START II, III AND BEYOND
We welcome the joint statement by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki on 21 March 1997 committing to the commencement of negotiations on a START III agreement, immediately once START II enters into force, which would establish, by 31 December 2007, lower aggregate levels of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads, possible reductions in tactical nuclear systems and other measures to promote the irreversibility of these deep reductions.
State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expect these commitments to be realized as soon as possible.
We call upon other nuclear-weapon States to commit immediately to not increasing their inventories and to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations among the five, in parallel with START III.
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY
We call on all States to make the utmost efforts to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, through all means possible up to and including the Conference of the States Parties to be held in 1999.
We emphasize that article 5 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referring to peaceful nuclear explosions, has been redefined and overtaken under the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
We recognize the decisive role that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty plays in preventing the development of new nuclear weapons and the modernization of existing ones. We look to the nuclear-weapon States to signal their unequivocal support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force, by declaring their intention never again to conduct nuclear explosions.
FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF CONVENTION
We look to the earliest possible commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament towards a fissile material cut-off convention, on the basis of the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
Pending conclusion of such a convention, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to affirm or reaffirm, as the case may be, their commitment to forever cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Determined efforts should be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and to place more of such material under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Further steps should be taken to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We welcome and will actively explore ideas in this respect, including those aimed at an internationally legally binding instrument.