A brief history of U.S.-Iranian nuclear negotiations
Long before their current nuclear crisis, the United States and Iran overcame concerns about proliferation and sovereign rights to negotiate a nuclear accord. Can they do it again?

BY WILLIAM BURR

Despite the attention given to recent Iranian nuclear activities, Tehran’s interest in nuclear technology stretches back more than 30 years. It began in the years preceding the 1979 Islamic Revolution when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi sought a “full-fledged nuclear power industry,” with the capacity to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity, as part of his ambition to turn Iran into a powerful modern state. Yet even in its early stages, Iran’s nuclear intentions were unclear and raised serious concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation.

While the Shah professed not to want nuclear weapons, he was steadfast in Iran’s “right” to the full complement of nuclear fuel cycle technologies. The newly created Atomic Energy Organization of Iran concluded nuclear deals with France and West Germany, but its dealings with the United States progressed slowly: Tehran proposed to purchase eight light water reactors from such U.S. suppliers as General Electric and Westinghouse, while the U.S. government encouraged the Shah to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in a U.S.-based uranium enrichment plant being proposed by the Bechtel Corporation.

From the very beginning, the U.S. negotiations were complicated by proliferation concerns. The 1974 Indian nuclear test had caught President Richard Nixon’s administration by surprise, and when Gerald Ford became president shortly thereafter, his administration began to focus on the possibility that the Indian test might encourage other countries to go nuclear. The administration reasoned that a world with more nuclear powers would be more unstable, the danger of nuclear war would increase, and U.S. influence would ebb as nuclear weapons gave “nations a sense of greater independence.” Nuclear proliferation “would also provide increased opportunity
for subnational theft and blackmail.” The fact that India had produced weapon-grade plutonium from a Canadian-supplied nuclear reactor meant that nuclear power exports could never again be considered as simply commercial propositions. As national security adviser and secretary of state to Nixon, Henry Kissinger had treated nuclear proliferation as a relatively low priority problem; in light of these considerations, however, he began to think otherwise. Before he left office in 1977, he was a true believer: “We should move heaven and earth [to curb proliferation]. Even if we can buy only a decade [it is] worth it to prevent it.”

The Nixon administration had aligned itself closely with the Shah, his dictatorial rule and human rights abuses notwithstanding, so it did not help matters that only weeks after the Indian test, the Shah made statements that raised questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions. When asked whether Iran would pursue nuclear weapons during an interview with a French journalist, the Shah was quoted as saying, “Certainly and sooner than one would think.” Iranian officials quickly denied the statement, suggesting, “[His Imperial Majesty] actually said Iran is not thinking of building nuclear weapons but may revise its policy . . . if other non-nuclear nations do.” The Shah later confirmed this position to a Le Monde reporter, when he ridiculed the nuclear arms race and observed that if other nations in the region acquired nuclear weapons, “then perhaps the national interests of any country at all would demand the same.”

The U.S. ambassador to Iran and former director of central intelligence, Richard Helms, was satisfied with these corrections. In a cable to the State Department, he wrote, “I want to emphasize to you personally that there has been no change in Iran’s declared policy not to acquire nuclear weapons.” But Defense Department and CIA officials were not certain about what the future held. Officials at the Pentagon’s Office of International Security Affairs observed that in light of the Shah’s “caveats” about changing circumstances, “It is inevitable that some in the press and the public will interpret an agreement to supply nuclear fuels . . . as assistance toward a nuclear capability.” CIA analysts further suggested, “[I]f Iran has a full-fledged nuclear power industry and all the facilities necessary to make nuclear weapons [by the 1980s], and if other countries have proceeded with nuclear weapons development, we have no doubt that Iran will follow suit.” Later accounts confirmed these suspicions. The diary of the Shah’s minister of court, which was published in 1993, recounts that the Shah “has a great vision for the future of this country which, though he denies it, probably includes our manufacturing a nuclear deterrent.”

