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RF Decree No. 264

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Translated from the Russian by Laurel Nolen, Research Associate, and Irina Yashkova, Graduate Research Assistant, CNS, MIIS.  December 1997.  The Russian text of this decree is available upon request.
 

Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation

March 7, 1997 No. 264

Moscow

On Confirming the Regulations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations, and Nuclear Material Storage Facilities

The Government of the Russian Federation decrees:
1.  That the proposed Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials presented by the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy and approved by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Defense Industry, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Ministry of Transportation, the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry, the Russian Federation Ministry of General and Vocational Education, the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice, the Russian Federation State Customs Committee, the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, and the Russian Academy of Sciences, be approved.
2.  That federal organs of executive power and organizations involved in the production, use, storing, reprocessing, and transportation of nuclear materials, as well as the design, construction, use, and decommissioning of nuclear installations and nuclear material storage facilities must, before 1 January 1999, take measures to ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear installations, and nuclear material storage facilities in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations in Point 1 of this decree, and approve, in the established procedure, departmental normative acts.
 

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation
 V. Chernomyrdin

 
 
APPROVED
by Decree of the Government
of the Russian Federation
March 7, 1997, No.264

 
 
REGULATIONS
On the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Material Storage Facilities
 
I. General Statutes
1.  These Regulations are drafted in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation in the sphere of providing for nuclear safety and security while conducting nuclear activities and in consideration of the Russian Federation’s international obligations and IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear materials,[1] nuclear installations, and nuclear material storage facilities.
2.  These Regulations establish requirements for providing for the physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear installations, and nuclear material storage facilities[2] throughout the Russian Federation that are mandatory for all legal entities conducting nuclear activities, regardless of form of property, source of financing, or subordination to any agency, and for federal organs of executive power coordinating and controlling nuclear activities.
    The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense has the right to establish special requirements for physical protection for individual dangerous nuclear facilities under its jurisdiction with consideration for the particularities of their operations.
    These Regulations govern situations that arise in the process of providing for safety while nuclear activities are conducted.
3. It is forbidden to conduct nuclear activities without providing for the physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear installations, and nuclear material storage facilities in accordance with the requirements of these Regulations.
4. The terms used in these Regulations[3] are defined as follows:
Access—entry into guarded zones of a dangerous nuclear facility;
Alarm system—a combination of detection devices, a warning system, and a system for collecting, displaying, and processing
data;
Anti-ramming device—a barrier designed to force a vehicle to stop;
Checkpoint—a specially equipped area through which access is gained in accordance with the pass regime;
Clearance—permission to do certain work or to obtain certain documents and information;
Dangerous nuclear facility—an enterprise (organization, military unit) at which nuclear material is used, or stored, or at which
a nuclear installation is located or operated or a nuclear material storage facility;
Detection—establishing the fact of an unauthorized action;
Detection device—a device designed to automatically sound an alarm in the instance that an unauthorized action is taken;
Diversion—any premeditated action involving nuclear materials, nuclear installations, nuclear material storage facilities or
vehicles carrying nuclear materials or nuclear installations, that can directly or indirectly cause an accident situation and which can create a threat to human life and health as a result of radiation or cause radioactive contamination of the environment;
Emergency card—a short list of instructions indicating the main characteristics of the shipment being transported, particularly
its potential danger, the procedure for safely liquidating the results of an accident involving the vehicle transporting the shipment, and first aid procedures for accident victims;
External threat—a threat from an external violator;
External violator—a violator who does not have access to guarded zones;
Guarded zone—a protected, inner, or high security zone;
Guard unit—an armed unit responsible for protection and defense of a dangerous nuclear facility or means of transportation
carrying nuclear materials;
High security zone—a guarded zone located inside an inner zone;
Inner zone—a guarded zone located within a protected zone;
Internal violator—a violator who has the right to enter guarded zones unaccompanied;
Internal threat—a threat from an internal violator;
International transportation of nuclear materials—the transportation of nuclear materials by different means of transportation
