Memorandum
on the Effects of Atomic Bomb
From: Henry Stimson, Secretary of War
To: Harry S Truman, President of the Unites States of America
Date: September 11, 1945
Dear Mr. President:
In handing you today my memorandum about our relations with
Russia in respect to the atomic bomb, I am not unmindful of the
fact that when in Potsdam I talked with you about the question
whether we could be safe in sharing the atomic bomb with Russia
while she was still a police state and before she put into effect
provisions assuring personal rights of liberty to the individual
citizen.
I still recognize the difficulty and am still convinced
of the ultimate im-portance of a change in Russian
attitude toward individual liberty but I have come
to the conclusion that it would not be possible to
use our possession of the atomic bomb as a direct lever
to produce the change. I have become convinced that
any demand by us for an internal change in Russia as
a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be
so resented that it would make the objective we have
in view less probable.
I believe that the change
in attitude toward the individual in Russia will
come slowly and gradually and I am satisfied that
we should not delay our approach to Russia in the
matter of the atomic bomb until that process has
been completed. My reasons are set forth in the memorandum
I am handing you today. Furthermore, I believe that
this long process of change in Russia is more likely
to be expedited by the closer relationship in the
matter of the atomic bomb which I suggest and the
trust and confidence that I believe would be inspired
by the method of approach which I have outlined.
Faithfully
yours,
Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
The President,
The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: The advent of the atomic bomb has stimulated
great military and probably even greater political
interest throughout the civilized world. In a world
atmosphere already extremely sensitive to power, the
introduction of this weapon has profoundly affected
political considerations in all sections of the globe.
In many quarters it has been interpreted as a substantial
offset to the growth of Russian influence on the continent.
We can be certain that the Soviet Government has sensed
this tendency and the temptation will be strong for
the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire
this weapon in the shortest possible time. Britain
in effect already has the status of a partner with
us in the development of this weapon. Accordingly,
unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the
partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust,
we are going to maintain the Anglo-Saxon bloc over
against the Soviet in the possession of this weapon.
Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish
activity on the part of the Soviet toward the development
of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament
race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence
to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.
If we feel, as I assume we must, that civilization
demands that some day weshall arrive at a satisfactory
international arrangement respecting the con-trol of
this new force, the question then is how long we can
afford to enjoy our momentary superiority in the hope
of achieving our immediate peace council objectives.
Whether Russia gets
control of the necessary secrets of production in
a minimum of say four years or a maximum of twenty
years is not nearly as important to the world and
civilization as to make sure that when they do get
it they are willing and cooperative partners among
the peace-loving nations of the world. It is true
if we approach them now, as I would propose, we may
be gambling on their good faith and risk their getting
into production of bombs a little sooner than they
would otherwise.
To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem
of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely
connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem
of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control
of the bomb, those relations, while vitally important,
might not be immediately pressing. The establishment
of relations of mutual confidence between her and us
could afford to wait the slow progress of time. But
with the discovery of the bomb they became immediately
emergent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably
embittered by the way in which we approach the solution
of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach
them now and merely continue to negotiate with them,
having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip,
their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes
and motives will increase. It will inspire them to
greater efforts in an all-out effort to solve the problem.
If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much
less likely that we will ever get the kind of covenant
we may desperately need in the future. This risk, is,
I believe, greater than the other, inasmuch as our
objective must be to get the best kind of international
bargain we can - one that has some chance of being
kept and saving civilization not for five or for twenty
years, but forever.
The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is
that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is
to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy
is to distrust him and show your distrust.
If the atomic bomb were merely another though more
devastating military weapon to be assimilated into
our pattern of international relations, it would be
one thing. We could then follow the old custom of secrecy
and nationalistic military superiority relying on international
caution to prescribe the future use of the weapon as
we did with gas. But I think the bomb instead constitutes
merely a first step in a new control by man over the
forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to
fit into the old concepts. I think it really caps the
climax of the age between man's growing technical power
for destructiveness and his psychological power of
self-control and group control-his moral power. If
so, our method of approach to the Russians is a question
of the most vital importance in the evolution of human
progress.
Since the crux of the problem is Russia, any contemplated
action leading to the control of this weapon should
be primarily directed to Russia. It is my judgment
that the Soviets would be more apt to respond sincerely
to a direct and forthright approach made by the United
States on the subject than would be the case if the
approach were made as a part of a general interna-tional
scheme, or if the approach were made after a succession
of express or implied threats or near threats in our
peace negotiations.
My idea of an approach to the Soviets would be a direct
proposal after discussion with the British that we
would be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement
with the Russians, the general purpose of which would
be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb
as an instrument of war and so far as possible to direct
and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful
and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more
specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop
work on the further improve-ment in, or manufacture
of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians
and the British would agree to do likewise. It might
also provide that we would be willing to impound what
bombs we now have in the United States provided the
Russians and the British would agree with us that in
no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument
of war unless all three Governments agree to that use.
We might also consider including in the arrangement
a covenant with the U.K. and the Soviets providing
for the exchange of benefits of future development
whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually
satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes.
I would make such an approach just as soon as our
immediate political considerations make it appropriate.
I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considerations
the importance of taking this action with Russia as
a proposal of the United States - backed by Great Britain
but peculiarly the proposal of the United States. Action
of any international group of nations, including many
small nations who have not demonstrated their potential
power or responsibility in this war would not, in my
opinion, be taken seriously by the Soviets. The loose
debates which would surround such proposal, if put
before a conference of nations, would provoke but scant
favor from the Soviets. As I say, I think this is the
most important point in the program.
After the nations which have won this war have agreed
to it, there will be ample time to introduce France
and China into the covenants and finally to incorporate
the agreement into the scheme of the United Nations.
The use of this bomb has been accepted by the world
as the result of the initiative and productive capacity
of the United States, and I think this factor is a
most potent lever toward having our proposals accepted
by the Soviets, whereas I am most skeptical of obtaining
any tangible results by way of any international debate.
I urge this method as the most realistic means of accomplishing
this vitally important step in the history of the world.
Henry L. Stimson
"Secretary of war."
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