To limit the likelihood that a close ally such as Iran would develop a nuclear weapons capability, Washington wanted to create
Trying to balance nonproliferation concerns with the priority of maintaining good relations with the Shah, U.S. officials favored a position that was not so “strong” that it would encourage the Shah to buy nuclear technology elsewhere, but not so “weak” that Congress would reject it.

significant constraints on any commercial or technical nuclear assistance that it provided. Today, the international community is most concerned about Iran’s effort to enrich uranium, but in the 1970s, the U.S. government and others were most concerned about the Shah’s interest in a domestic reprocessing facility. At that time, reprocessing did not have significant commercial potential, but it did enable scientists to recover plutonium from nuclear fuel once it had been used in a power reactor, and that plutonium could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

During fall 1974, by which time Ford was president, senior U.S. officials recommended a general approach to nuclear negotiations with Iran. Trying to balance nonproliferation concerns with the priority of maintaining good relations with the Shah, they favored a position that was not so “strong” that it would encourage him to buy nuclear technology elsewhere, but not so “weak” that Congress would reject it. Of the four options for negotiating with Iran, State bureau chiefs recommended that Kissinger approve the second toughest, which would provide Washington with “veto rights” on how Tehran would deal with U.S.-supplied nuclear spent fuel, allowing the United States either to insist on “external processing and storage” of spent fuel or to set standards “for internal disposition and possible construction of a multilateral reprocessing plant.” While these provisions might alienate the Shah and other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories, the officials suggested that Washington could take the position that it was setting a “new standard” for future agreements.

The idea of multilateral reprocessing centers came out of an interagency review on nonproliferation strategy initiated by the Ford administration. Worried that inhibitions to nuclear proliferation were weakening, Ford’s advisers observed that even if it was possible only to delay proliferation, a “partially effective strategy” could nonetheless serve U.S. national security interests. Emphasizing cooperative approaches generally, such as a special conference of nuclear suppliers, the review raised the possibility of “regional multinational plants . . . offering favorable terms for reprocessing services to smaller countries,” thereby reducing the risks of emerging independent capabilities to manufacture plutonium.

Kissinger signed off on the recommended option, but it would undergo additional scrutiny before Ford approved a negotiating position. In early spring 1975, before the Shah’s scheduled May visit to Washington, Kissinger presided over an interagency review to
determine the best possible approach to the reactor sale, one that would optimally balance proliferation “principles and objectives” with the swift conclusion of an agreement and the resulting nuclear exports. Agency representatives saw a “serious dilemma” in dealing with Iran because they wanted to impose tighter restrictions than Washington had required in other nuclear agreements. Recognizing that an “overly receptive U.S. reaction” to Iranian interest in reprocessing “could detract from any . . . efforts to discourage such developments” in Pakistan and elsewhere, agency officials believed it was important to seek a virtual veto of reprocessing U.S.-supplied reactor fuel. Because U.S. agencies saw the negotiations with Iran as a potential model for future understandings with other countries, they wanted to persuade Tehran to accept restrictive terms and not feel that Washington was abruptly taking a discriminatory approach on reprocessing, a possibility that worried Helms.9

After reviewing a number of options, ranging from a veto over reprocessing to allowing Iran to “perform reprocessing” with adequate safeguards, Kissinger signed a National Security Decision Memorandum on April 22, 1975.10 The initial negotiating position on reprocessing outlined by the memorandum would be firm: “Continue to require U.S. approval for reprocessing of U.S.-supplied fuel,” with the establishment of a multinational reprocessing facility an “important factor” for securing such approval. As a fallback position, the U.S. would approve reprocessing of U.S. material, even if it did not supply the technology and equipment, as long as the supplier was a “full and active participant in the plant,” and the possibility of U.S. involvement should be “open.” Mutual agreement on “safeguardability” was essential. These positions were consistent with Helms’s suggestion that Washington work for a tacit veto by acquiring “a voice in management decisions” in a reprocessing plant.

**Negotiations, 1975–1976.** When talks between Washington and Tehran began in late April 1975, the Shah’s representatives wanted more give on reprocessing. The Iranian negotiators reasoned that if Tehran made a “strenuous” effort to develop a multinational facility, but failed to get a supplier involved, Iran should not be penalized. The U.S. response was that good intentions weren’t enough: “The added assurances against [proliferation] which accompany supplier involvement depend on its actually being achieved.”11

The concept of a multinational reprocessing facility continued to meet objections from Tehran. To better explain Iran’s concerns, Jack Miklos, the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran further analyzed the Shah’s interest in nuclear power. He observed that no Iranian official had “satisfactorily explained how Iran expects to absorb 23,000 megawatts-electric of additional power within the next 20 years.” He concluded that the Shah’s mo-
Because U.S. agencies saw the negotiations with Iran as a potential model for future understandings with other countries, they wanted to persuade Tehran to accept restrictive terms and not feel that Washington was taking a discriminatory approach.