from the territory (facility) of the shipping country to the territory (facility) of the receiving country;
License—permission to conduct nuclear activity granted to the administration of a dangerous nuclear facility by authorized
state safety regulation organs;
Nuclear activity—activity related to the production, use, storage, reprocessing, and transportation of nuclear materials, or
the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear installations and nuclear materials storage facilities;
Nuclear installations—
a. structures and complexes with a nuclear reactor, including nuclear plants, military nuclear power plants, ships or any other floating craft, spacecraft, aircraft, or any other vehicles or transportable craft;
b. structures and complexes with production, experimental, or research reactors, critical or subcritical assemblies, including military research nuclear reactors and critical assemblies;
c. structures, complexes, testing grounds, installations, and devices with nuclear charges;
d. other structures containing nuclear materials, complexes, or installations for the production, use, reprocessing and transportation of nuclear fuel and nuclear materials;
Nuclear material—material containing or able to produce fissionable (fissile) nuclear substances, including:
a. depleted uranium—uranium having a lower percentage of the isotope U-235 than is found in natural uranium;
b. irradiated nuclear material—nuclear material that, as a result of exposure to neutrons in a nuclear reactor or other nuclear installation, emits the equivalent of a radiation dose of greater than 1 Sv per hour (100 rem per hour) at a distance of one meter without any biological protection;
c. enriched uranium—uranium having a higher percentage of the isotope U-235 than is found in natural uranium
d. spent nuclear fuel—irradiated nuclear fuel that will no longer be used in a nuclear reactor;
e. natural uranium—uranium containing roughly 99.28 percent U-238, 0.71 percent U-235, and about 0.01 percent U-234;
f. radioactive waste—nuclear materials that will no longer be used;
g. low-irradiated nuclear material—nuclear material that, as a result of exposure to neutrons in a nuclear reactor or other nuclear installation, emits the equivalent of a radiation dose of less than or equal to1 Sv per hour (100 rem per hour) at a distance of one meter without any biological protection;
Nuclear materials storage facility—a stationary facility or structure that is not a part of a nuclear installation and is intended
for the storage of nuclear materials and the storage or burial of radioactive waste;
Pass regime—an established procedure for admitting personnel, visitors, visiting workers, means of transportation, objects,
materials, and documents across the boundary of the guarded zone or into (out of) a building, structure, or area;
Perimeter—the boundary of the guarded zone, equipped with physical protection devices and checkpoints;
Personnel—employees of the dangerous nuclear facility;
Physical barrier—a physical obstacle that serves to impede a violator’s attempt to enter guarded zones;
Physical protection—a combination of organizational measures, engineering and technical devices, and the actions of
guard units intended to prevent the diversion or theft of nuclear materials;
Protected zone—an area of a dangerous nuclear facility that is surrounded by physical barriers, is constantly guarded and
monitored, and to which access is limited and controlled;
Rule of two (three) persons—the principle of team work (including opening areas and placing them under guard), based on
the requirement that two (three) persons should be present at the same time in the same area in order to limit the possibility of unauthorized actions;
Security service—an internal unit at a dangerous nuclear facility that is responsible for organizing and controlling the
implementation of measures for physical protection and a number of other special tasks;
Threat—a potential opportunity to divert or steal nuclear materials;
Unauthorized access—penetration of unauthorized individuals into guarded zones, buildings, structures, areas, or the
freight compartment of a vehicle carrying nuclear materials;
Unauthorized action—the act or attempted act of diversion or theft of nuclear materials, unauthorized access, bringing in
forbidden objects, or disabling physical protection devices;
Violator—a person who has performed or has tried to perform unauthorized actions, as well as any person assisting him;
Vulnerable areas—
a. places where nuclear materials are used or stored;
b. parts of systems, equipment, or devices of a nuclear installation or nuclear materials storage facility which may be involved in diversion attempts;
c. parts of the physical protection system that, if overcome, give the violator the greatest probability of successfully diverting or stealing nuclear materials;
Warning system—an emergency system alerting the guard unit.
5. Physical protection is intended to fulfill the following tasks:
a. to prevent unauthorized access;
b. to detect unauthorized actions in a timely manner;
c. to halt (slow down) entry by a violator;
d. to stop unauthorized actions;
e. to detain persons involved in preparing to carry out or carrying out the diversion or theft of nuclear material.
    Physical protection should be implemented in all phases of design, construction, use, and decommissioning of nuclear installations and nuclear materials storage facilities, as well as when handling nuclear materials, including their transportation.
6. The requirements of departmental normative acts should be no lower than the requirements of these Regulations.
7. Federal organs of executive power and organizations possessing knowledge of physical protection, as well as the administration (organs of military command, for facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) of a dangerous nuclear facility must take the necessary measures to protect information on the organization and operation of the physical protection system.
