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  LIbrary Treaties Non-Proliferation Treaty, Proposal, May 19, 1999

Proposals Submitted by Canada

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/36 19 May 1999
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Elements for inclusion in the draft Chairman's working paper:
The elements proposed above are also tabled in NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/2, annex.

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Welcoming the indefinite extension of that Treaty as decided at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty;

Emphasizing that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty and full compliance with its provisions are essential to international peace and security;

Comments on Chairman's working paper of 14 May

Paragraph 6

Delete the last phrase of the paragraph. (Canada agrees that Article I and II of the NPT are critical. That being said, we do not believe that articles of the Treaty should be graded)

Paragraph 8

In working paper PC.III/4, Canada has proposed specific paragraphs on substantive issues to be included in the final report of the Preparatory Committee, among which a section on Nuclear Tests. Canada would like the Preparatory Committee to address nuclear tests in the substantive part of its final report. As well, in working paper PC.III/2, Canada has proposed specific language to deal with the issue of the nuclear tests in South Asia. As the language that we proposed is very similar to paragraph 8 of the Chairman's working paper, Canada can support that paragraph.

Safeguards

The Chairman's proposals in paragraphs 19 to 24 are largely acceptable to Canada as they reflect the proposals we made on that topic in our working paper PC.III/2.

Canada supports the proposal put forward by Japan for a restructuring of the section on Safeguards. That being said, in our view paragraph 24 would be better placed in the section dealing with "Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy".

Canada has serious reservation regarding the proposal put forward by Luxembourg for the addition of a new sentence at the end of paragraph 21 which would read as follows: "For non-nuclear weapon States that are parties to such an additional Protocol, the export controls of the nuclear suppliers should be alleviated for the benefit of these recipient States".

Regarding the Austrian proposal on paragraph 21, Canada would like to draw the Chairman's attention to paragraph 13 of Canadian working paper PC.III/2 which also touches the same issue.

Chairman's working paper
Suggestions on the nuclear disarmament section

Note: Most suggestions are drawn from the Annex to the Canadian working paper distributed as NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/2.

1. Paragraph 11, line 2: add "all States, especially" after "by". (Article VI includes two undertakings by all States party: see Canadian working paper PC.III/10.)

2. New paragraph 11 bis: "The achievement of the following programme of action is important for the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI:

  • (A) The START Process should be renewed, accelerated and fully implemented. The reduction targets established by the Russian Federation and the USA for START II and START III should be achieved; further substantial reductions should be pursued. The other three nuclear-weapon States should become directly engaged in this process in the near future.
  • (B) Additional measures (e.g. de-alerting; transparency; confidence-building) as regards nuclear weapons operations should also be pursued.
  • (C) Measures to reduce the threats posed by tactical nuclear weapons -their numbers and their deployment - should be negotiated and implemented.
  • (D) The earliest possible entry-into-force, drawing upon all measures consistent with international law, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be achieved. The rejection of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions as established by this Treaty is reaffirmed.
  • (E) The early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as initiated within the Conference on Disarmament, should be pursued. Appropriate and effective measures to deal with stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should also be identified and implemented.
  • (F) The five nuclear-weapon States should formally affirm a moratorium on the production of such fissile material pending negotiation of the Treaty.
  • (G) Mechanisms should be devised both within the NPT context and within other relevant bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament for exchanges of information and the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to exploring possibilities for further progress on nuclear disarmament through national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives.

3. Paragraph 12: replace the last three sentences with the following: "The START Process should be renewed, accelerated and fully implemented. The reduction targets established by the Russian Federation and the USA for START II and START III should be achieved; further substantial reductions should be pursued. The other three nuclear-weapon States should become directly engaged in this process in the near future. Additional measures [e.g. de-alerting; transparency; confidence-building] as regards nuclear weapons operations should also be pursued. Measures to reduce the threats posed by tactical nuclear weapons - their numbers and their deployment - should be negotiated and implemented."

4. Paragraph 13: support new final sentence proposed by New Zealand.

5. Paragraph 14: add at the end the following: "Pending the Treaty's entry into force, the States Parties urge all states to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Further, the five nuclear-weapon States should formally affirm a moratorium on the production of such fissile material. Appropriate and effective measures to deal with stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should also be identified and implemented." [First sentence based on New Zealand proposal.]

6. New paragraph 15 bis: "Mechanisms should be devised both within the NPT context and within other relevant bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament for exchanges of information and the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to exploring possibilities for further progress on nuclear disarmament through national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives."