material for use in nuclear weapon.
This is a step which can - and should - be taken now, to ensure that the nuclear-weapon states' current willingness to cease production of fissile material cannot be reversed.
It is difficult to envisage significant further progress towards nuclear disarmament which does not include, sooner or later, measures to address both fissile material production facilities and fissile material stockpiles.
For this reason, the conclusion of a first treaty codifying a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons should be followed by a second agreement providing for greater transparency over fissile material inventories and gradually bringing fissile material stocks under strict and effective international control.
This too should be an evolving instrument which tracks other nuclear disarmament measures and progressively brings direct-use fissile material into the scope of a fissile material regime.
An important objective of this progressive approach will be to make disarmament measures irreversible by ensuring that fissile material no longer needed is not available for military use again.
This fissile material regime will require an innovative, multifaceted approach involving a balance of bilateral, plurilateral and appropriate international and possibly regional arrangements for nuclear material made excess to military requirements.