8. All technical devices of the physical protection system must be certified in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation.
9. The head of the facility (the commander, for facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) is responsible for providing for the physical protection of the facility.
10. Any individual or legal entity violating these Regulations will be prosecuted in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation.
II. Function of Federal Organs of Executive Power and Organizations Providing Physical Protection
11. In order to fulfill the tasks of physical protection, federal organs of executive power, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and organizations having subordinate dangerous nuclear facilities, will provide, within the scope of their authority:
  • organization and coordination of activities for providing physical protection to subordinate dangerous nuclear facilities;
  • development and confirmation, in the established procedure, of normative regulatory acts concerning providing physical protection at subordinate dangerous nuclear facilities;
  • control over the organization and condition of physical protection at dependent dangerous nuclear facilities;
  • fulfillment of obligations to the Russian Federation within the framework of international cooperation in the area of physical protection.
12. The Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation will, within the scope of its authority:
  • provide for the cooperation of federal organs of executive power, organs of executive power of the constituents of the Russian Federation, and organizations having subordinate dangerous nuclear facilities on issues regarding providing physical protection;
  • fulfill the function of the central state organ and point of communications in accordance with the statutes of the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the function of the national competent organ on fulfilling the Russian Federation’s obligations to the IAEA and other international organizations in the area of physical protection;
  • fulfill the function of the state competent organ on nuclear security and radiation safety during the transport of nuclear materials;
  • issue certification for technical items used in physical protection systems.
13. The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, within the scope of its authority:
  • will provide clearance checks for individuals working with nuclear materials, at nuclear installations, and in nuclear material storage facilities;
  • will conduct operative search activities to expose, prevent, cut off, and uncover crimes involving nuclear materials, nuclear installations, and nuclear material storage facilities;
  • will participate in providing the secure transport of nuclear materials and physical protection of dangerous nuclear facilities in the regime of daily activities (hereafter, the normal situation) and in emergency situations;
  • will participate in the development of normative regulatory acts on providing physical protection.
14. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, within the scope of its authority:
  • will provide for the security and defense of dangerous nuclear facilities, and during the transport of nuclear materials, will provide an escort;
  • will provide for the development and confirmation, in the established procedure, of normative regulatory acts on providing security and defense of dangerous nuclear facilities.
15. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, within the scope of its authority:
  • will provide for the security and defense of subordinate dangerous nuclear facilities;
  • will participate in providing defense for dangerous nuclear facilities not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense in emergency situations;
  • will implement state oversight for providing physical protection of dangerous nuclear facilities subject to monitoring;
  • will provide for the development and confirmation, in the established procedure, of normative regulatory acts concerning state oversight for providing physical protection to dangerous nuclear facilities subject to monitoring.
16. The Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, within the scope of its authority:
  • will implement state oversight for providing physical protection for dangerous nuclear facilities subject to monitoring;
  • will provide for the development and confirmation, in the established procedure, of normative regulatory acts concerning state oversight for providing physical protection for dangerous nuclear facilities subject to monitoring;
  • will provide for the fulfillment of the Russian Federation’s obligations in the framework of international cooperation on oversight for the state of physical protection at dangerous nuclear facilities subject to monitoring.
17. The Ministry of Communications of the Russian Federation, during transportation of nuclear materials via railroad, within the scope of its authority:
  • will fulfill the function of the state competent organ on the transportation of nuclear materials via railroad;
  • will provide for the safety of movement during the transportation of nuclear materials by rail;
  • will participate in the development of normative regulatory acts on physical protection of nuclear materials during transportation;
  • will implement the coordination of projects for outfitting special train cars with physical protection equipment;
  • will provide for the fulfillment of obligations of the Russian Federation in the framework of international cooperation in transporting nuclear materials and international rail freight.
18. The Ministry of Transportation of the Russian Federation, during transportation of nuclear materials, within the scope of its authority:
