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  Library Treaties Non-Proliferation Treaty, EU Draft Recommendations, April 16, 1997

Draft Recommendations by the EU

Submitted by the European Union

For insertion in part B of the Chairman's paper

Universality

Recognizing that universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent requirement, the States Parties recommend that all States Parties should make every effort to achieve this objective, and call on all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it

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1997 NPT Prep Com 

at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded facilities.

Cluster one

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The States Parties welcome the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, and call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date

[If the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force:]

, in particular those States upon whose adherence entry into force of the Treaty depends.

Fissile material cut-off treaty

The States Parties call on all States to sign and ratify a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention, negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament of 24 March 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein.

Disarmament

Welcoming the progress towards nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear-weapon States, including that made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, the States Parties call for further progress towards global reductions of nuclear arsenals. The States Parties urge the nuclear-weapon States to continue the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons, and all States to continue the determined pursuit of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control.

[If START II has not been ratified:]

The States Parties call for the START II Treaty to be ratified as soon as possible and for an early start to negotiations on a START III treaty.

[If START III has not been concluded:]

The States Parties call for an early conclusion to negotiations on a START III treaty.

The States Parties welcome efforts by the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation to address the issue of management of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

[If the Chemical Weapons Convention is not universal:]

The States Parties urge all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

[If negotiation on a Biological Weapons Convention verification protocol is not completed:]

The States Parties urge the Ad Hoc Group of the States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to complete as soon as possible a legally binding verification and compliance regime for the Treaty.

The States Parties recommend that all regions make major reductions in their level of conventional arms, as has been done in Europe on the basis of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Considering nuclear-weapon-free zones to be important complementary instruments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the States Parties welcome advances made in this field, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned.

Security assurances

The States Parties welcome the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 4 November 1995, as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances as important developments in this field. The States Parties recommend that further steps be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument. The States Parties recognize that treaty-based security assurances are available to parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones through the signature of the relevant protocols to such zones by the nuclear-weapon States. The States Parties recommend that concerned States that have not yet signed and ratified these treaties do so as soon as possible, and thus bring into effect those security assurances.

Cluster two

Safeguards

The States Parties call on all States and other Parties with INFCIRC 153-type agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have not yet done so to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into effect additional safeguards agreements using the model protocol containing the Programme "93+2" Part 2 measures as a standard text.

The States Parties call on States with voluntary offer safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have not yet done so to conclude additional agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency incorporating measures that they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the protocol, when implemented with regard to that Party and as consistent with its obligations under article I.

The States Parties call upon States with INFCIRC 66-type safeguards agreements to negotiate and bring into effect agreements providing for the implementation of Programme "93+2" Part 2 measures.

Nuclear materials accountancy and physical protection

The States Parties recommend that each Party with nuclear materials on its territory maintain and improve its own arrangements for nuclear materials accountancy, safety and physical protection, applying the appropriate internationally agreed standards.

Export controls

The States Parties recommend that transparency in nuclear-related export controls should continue to be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

All States Parties should exercise their responsibility to control nuclear-related exports whatever their destination and give full effect to their commitment that new supply arrangements should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency's full-scope safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The States Parties call upon Parties that have not yet done so to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.

Nuclear smuggling

The States Parties call upon all Parties that have not yet done so to adhere to the Programme of Action on Illicit Trafficking as agreed by the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation. States Parties that have adhered should continue to work to promote international cooperation between the relevant national agencies with a view to preventing such smuggling.

Cluster three

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

The States Parties recommend continued international cooperation in this field, taking into account, in particular, the needs of developing countries.

The States Parties call on all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety at the earliest possible date.

The States Parties urge early conclusion of a convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management, and call on all States to sign and ratify that convention at the earliest possible date.