STATEMENT

BY

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AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Geneva, 30 June 2005
Mr. President,

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a priority matter for the Russian Federation at the Conference on Disarmament. It is a major and urgent issue.

Weaponisation of an outer space is a real and big threat. Its consequences would be extremely negative. Hopes for domination in space with the use of force are illusionary, and, in the final outcome, such ambitions can weaken rather than strengthen security of all states without exception. At the same time, now we have a practical possibility to ensure safety of outer space objects – on which we increasingly depend in our daily life - through preventive non-military methods that would avert deployment of weapons in outer space. As a simple and efficient method, we can cover the loopholes in the existing international law on outer space and reach a new comprehensive international legal agreement that would safely prevent a possibility of placement of weapons of any type in outer space and use or threat of force against outer space objects. We are convinced that the new agreement on non-weaponisation of outer space would meet the interests of all, and, of course, primarily the interests of those countries which have their own space programs. There are about 130 such countries at present.

This is exactly the reason why Russia coherently stands for the earliest agreement on the program of work of the Conference on Disarmament - which has accumulated a vast experience of dealing with PAROS - that would allow us to reestablish the CD Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS and begin substantive work on the new agreement regarding non-weaponisation of outer space. In order to help to reach consensus on the CD program of work, Russia has stated that it was prepared not to object against well-known compromise initiatives providing for establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS with “to deal with” rather than negotiating mandate. Russia hopes that its move aimed at this goal will be reciprocated. We understand that with the reestablishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS with this mandate we will have to convince those who still express doubts about necessity of a new agreement on PAROS that this agreement is relevant, feasible and beneficial for all. We are prepared to engage in such an effort. The main parameters of the new agreement on the non-weaponisation of outer space proposed by us have been provided in CD/1679, and some of its particular aspects have been further developed in the three thematic non-papers prepared jointly by delegations of China and Russia and distributed at the CD. Nothing in our proposals is “carved in stone”. These are rather an invitation to a joint creative effort of all interested states. Our goal is to produce a document that would be acceptable to all. Therefore, we believe that even with the “to deal with” mandate the CD Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS will have to engage in an interesting and intensive activity. Not in the least because of other valuable ideas and proposals, which were previously put forward by Canada, France and other countries.
Sometimes we come across a statement that the countries which most actively support working out of a new international legal agreement on non-weaponisation of outer space are allegedly doing so for tactical or publicity purposes only, while in reality they are trying to narrow the gap of their lagging behind in military space technologies or to smokescreen their own military space preparations. These allegations are groundless. Everything here is turned upside down. Of course, assuring its own security is a priority for any state. And, if someone starts to place weapons in outer space we will have to react accordingly. However, the development of space weapons is not our choice. We have already stated that at present and for the near future the Russian Federation does not intend to develop and place into space any space weapon systems. Russia strictly observes the moratorium on testing of anti-satellite systems. In 2004 Russia declared that it would not be the first to place weapons of any type in outer space. Our restraint in military space sphere is based on the same understanding of extremely negative consequences of space weaponisation for all, as well as the belief that security in space - at a time when space technologies and international cooperation is rapidly developing - can and should be achieved by compliance with the existing international legal agreements and by working out new ones.

In our view, there is no fatal technological inevitability of space weaponisation. All together we are quite able to put a barrier on the way of placement of weapons in outer space, and to direct progress in science and technology onto a constructive track. Indeed, we have managed to agree on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons after we realized all catastrophic consequences of their use and existence. We also have succeeded in prohibiting the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

It is important to bear in mind that now there are no weapons in outer space. We are not proposing to ban or limit somehow the performance of systems in outer space that perform important information functions - such as communications, monitoring, navigation, geodesy, meteorology etc., including in the interests of defense. These space systems can play a stabilizing role, for example, as means of verification of compliance with agreements on arms reduction and limitation, as well as ensuring safe daily activities of armed forces in peacetime. In other words, nothing of what is presently stationed in outer space would become subject to prohibition or limitation. What we want to prohibit is rather the placing in outer space of any type of striking weapons. We have already proposed concrete definitions of the terms "deployment" and "weapons".

Mr. President,

Promotion of security of outer space and progress toward consensual apprehension of the danger of space weaponisation could be helped by working out measures of transparency and building confidence in outer space. Such
measures – important by themselves – could complement the existing norms of international law on outer space, and could be used for verification of compliance with the existing and new treaties. There is a wide variety of measures that the states could apply, including those of a voluntary nature. Let me recall in this connection that in October 1993 the UN Secretary General prepared a detailed report entitled “Study on the Application of Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space” (A/48/305), which contained the analysis of the potential of CBMs in general and provided a comprehensive review of eventual specific measures, building on proposals made by the states at that time. Many of those proposals are still relevant, although over the 12 years since that study life moved far ahead, and, obviously, there is a clear need to update and modernize our concepts and ideas in this domain.

Russia has initiated some important CBMs in outer space and expects that the states which have outer space programs will follow its example. For instance, we started to post on the website advance information on the scheduled launches of outer space objects and their missions.

We are grateful to the states that have already highly appreciated the declaration by Russia that it would not be the first to place weapons of any type in outer space. If all the leading space powers take a similar political step, we could make a real contribution to scaling down motivation to weaponisation of outer space. We call again on all the states with space potential to follow our example. We are glad to draw your attention to the fact that last week, on 23 June, heads of state of the Collective Security Treaty Organization member countries – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan – made an official statement that these countries would not be the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space.

Obviously, working out of CBMs in outer space cannot substitute elaboration of a legally binding document on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space. Nevertheless, one should not contradict the other. The first effort logically complements the second. Both are aimed at the same goal – to promote security of space and safety of spacecraft, to strengthen mutual confidence and cooperation of states in outer space, and to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Mr. President,

We consider the Conference on Disarmament to be the most appropriate forum for the work on PAROS. This issue is the most important item in our agenda. As a result of major forthcoming steps made by delegations of Russia and China in order to ease a compromise on the CD Program of Work, the mutually acceptable mandate of an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS has been practically agreed. And even before this Committee resumes its work we have an opportunity to prepare in advance ideas, proposals, non-papers or to conduct in-depth study of specific issues, etc. We expect that we would be able to
achieve a wide agreement on issues related to PAROS. As in the past, we will continue to pay the priority attention to this issue.

Taking today's opportunity, we would like to note the report, prepared by the UNIDIR, of the international conference "Safeguarding Space Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" that with ample detail registered the main assessments, ideas and proposals expressed at that Conference. This important and representative Conference, held in this Chamber on 21-22 March 2005, was organized by the governments of Russia and China together with the UNIDIR and the Canadian Simons Foundation. We believe that this report is very useful for our further work on PAROS. It will be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Thank you.