  • will fulfill the function of the competent organ on transportation of nuclear materials;
  • will provide for the safety of movement of means of transport implementing the transportation of nuclear materials;
  • will provide for the fulfillment of physical protection requirements for nuclear materials;
  • will participate in the development of normative regulatory acts on the physical protection of nuclear materials during transportation;
  • will provide for the fulfillment of obligations of the Russian Federation in the framework of international cooperation in the area of transporting nuclear materials.
19. The State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation, within the scope of its authority:
  • will ensure priority customs processing and control of nuclear materials during their export and import;
  • will ensure measures are taken to prevent the unauthorized transportation of nuclear materials across customs border of the Russian Federation;
  • will provide physical protection of nuclear materials and storage facilities in the instance that the materials are detained during customs processing and control, and will develop and confirm, in the established procedure, the appropriate normative regulatory acts.
III. Main Requirements for Organizing Physical Protection of Dangerous Nuclear Facilities
20. During the creation of a system of physical protection for a dangerous nuclear facility, it is necessary to:
consider the particular features of the facility and its existing measures for safety and security, including but not limited to nuclear, radiation, environmental, fire, and technical safety and security;
ensure the stable operation of the system, such that the failure of a particular element of the system neither causes the breakdown of the entire system nor leads to the failure of another element;
minimize the number of individuals who have access to nuclear materials and nuclear installations.
21. Depending on the category of nuclear materials being used (see the appendix to these Rules), the particular features of the nuclear installation, and the nuclear material storage facility, the dangerous nuclear facility must have the appropriate guarded zones.
    In a high security zone, the rule of two (three) must be observed.
22. Nuclear materials in Categories I and II must be used and stored in an inner or high security zone; nuclear materials in Category III may be kept in any guarded zone.
23. Nuclear materials not included in Categories I, II, or III must be accorded physical protection according to practical expediency.
24. Nuclear installations must be located in an inner or high security zone.
25. The system of physical protection must include the following: organizational measures, engineering and technical devices, and the activity of the guard unit.
26. Organizational measures within the framework of the physical protection system must include a set of measures implemented by the administration (command, for facilities under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) of the dangerous nuclear facility, and normative acts that regulate these measures.
27. The administration (the organs of military command, for facilities under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) of the dangerous nuclear facility (its security service) will:
a) develop, create and implement the physical protection system;
b) conduct analyses of the vulnerability of the dangerous nuclear facility jointly with specialized organizations in order to determine internal and external threats and probable methods of their implementation, as well as to discover vulnerabilities in the nuclear installation, nuclear material storage facility, and technological processes of using and storing nuclear materials. The procedure for conducting analyses of the vulnerability of the dangerous nuclear facility and systems of physical protection are determined by departmental normative acts;
c) assess potential environmental and economic damage resulting from the realization of internal and external threats;
d) develop and confirm, in the established procedure, the following normative acts:
  • the statute on the pass regime and on the permission system for clearance and access to nuclear materials, nuclear installations, and nuclear material storage facilities, which determines the organization of the pass regime and procedure for issuing (revoking, extending, restoring) clearance and access rights to personnel, individuals in the guard unit, visitors, visiting workers, and means of transport for entry into guarded zones;
  • the security and defense plans for the dangerous nuclear facility, which determine the procedures for action and the number of security guards in normal and emergency situations;
  • the plan for cooperation among the administration, security service, guard unit, and personnel of the dangerous nuclear facility in normal and emergency situations (excluding facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense);
  • the plan for cooperation of the administration (the organs of military command, for facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense), security service, and guard unit of the dangerous nuclear facility with organs of the Russian Federation Federal Security Service and the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs in normal and emergency situations;
  • the plan to check the technical condition and proper operation of engineering and technical means of physical protection;
  • e) exercise control over observing the requirements of documents listed in this point.
    28. Engineering and technical means of physical protection consist of technical devices and physical barriers.
    Technical means of physical protection include:
    • alarm systems located along the perimeter of guarded zones, buildings, structures, facilities;