Talks held in Vienna during September and October 1975 failed to bridge the disagreement, and Iranian atomic energy chief Akbar Etemad rejected Washington’s insistence on a multinational reprocessing plant with U.S. involvement. For Etemad, who spoke for the Shah, U.S. policy was too restrictive because it would “tie [Iran’s] hands for 30 years.” Iran would not buy U.S. reactors “unless the United States [was] prepared to base cooperation only on principles of the NPT, and unless it was clear that Iran was not being treated as a second-class citizen.” He insisted that Tehran had to be able to make “the final decision” on reprocessing.

Not ready to back down, in October, Kissinger asked Helms to explain U.S. motives to the Shah and to make the point that “we are not in any way singling out Iran for special, disadvantageous treatment”; the issues at stake were “directly related to security and stability in the region.” Worried about a “nuclear deadlock” that could hurt U.S.-Iranian relations and deprive U.S. industry of an opportunity, Helms cited the Shah’s remarks in a Business Week interview, where he complained that the U.S. position conflicted with Iran’s sovereignty: Washington was asking for things “that the French or Germans would never dream of doing.” Given the Shah’s nationalistic objections, Helms concluded that the proposal for a regional reprocessing facility was dead and that if Iran insisted on a plant it should be under joint U.S.-Iranian control with “stringent safeguards.” Nevertheless, in November, Etemad objected to “terms of conditions that go beyond [Iran’s NPT] commitments if they are dictated by nuclear-have nations.”

In early 1976, Robert Seamans, director of the Energy Research and Development Administration (the Energy Department’s predecessor) traveled to Iran for meetings with the Shah to move negotiations along. Believing that the Shah would not accept an “ultimate
U.S. veto” over reprocessing and that a multinational or binational reprocessing facility could also prove nonnegotiable, Seamans suggested the possibility of some level of U.S. “consent” involving assignment of U.S. personnel to a reprocessing facility and a “continuing requirement that we be satisfied the safeguards applied to these activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] are effective.” To increase U.S. “leverage” against Iranian national reprocessing, some State officials were interested in a “buy-back” option to purchase spent fuel rods. Kissinger supported exploring this idea, but if it failed, he wanted U.S. diplomats to try to negotiate other forms of leverage over Iranian decisions on reprocessing.15

Besides negotiating a suitable U.S. agreement with Iran, Kissinger also faced the prospect of Pakistan building a nuclear weapons capability and the consequences of West Germany’s nuclear commerce with Iran, which also raised concerns about reprocessing. Believing that the Germans had not taken a tough enough position in their nuclear agreement with Iran, Kissinger told Germany’s ambassador to the United States, Berndt von Staden, “We had strongly urged that the [Federal Republic of Germany] not transfer reprocessing to Iran.” Von Staden argued that Germany’s agreement included safeguards designed to limit Iran’s freedom of action, yet he conceded that the agreement did not prevent reprocessing. This prompted Kissinger to observe, “This agreement is not greeted with enthusiasm by the United States... [W]e cannot avoid saying that we did not approve of this agreement.”16

The prospect of a multinational reprocessing facility in Iran remained part of the U.S. negotiating position throughout 1976, but by May, Kissinger already had serious doubts about it. While he observed that opposing reprocessing made sense, in his mind, the multinational concept was contrary to U.S. interests and a “fraud.” For example, a multinational reprocessing facility in Pakistan designed to serve countries in the region could be a “cover” for national reprocessing, while the Pakistanis would not want one located in Iran, outside of their control. “[We should] not fall on our own swords to push others into multinational projects,” Kissinger opined. The negotiations with Iran, however, had gone too far to abandon the concept.17

