applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices..
Despite the fact that negotiations on a fissile material ban must take place in the Conference on Disarmament, which includes all the so-called threshold states, Egypt believes that this issue should also be discussed in the PrepCom. Such a discussion, far from hampering efforts to achieve concrete results in the field of a fissile material ban, would contribute to them. If all NPT States Parties can agree to certain basic principles, success in the CD would be more likely.
With a view to making such a contribution, Egypt would like to put forward a number of ideas concerning a fissile material ban. It is Egypt's view that a clear and consensual position from all States Parties to the NPT can only have a positive impact on the early conclusion of a fissile material ban.
Egypt considers that it would be useful for the States parties to the NPT to adopt language reflecting a number of basic principles on the issue of a fissile material ban. The purpose of this would be to lay a general framework to which NPT States Parties Would be committed in their pursuit of the objective of a fissile material ban.
Egypt considers that the following elements should be reflected in the proposed language. They do not aim to conceal existing differences of opinion on the issue of a fissile material ban, but rather they seek to find an acceptable middle ground which would allow for substantive work to proceed on this important issue.
These elements are:
- A ban on the production of weapons usable fissile materials represents and important measure within the overall scope of efforts aimed at achieving nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
- Any negotiations on an effective ban on the production of weapons usable fissile materials must take into account both the non-proliferation and the disarmament dimensions of the issue. In other words, future production and existing stockpiles of weapons usable fissile materials should be covered by the scope of the Treaty.
- A ban on production of weapons usable fissile materials would not achieve the total elimination of all such materials, and as such it is only a non-proliferation measure and cannot be considered a measure of nuclear disarmament.
- For a ban on production of weapons usable fissile materials to be effective, it must be verifiable. Verification of such a ban must be water-tight and necessarily entails the drawing up of a global inventory detailing existing amounts of weapons usable fissile materials and subjecting them to effective international control.
Universal adherence to a fissile material ban would be essential for its success.
- The Conference on Disarmament is the sole appropriate forum for negotiations on a fissile material ban. The Ad Hoc Committee established in 1998 by the Conference on Disarmament under item 1 of its Agenda should be reestablished with a view to undertaking such negotiations
Negotiations on this issue must make use of the expertise available at the IAEA.
DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PREPCOM ON PRODUCTS OF THE NPT 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE
1. - The Preparatory Committee at its third session decided to have a general exchange of views focused on expected products of the 2000 Review Conference, during which 37 delegations participated
2.- In accordance with Article VIII paragraph 3 of the Treaty and taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, in particular paragraph 7 of the Decision 1 the Preparatory Committee recommends that the 2000 Review Conference should produce:
- a document evaluating the results of the period which the 2000 Review Conference is reviewing, including the implementation of the undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty; and
- a forward-looking document identifying the areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought in the future.
The 2000 Review Conference should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.
3.- These documents should take into account the reports of the Main Committees.
4. - The 2000 Review Conference should examine the functioning of the review process itself, taking account of experience since 1995, and may wish to reflect the conclusions of the examination on a further document.
5. - The 2000 Review Conference can also consider and adopt other products, decisions, or resolutions as may be decided upon; and produce statements regarding specific outstanding circumstances that can affect the aims of the Treaty and international peace and security.
6. - These documents shall reaffirm the validity of the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
7. - Every effort should be made to adopt these documents by consensus.