    • means to implement access, installed at checkpoints and in guarded buildings, structures, and areas;
    • optical-electronic monitoring systems behind the perimeter of guarded zones, checkpoints, guarded buildings, structures, and areas;
    • special communications systems;
    • devices for detecting the presence of nuclear materials, explosives, and metal objects;
    • utility systems (electricity, lighting, and so on).
        The perimeters of guarded zones; guarded buildings, structures, and facilities located in inner or high security zones; and checkpoints must be equipped with:
    • detection devices (the perimeter of a protected zone must be equipped with devices that operate on no fewer than two different physical principles);
    • optical-electronic monitoring devices;
    • mobile communications systems;
    • utility systems.
        In addition, inner and high security zones and checkpoints must be equipped with devices for implementing access and devices for detecting the presence of nuclear materials, explosives, and metal objects.
        All devices included in the physical protection system, in case of shutdown of the main electricity grid, must remain operational, which will be effected by the automatic switch to reserve power sources.
        All emergency exits located in the guarded zone and in guarded buildings (structures, facilities) in which nuclear materials or installations are located must be locked and equipped with detection devices and in case of an accident, must provide an unblocked exit for people.
    29. Physical barriers are structures in the dangerous nuclear facility (walls, covers, gates, doors), specially developed structures (barricades, anti-ramming structures, gratings, reinforced doors, containers) and other physical barriers.
        There must be no fewer than two physical barriers along the perimeter of a protected zone.
        Checkpoints must be equipped with safety devices to protect guards from firearms, and transportation checkpoints must be equipped with anti-ramming structures.
        Personnel, visiting workers, and visitors (hereafter--individuals) and their belongings may be searched, including the use of devices for detecting nuclear materials, explosives, and metal objects.
        All entrances (exits) to buildings, structures, and facilities located in inner or high security zones must be equipped with locks (locking devices), including code-blocking devices, detection devices, optical-electronic monitoring devices, and access devices.
        Individuals are searched for nuclear materials upon exiting a high security zone.
        All vehicles leaving guarded zones and carrying containers and vessel out of guarded zones must be searched using the rule of two (three) in order to uncover unauthorized transport of nuclear materials out of the zone.
    30. The security and defense of dangerous nuclear facilities is implemented by the appropriate units of the internal troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, non-departmental guards of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, or departmental guards of dangerous nuclear facilities.
        The list of dangerous nuclear facilities to be guarded by the internal troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs is determined by the government of the Russian Federation.
        The operating procedure and tasks carried out by the guard unit is determined by the appropriate federal organs of executive power. The necessary normative acts are to be developed jointly with the administration of the dangerous nuclear facility and the command of the internal troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs that implements security and defense of the particular dangerous nuclear facility (except facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense).
        The administration (organs of command, for facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) of the dangerous nuclear facility will regularly organize and conduct exercises for guards in order to verify their effectiveness and cooperation with the appropriate organs of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs and Russian Federation Federal Security Service. Interested federal organs of executive power and other organizations shall be notified of the exercise no less than two months before it is conducted. The procedure for organizing and conducting exercises is determined by normative acts of the federal organ of executive power that has authority over the dangerous nuclear facility.
    31. Engineering and technical devices operate from a central control panel or from local control panels of the physical protection system located in specially designed areas with bulletproof doors and glass.
        Engineering and technical devices of the physical protection system located at checkpoints, within guarded zones, in separate buildings (structures, areas) can, if necessary, be operated from local control panels connected to the central control panel. Information from the local control panel must be duplicated at the central control panel.
        The operator of the central control panel is a permanent employee of the security service at the dangerous nuclear facility, in whom the facility’s administration has vested the appropriate power to make decisions in both normal and emergency conditions. It is forbidden to give the control panel operator additional responsibilities which could interfere with his main duties.
        At facilities where security and defense are implemented by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense or by the internal troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the operators of the control panel for detection devices are military personnel of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense or the internal troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs.