The initial nuclear agreement. Hopeful that it could persuade the Shah to “set a world example by foregoing national reprocessing” as a “major act of nuclear statesmanship,” the Ford administration was more interested in the “buy-back” concept as a fallback to the multinational facility option.18 By May 1976, the two sides appeared to converge on basic principles. Based on talks with Etemad, State and the Energy Research and Development Administration sent the U.S. Embassy in Tehran a draft agreement. The key provisions concerned reprocessing and safeguards.19
As far as Kissinger was concerned, the crux of any agreement with Iran would be the buy-back option. He was not willing to take any chances that Iran would someday use U.S. technology to reprocess spent fuel. In keeping with the U.S. interest in “consent,” the draft stipulated that reprocessing spent fuel obtained from the United States must be “performed in facilities acceptable to the parties.” Before Tehran could consider reprocessing, though, the United States would have the right to buy back spent fuel, with payment in money or in the equivalent value of reactor fuel. Alternatively, Iran could transfer spent fuel to another country or group of nations, as long as it was used for peaceful purposes under mutually acceptable safeguards. The U.S. draft spelled out additional arrangements—above and beyond IAEA safeguards intended to prevent diversion into military applications—to support nonproliferation interests. Additionally, it stated that Washington would have the right to review the design of any reactor or other equipment and devices “determined to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards,” and designated U.S. personnel would have “access in Iran to all places and data necessary to account for . . . special nuclear material.”

The agreement included a note designed to address “special” aspects of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. If Washington did not exercise the buy-back option and Iran chose to establish reprocessing facilities, Tehran would be required to “achieve the fullest possible participation in the management and operation of such facilities of the nation or nations which serve as suppliers of technology and major equipment.” Moreover, Iran would invite the United States to “participate fully and actively in [the] management and operation” of the facilities. If Iran’s “strenuous” efforts to secure multinational participation failed for “reasons beyond [its] control,” Tehran could develop reprocessing facilities “acceptable to the parties” that followed the agreement’s rigorous safeguards.

In Iran’s response to the U.S. draft agreement, Etemad rejected a veto of Iranian reprocessing of U.S.-supplied spent fuel: “[Iran] seriously intended to have [reprocessing] performed in facilities established in Iran. . . . [In] all fairness [Washington should] be prepared to supply Iran with the means to establish all facilities which . . . constitute [an] integral part of [Iran’s] nuclear power program.” He continued, “[Iran should] have the full right to decide whether to reprocess or otherwise dispose [of] or treat the materials provided under the agreement.” Nevertheless, the Iranians left the U.S. buy-back option on the table; if Iran chose not to reprocess, Washington could either provide financial compensation or enriched uranium “equivalent in energy value to the recov-
erable special nuclear material” contained in the spent fuel.20

As far as Kissinger was concerned, the crux of any agreement with Iran would be the buy-back option. He was not willing to take any chances that Iran would someday use U.S. technology to reprocess spent fuel. In early August, Kissinger met with the Shah in Tehran. While the record of their discussions is not available, Kissinger apparently let the Shah know that Washington could not accept a “purely national” Iranian reprocessing plant and that even a binational plant would not be possible. Indeed, Kissinger later wrote that “we’ll insist on processing in [the] United States.”21

Whatever the Shah may have thought about Kissinger’s stand on national reprocessing, when U.S. officials traveled to Iran in late August, they found Etemad relatively cooperative; while insisting that Iran would not “accept discriminatory treatment,” he conceded that the key issue for Iran was an “assured fuel supply.” U.S. officials could not make such assurances, but they explained that they wanted the agreement to reflect “U.S. intent to perform” within “practical and legal limits.” “They also stressed that [the] bottom line of [the] U.S. May 31 draft enables reprocessing in Iranian national facilities, thus ensuring that Iran is not foreclosed from every solution to reprocessing problem.” In the ensuing discussion, the Iranians showed readiness to consider the alternatives to the “bottom line,” e.g., the buy back (“fuel exchange”) or third-country reprocessing.22

A shift in U.S. policy. Helms saw these discussions as a “promising basis” for continuing negotiations with Iran. But the domestic pressure of the 1976 presidential elections forced the Ford administration to tighten its policy on reprocessing. Near the end of October, Ford belatedly responded to Jimmy Carter’s criticisms about his nonproliferation policy. In keeping with the direction of the ongoing negotiations with Iran, Ford took a restrictive approach toward reprocessing: “[It] should not proceed unless there is sound reason to believe that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation.” To support that judgment, Ford called for changes in domestic nuclear policies, cooperation between nuclear exporters on behalf of “maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technology,” and international cooperation to ensure that “customer nations have an adequate supply of fuel for their nuclear power plants,” among other measures.23

