particular, the new information regime has to be set up to satisfy the needs of the new strengthened safeguards system. In this regard, we expect the IAEA to come up with a report to the Review Conference 2000, describing the progress achieved so far in implementing the new Protocol.
The role of the IAEA, as seen by the the Member States, has been reiterated in Principle 9 of the P&O document, decision 2 of the NPT Review&Extension Conference 1995. The IAEA is the global international organisation to verify compliance with the NPT, and we therefore see this principle fully implemented.
At the same time, let me stress that it will be of utmost importance to ensure that the financial means necessary to implement the new protocol and to integrate these measures with "traditional" safeguards are put at the disposal of the Agency. A policy whereby more and more tasks are conferred on the IAEA, while its budget remains unchanged, might in the long-term be detrimental to the effectiveness of its safeguards system.
It is our clear understanding that the conclusion of the Additional Protocol for NonNuclear Weapons States party to the treaty does nor represent an option, but a mandatory requirement. As is laid down in Article I of the Protocol, it forms an integral part of the existing Safeguards Agreement. Its conclusion therefore constitutes an equivocal obligation to existing safeguards agreements in accordance with Article 111.1 NPT. Therefore, we expect the Review Conference 2000 to clearly express this obligatory nature in a respective Principle of a new P&O document as part of the Final Document.
Nuclear export controls are complementary to IAEA safeguards, and together they offer assurances that activities in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are only taking place for the benefit of mankind, and are not diverted for non-peaceful purposes. The NPTREC 1995 introduced an important clarification regarding the understanding of NPT Article 111.2, as it stated that the safeguards to be applied as a condition of supply of Trigger list items should be ,,full scope safeguards". This in our opinion constitutes an important new element of interpretation and clarification in 1995 by the sovereign of the NPT, namely its Member States. In this regard we take it that Principle 12 of the P&O document is valid for all Member States and will be introduced in all national legislations. We expect that the Review Conference 2000 will be able to judge the principle to have been properly implemented by all NPT Member States. We emphasise the importance of Principle (12) as it continues to be of decisive nature for the future development of NPT export controls. In this regard, let me refer to new concepts brought forward in recent years, namley that the IAEA via the new ,,integrated" safeguards system will play an increasingly important role in the field of export controls. Further elaboration of our thinking in this regard will be brought forward both in the NPT context as well as in other fora. Let me, however, make one remark before leaving this subject: Although this complementary role of
IAEA safeguards in transfer controls of nuclear goods will have to be elaborated upon further, the borderline between the multilateral nature of transfer controls and the sovereign obligation of each individual State for export licensing has nevertheless to be clearly observed. The sovereign obligation of each individual NPT member state to control exports of trigger list items should not be forgotten when referring to the ,,internationalisation" of export controls.
The call for transparency in export controls was prominent in the 1995 Conference and is laid down in Principle 17 of the P&O document. For co-operation among member states to function well, the provision of information on export control policies is crucial in order to allow for a proper understanding of individual actions taken by Member States. We expect the Review Conference 2000 to take proper note of transparency activities having taken place. In order to facilitate such conclusions, it would seem necessary to have appropriate documentation prepared by the Zangger Committee and also by the NSG for presentation to the Review Conference 2000. In this regard, we commend the NSG for its holding of two transperancy seminars. Our delegation, providing the chair of the Zangger Committee, welcomed the fact that the chairman of the committee was invited to participate and thereby in a position to present and discuss the activities of the Zangger Committee accordingly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.