     

     IV. Main Requirements for Organizing Physical Protection During the Transportation of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Installations

    32. Transportation of nuclear materials and nuclear installations within the territory of the Russian Federation must be implemented in the established procedure under conditions for ensuring their physical protection, the presence of emergency cards on the items being transported and a permission certificate for the transportation container and for the transportation itself.
        During the transportation of nuclear materials within the borders of the Russian Federation, the responsibility of ensuring their physical protection is held by the manager of the enterprise shipping the material or the enterprise receiving the material (in the instance that the latter transports the items).
    33. To ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials while they are being transported, the following is necessary:
    • to limit the time the nuclear materials spend on the road to the maximum extent possible;
    • to minimize the number of transfers of the nuclear materials from one vehicle to another and the time spent waiting for the vehicle to arrive;
    • to organize the progress of the vehicles carrying the nuclear materials in such a way that various scheduling and route options are available;
    • to use coded and special channels for communications regarding the transportation of nuclear materials;
    • to ensure that the mode of transport bears no signs or markings indicating the nature of the shipment;
    • to choose a transportation route outside regions experiencing emergencies, natural disasters, and other extreme situations;
    • to limit as much as possible the circle of officials notified of the route and the transportation schedule of the nuclear materials;
    • to ensure that the transport, escort, and guarding of nuclear materials is implemented only by individuals having the proper clearance;
    • to provide for the timely notification by the shipper to the receiver of the planned shipment of materials with the indication of the mode of transportation, expected arrival time, and exact place of its transfer;
    • to ensure that the shipment is sent only after receiving written confirmation from the receiver concerning their preparedness to receive the shipment, their possession of a license for conducting nuclear activities (except facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense), and in the case of transportation of the items by the receiver, their implementation of physical protection of the nuclear materials being transported;
    • to organize, in a timely fashion, the cooperation of the shipper and receiver (in the instance that the latter transports the items) with the appropriate organs of the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in order to jointly determine additional measures to ensure the protection and safety of the shipment, to ward off possible attacks on the shipment en route or in the instance that the vehicle has an accident en route;
    • to provide, according to established procedure, a detailed inspection of the physical condition of the vehicle before the nuclear materials are loaded and sent; this inspection is to determine that no devices are present that could cause the vehicle to break down and/or cause damage to the materials being transported.
    34. The owner of the mode of transportation will, during the transportation of the nuclear materials, provide the following:
    vehicles that are in good physical condition and are specially equipped;
    outfitting of the vehicles with physical barriers to prevent unauthorized entry to the freight compartment, as well as detection and monitoring devices and alarms.
    35. The transportation of Type I and Type II nuclear materials must take place under the following conditions:
    • under guard and with the escort of a representative of the shipper or receiver (in the instance that the latter transports the materials);
    • two-way radio communications must be maintained between the guard unit, the escort, and the driver of the vehicle;
    • nuclear materials must be placed in containers that are then sealed and placed in a structure that protects these materials from small arms before being loaded into the vehicle;
    • the seals and locks must be periodically checked before the shipment is sent and en route (at stops) by individuals guarding the materials being transported;
    • automobile transport must be escorted by automobiles with guards and an escort automobile from the State Automobile Inspectorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Military Automobile Inspectorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (if the shipment transported is military). The guard automobiles must be equipped in order to protect the individuals in the guard unit from small arms, and must have two-way radio devices that allow communication with the automobile carrying the nuclear materials, with the escort automobile, among themselves, and with the post directing the movement of the vehicle.