Ford’s new policy approach raised questions about the Iranian agreement. If reprocessing at home or abroad “should not proceed,” the provisions in the draft agreement allowing Iranian reprocessing under some conditions would likely require renegotiating. In any event, the 1976 presidential campaign put the talks on hold, and the incoming Carter administration’s nonproliferation policy review would produce further delay. Carter’s likeliness to take a harder
In the first half of 1978, few were prescient enough to anticipate the looming revolution, and the two sides concluded the nuclear negotiations on the assumption that the United States would sell Iran eight reactors. Neither Carter nor the Shah would ever sign the accord.

line against reprocessing than Ford may have influenced a February 1977 Iranian announcement that Tehran had given up the option of a national reprocessing facility and was, instead, looking at binational and multinational options. In making this announcement, Etemad said that he assumed safeguards would be integral to the Carter administration’s approach, but he asserted that no country “has a right to dictate nuclear policy to another.”

Officials at the U.S. Embassy and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, who had been visiting Iran, did not entirely believe Etemad’s statements about reprocessing. When Oak Ridge officials received a briefing from Iranian officials about plans for the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, they observed that its location reminded them geologically (“between two mountains”) of the U.S. weapons laboratory at Sandia, New Mexico. According to the Oak Ridge scientists, the “unusually large” size of the facility “makes it theoretically possible to produce weapon-grade material (plutonium),” although they were unable to make “categorical statements” and concluded that the facility could just as easily produce “mixed oxide appropriate for reactor cores.” In any event, the scientists concluded that the facility “bears watching” because its plans included a “large hot lab,” which would be capable of supporting the first steps toward reprocessing. The implication of this analysis was that as hard as Washington was willing to work to leverage nuclear sales for non-proliferation ends, Iran might circumvent an agreement and pursue weapons-related activities.

The Carter administration’s policy review took longer than anticipated, but on April 7, 1977 it issued its first official policy statement on nuclear proliferation. The key announcement was the decision to defer “indefinitely” commercial reprocessing in the United States in order to discourage other countries from reprocessing. While acknowledging that nuclear exporters such as France and West Germany had a “perfect right” to reprocess spent fuel, Carter wanted to reach a “worldwide understanding” with them to curb the risks of widespread reprocessing capabilities. To show that Washington would be a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel, he announced that he would submit to Congress “legislative steps to permit us to sign . . . supply contracts and remove the pressure for the reprocessing of nuclear fuels.” In response to press questions about the multinational reprocessing option that the Ford administration had considered, Carter said that he had not made a decision but that “regional plants
under tight international control” were a possibility to explore.26

Carter amplified the new position in subsequent statements, and the tough line on reprocessing undoubtedly shaped his guidance on negotiations with Iran. Carter’s ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, presented his credentials to the Shah on June 18. Not wanting to look too “eager,” Sullivan did not bring up the nuclear negotiations. But the Shah told him that he was ready to resume the talks and expressed hope that the reactors would be sold. The Shah also made a “specific disavowal of interest in reprocessing plant.” Skeptical, an official at the Pentagon’s Office of International Security Affairs’ Iran desk drew a little picture of a bull next to those words.27

While State officials had hoped that early congressional action on White House nonproliferation objectives would expedite the agreement with Iran, Carter did not sign the Nonproliferation Act that codified his policies until March 1978. Either way, the act did not change anything in the negotiations with Iran because its provisions—i.e., the application of IAEA safeguards on nuclear exports and a prohibition of reprocessing U.S.-supplied material without U.S. approval—kept with the direction of the negotiations.28 Indeed, U.S. and Iranian officials had completed negotiations the month before, after a brief conversation between Carter and the Shah in Tehran in late December 1977 had hastened the process.

