's why in the latest joint declaration (inaudible) there is a sentence on the importance to consider the Indian energy need, and to discuss a possible framework for enhancing cooperation with India. But we are not at the stage of a final decision on this issue. Thank you.

LAURENTI: Jayantha, the last word.

DHANAPALA: Well, just to link up with what was said earlier regarding the comment on the DPRK deal vis-à-vis the possibility of an Iranian deal – and again, the India/U.S. cooperation deal. I think there has always been this fallacy that there can be safe hands for nuclear weapons and unsafe hands. Whereas, as a matter of fact, we are losing sight of the inherent dangers of this weapon itself. And in any hands, this is a dangerous weapon. We could have a nuclear war by accident or by design. So it is not just a question of a democratic country, or a country which is not a democracy, or non-state actors versus state actors. It is a question of nuclear weapons themselves having to be eliminated. Thank you.

LAURENTI: Thank you very much. We had spoken before at the beginning of the program, Filippo, about standard Italian time. We're running a little late. So we would ask all of you to stay in your places as Joe Cirincione and the first substantive session takes the dais. And we'll proceed straight away into that discussion of 2020.

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