    36. Uranium hexafluoride with any content of U-235 and all irradiated nuclear materials (including spent nuclear fuel) are to be transported under guard and considered to be highly hazardous for the population and the environment, should an accident occur.
    37. The transportation of salts and oxides of natural uranium, as well as the following Type III nuclear materials, are transported without guards, but with an escort from the shipper or receiver (in the instance that the latter ships the materials):
    • non-irradiated fuel rods (fresh nuclear fuel) with a U-235 content of less than 20 percent;
    • uranium dioxide with a U-235 content of less than 5 percent;
    • uranium concentrates with a U-235 content of less than 1 percent.
    38. The necessity of guards and the implementation of other measures to ensure the physical protection during transportation of other Category III nuclear materials and nuclear materials not classified under Categories I, II, or III shall be determined by agreement between the shipper and the receiver depending on the mode of transportation, the extent and nature of the route followed, other particulars of transportation and shall be approved by the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy.
        When transporting more than 500 kg of natural uranium, the following is also necessary:
    • preliminary notification of the receiver of the departure time of the shipment and the type of transport and estimated time of arrival;
    • implementing control over the progress of the vehicle with the shipment;
    • providing confirmation that the shipment was received.
    39. To implement international transportation of nuclear materials, the following is necessary:
    • the competent organs of the states in which transportation of nuclear materials will take place must sign an agreement including the time, place, and procedure for transferring responsibility for ensuring the physical protection of the nuclear materials on the basis of national and international regulations and/or appropriate intergovernmental agreements;
    • in the instance that the Russian Federation exports the nuclear materials, the shipper must notify the receiver, in a timely fashion, of the nature of the shipment, the proposed departure and arrival times, and the mode of transportation, and must receive confirmation of the receipt of the shipment;
    • to determine (should nuclear materials be transported across the territory of a third country) in an external trade contract between the shipper and receiver, the country responsible for obtaining international guarantees from the third country that the necessary measures for ensuring the physical protection of the shipment will be taken while it is transported across that country’s territory.
    40. In the instance that nuclear materials are exported or imported, they may not be transported across the territory of the Russian Federation unless confirmation has been received from all involved states that the nuclear materials will be protected during transportation across their territories at a level no lower than that specified in the statutes of the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
    41. Individuals responsible for physical protection during international transportation of nuclear materials across the territory of the Russian Federation must notify the competent organs of the Russian Federation of any instances involving the breach of physical barriers protecting the nuclear materials, unauthorized actions concerning these materials, or the threat to take unauthorized actions during transportation, so that the necessary measures can be taken.
    42. Customs processing and control of nuclear materials is implemented by the customs organs of the Russian Federation in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation concerning control and accounting of nuclear materials crossing the customs border of the Russian Federation, and by acts of the President of the Russian Federation, the government of the Russian Federation, and the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation in this sphere.
        Guard units must not interfere with the process of customs registration and control of nuclear materials. When the seals on the guarded vehicles are intact, as a rule it is not opened and the contents are not inspected.
        If a seal is damaged or its imprint does not correspond to the example, the vehicle carrying nuclear materials may be detained and inspected in the established procedure.