The final nuclear agreement. During the weeks that followed Carter’s visit, riots broke out in Tehran. In the first half of 1978, few were prescient enough to anticipate the looming revolution, and the two sides concluded the nuclear negotiations on the assumption that the United States would sell Iran eight reactors. During that summer, U.S. and Iranian diplomats initialed the accord, signaling informal agreement, although neither Carter nor the Shah would ever sign it. As in the 1976 draft, the final agreement retained a U.S. veto on reprocessing but did not include options for buy back or a multinational plant. Under Article 6, Iran would not reprocess spent fuel or enrich uranium supplied by the U.S. “unless the parties agree.” The agreement’s separate note was more detailed than in the 1976 draft. In addition to including language on physical security, expeditious U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission action on licenses, and international fuel cycle studies, the note provided alternative suggestions for handling spent fuel resulting from both U.S.-supplied fuel and reactors: storage in Iran; storage in the United States; or “storage, processing, or other disposition . . . in accordance with internationally accepted arrangements.” The latter could involve reprocessing in Britain, France, or “other mutually agreed states and return of recovered plutonium in the form of fabricated fuel to Iran, under arrangements which are deemed to be more proliferation resistant than those which currently exist.”29
Even though the final agreement was premised on constraining Iran’s freedom to operate nuclear technology, the Shah and his advisers accepted the conditions as part of the price of the nuclear reactors and, presumably, good relations with Washington. The bottom line of each of these possibilities was that Iran would not have the option of reprocessing U.S. supplied material. Iran’s spent fuel could be reprocessed in Western Europe but only if it was impossible to store the material in Iran, the United States, or Western Europe. During negotiations, Washington wanted reprocessing in Western Europe to be “an option of last resort,” but Tehran wanted it to be an “equal choice” with the storage options. According to a State telegram, the Iranians feared a discriminatory outcome: “[The] United States would strike a deal with others to allow commercial-scale reprocessing subsequent to U.S.-Iran agreement.” To accommodate the Iranians on this point, without sacrificing nonproliferation objectives, Washington agreed to include a separate paragraph in the agreement that spelled out circumstances under which nondiscriminatory treatment would be possible and reprocessing in Europe would be better than a “last resort.” All options would be “subject to U.S. law which includes determination of no significant increase in the risk of proliferation associated with approvals for reprocessing.”

Even though the agreement was premised on constraining Iran’s freedom to operate nuclear technology, the Shah and his advisers accepted the conditions as part of the price of the nuclear reactors and, presumably, good relations with Washington. Whatever the Shah’s motives, domestic Iranian instability ballooned during August and September 1978, throwing the nuclear agreement and everything else up in the air. The U.S. Embassy interpreted an editorial on nuclear policy in the prestigious Kayhan International newspaper as a sign that some officials in the government wanted to renegotiate the accord, partly because of the provisions on reprocessing.

Not long after the Shah initiated martial law under a new prime minister, Jalfaar Sharif-Emami, in August 1978, Etemad resigned his position as atomic energy chief. Major cutbacks in government capital investment programs, the U.S. Embassy reported, had already “paralyzed the decision-making process in both [the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran] and Ministry of Energy on matters nuclear.” Except for the four reactors under construction with the help of Germany and France, “nuclear activity . . . has come to a halt.” Iranian officials were nonetheless bullish about their country’s nuclear prospects telling a local Westinghouse representative that they wanted to work with the U.S. nuclear industry and that “the bilateral would certainly not be scrapped.” This attitude proved to be
wishful thinking. When the Shah’s regime collapsed in 1979, so did the nuclear power program; neither the French nor the Germans finished work on their reactor projects.

The apprehension about nuclear proliferation in South Asia and the Middle East that may have encouraged the Shah to think about a nuclear option did not vanish with his overthrow, however. Significantly, the same nationalism that informed Iran’s stance toward nuclear technologies under the monarchy and emphasized Iran’s “full right” to reprocess and concerns about “second-class” status foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” under the NPT. And ironically, U.S. enmity toward Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution has critically impacted the regime’s security calculations, increasing its interest in nuclear deterrence. Understanding the background to Iran’s initial quest of nuclear power technologies will not in and of itself create better negotiating positions for today’s leaders, but a more comprehensive understanding of the motivations at play is essential if present negotiations are to succeed.

William Burr is a senior analyst at the National Security Archive at George Washington University where he directs a documentation project on nuclear weapons. He has written for the Journal of Cold War Studies, Diplomatic History, and is a regular contributor to the Bulletin. He thanks Malcolm Byrne and J. Samuel Walker for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

NOTES


28. Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation,” pp. 239–240. A requirement for IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities (“full scope”) in the 1978 law would not apply to the agreement with Iran because it was not to go in effect for 18 months.