     

     V. State Monitoring and Departmental Control for the Provision of Physical Protection

    43. State monitoring for the provision of physical protection of dangerous nuclear facilities is implemented by the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in accordance with their authority.
        The main tasks of state monitoring for the provision of physical protection are as follows:
    • monitoring the fulfillment of the requirements of these Regulations and other normative regulatory acts on physical protection by federal organs of executive power, organizations conducting nuclear activities, and personnel of dangerous nuclear facilities;
    • monitoring the adherence of the administrations of dangerous nuclear facilities to physical protection requirements stipulated in licenses for conducting nuclear activities (except facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense);
    • presenting, in the established procedure, interested federal organs of executive power with information on the actual status of physical protection and the fulfillment by the administrations (commands, for facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) of dangerous nuclear facilities of the requirements of these Regulations and other normative regulatory acts on physical protection.
        The procedure for conducting state monitoring of the provision of physical protection is determined by normative acts of the federal organs of executive power implementing state monitoring approved by interested federal organs of executive power and confirmed according to the established procedure.
        If it is discovered that the administration (command, for facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) of a dangerous nuclear facility has violated the requirements in these Regulations, the appropriate federal organ of executive power implementing state monitoring will impose sanctions within the scope of its authority.
    44. Federal organs of executive power having dangerous nuclear facilities under their jurisdiction and organizations conducting nuclear activities must provide departmental control over the condition and functioning of the system of physical protection at the aforementioned facilities and organizations and for its compliance with the requirements of these Regulations.
        The main tasks of departmental control are as follows:
    • control over dangerous nuclear facilities’ fulfillment of the requirements of these Regulations as well as the departmental normative documents developed in accordance with them;
    • testing of the administration (command, for facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense), personnel, and the individual constituents of the guard units of dangerous nuclear facilities on their knowledge of the statute of normative regulatory acts on physical protection and on their ability to act in various situations in accordance with developed plans;
    • taking necessary measures to eliminate deficiencies demonstrated by the tests.
        In individual instances, in order to conduct a special-purpose comprehensive investigation of the compliance of the physical protection system at a dangerous nuclear facility with the requirements of these Regulations, the federal organ of executive power, under whose jurisdiction the dangerous nuclear facility is located, can, with the approval of interested federal organs of executive power, create a commission that will forward the results of its work to the attention of interested federal organs of executive power and, when necessary, present reports to the Government of the Russian Federation.

     

     VI. Notification of Unauthorized Activities

    45. For all incidents of unauthorized activities concerning nuclear materials, nuclear installations, and nuclear material storage facilities, as well as instances of locating missing nuclear materials, the administration (command, for facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) of the dangerous nuclear facility is obligated to notify the federal organ of executive power, under whose jurisdiction the facility is located, the organs of the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, the organs of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the federal organ of executive power that implements state monitoring within the course of an hour, and then present a written report within the course of ten days.
        Additional information and new facts that come to light after the preliminary notification or subsequent written report, must also be communicated by the administration (command, for facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) of the dangerous nuclear facility to the aforementioned federal organs of executive power.
     

     
     

    Appendix to Regulations for physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear installations and nuclear material storage facilities
     

    CLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS


    Nuclear material and degree of irradiation Isotope content (by mass) Category, mass (m, kg)

    I II III
    Plutonium: non-irradiated or low-irradiated No more than 80 percent Pu-238 m > 2 0.5 < m < 2 0.015 < m < 0.5
    Uranium-235: non-irradiated or low-irradiated Greater than or equal to 20 percent U-235  m > 5 1 < m < 5 0.015 < m < 1
    Less than 20 percent U-235 but greater than or equal to 10 percent U-235 m > 10 1 < m < 10
    Less than 10 percent U-235, but greater than or equal to 0.71 percent U-235 m > 10
    Uranium-233 Any m > 2 0.5 < m < 2 0.015 < m < 0.5
    Any irradiated nuclear material, including irradiated natural and depleted uranium and thorium Fissile isotope content less than 10 percent prior to irradiation Any mass
    Fissile isotope content greater than or equal to 10 percent prior to irradiation Mass corresponding to Category I of non-irradiated or low-irradiated nuclear material Mass corresponding to Categories II and III of non-irradiated or low-irradiated nuclear material
    Note: The following nuclear materials are not included in the above categories:
    1. Neptunium-237, Americium-241, Americium-243, and Californium-252
    2. Nuclear materials (regardless of their chemical compounds and physical state) which, in terms of mass, degree of irradiation, or isotope content, cannot be placed in any of the above categories.

     
     
    End Notes
    [1] any materials made on the basis of nuclear materials fall under the category of nuclear materials.

    [2] Requirements for physical protection when carrying out activities dealing with equipment and devices containing nuclear materials, as well as for hazardous nuclear industrial (technological) section of nuclear storage facility, and sources for ionizing emission are determined by other by-laws, which do not contradict these regulations.

    [3]Translator’s Note: these terms have been placed in alphabetical order according to their English translations, and are thus in a different order than in the original document.