Allow me to begin by telling you how happy I am to see you in the chair of the Third Session of Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Please accept the assurance of the Myanmar delegation that it will flilly cooperate with you for the advancement of the work of the Third PrepCom. Our felicitations also go to other Members of the Bureau.
The track record of the NPT regime in the past one year does not give us much ground for satisfaction. Nuclear weapons have spread fi[rther. Two countries have gone nuclear by c~~g out nuclear tests in May 1998.
In the meantime, some Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT are not showing willingness to make firm commitments to take flirther steps on the Principles and Objectives laid down by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. That is why little progress had been achieved at the last PrepCom meeting--- the Second PrepCom.
Whenever we try to deal with the question of nuclear non-proliferation, we are confronted with the problem of nuclear disarmament. This is inevitable and quite natural.
In the view of my delegation, nuclear non-proliferation without adequate nuclear disarmament measures is meaningless, and cannot be enduring and effective.
For this reason, nuclear disarmament measures should be given priority in our preparatory work for the 2000 Review Conference. It is essential that the questions of nuclear disarmament, in both bilateral and multilateral contexts, the CTBT, a ban on fissile materials, security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones be flilly and adequately addressed at this Third PrepCom and at the 2000 Review Conference.
There is no denying that this PrepCom Session is most crucial. Next year, we shall have the 2000 Review Conference. The success of the Conference will, to a large extent, depend on the fruitfil' results of this PrepCom Session.
It is, therefore, imperative that we begin to seriously address the question of what type of document we want to see as an outcome of thc 2000 NPT Review Conference.
Our preference is, of course, to have a flill and comprehensive final document, addressing various issues of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in a thorough and substantive manner.
Frankly speaking, we are not very optimistic about producing such a final document at the 2000 Review Conference.
Given the existing differences of opinions between the Nuclear Weapon States and the non-nuclear weapon States Parties on substantive issues, my delegation, for one, favours the adoption by the Review Conference of a set of decisions and one resolution.
There could be two decisions or more and one resolution. In any case, they should include, inter alia,
- decision on the flirther strengthened review process;
- decision on principles and objectives and on a programme of actions (POPA) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament; and
- resolution on the Middle East.
Allow me to concentrate my comments here on some draft elements in the possible decision on prmciples and objectives and a programme of actions ( POPA ) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
The following are some draft elements, proposed by my delegation:-
Universal adherence to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains to be an urgent priority
The States Parties welcome the nine recent accessions to the Treaty. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.
The State Parties reaffirm their view that eftective measures for nuclear disarmament will contribute towards the realization of the goal of the universality ofadherence to the Treaty.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliftration of Nuclear weapons has a vital role to play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The international community should make all possible efforts to prevent the prohferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty
They recognize that nuclear non-proliftration and nuclear disarmament are complementary to one another and that effective nuclear disarmament measures will contribute to the maintenance of an effective regime ofnuclear non-proliftration.
The States Parties reaffirm the great importance they attach to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
They recognize that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the human civilization and that the best and the only genuinely efftctive defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of these weapons.
All States Parties reaffirm their firm commitment to the goal of the total elimination ofnuclear weapons.
They also reaffirm that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
While they appreciate the important role of bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament between the Nuclear Weapon States, they recognize the need to multilateralize negotiations on nuclear disarmament in view of the global nature of the problem.
In this context 9 they call for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament in the Confrrence on Disarmament at an early date and the commencement of multilateral negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of these weapons.
ihe achievement of the following measures is important for the full realization of nuclear disarmament and effective implementation of Article Vi, including the effective actions as reflected below; -
(a) the early entry into force of the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty, not later than ----;
~) the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production offissile matenals for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, not later than----; and
(c) other crucial arm control measures for the reduction ofnuclear danger such as dc-alerting and dc-activating nuclear weapons and ajoint undertaking by the Nuclear weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and jurther measures ofde-emphasizing the role ofnuclear weapons.
The States Parties reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal a legally binding international instrument on a security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded.
The States Parties recognize that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option, the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty are entitled to receive legally-binding security assurances from the Nuclear Weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.
The States Parties reaffirm their firm commitments to take further steps which could take the form of an internationally and legally-binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use ofnuclear weapons.
The States Parties reaffirm their conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security.
In this respect, the establishment qf nuclear-weapon free zones in their respective regions by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Palindeba have gone a long way in limiting the geographic prolifrration of nuclear weapons and in enhancing global and regional peace and security.
The cooperation of all the Nuclear Weapon States and their respect and support for the respective protocols are necessary jor the maximum effectiveness ofnuclear-weapon-free zones and their respective protocols.
The States Parties express their desire to see an early entry in to force of the protoculs which still remain to be ratified by the Nuclear Weapon States through the resolution of the remaining issues in a spirit of amity and cooperation in the shortest possible times.
These are some thoughts and proposals of the Myanmar delegation on the format and substance of the document we want to see as an outcome of the 2000 Review Conference. We hope that these proposed draft elements will be useflil inputs to the preparatory work of this PrepCom for the Review Conference.
My delegation may revisit to these draft elements with some more suggestions, as the work of this PrepCom flirther advances.
I should like to request you, Mr. Chairman, that these proposals or proposed elements, put forward by my delegation, be inckided in the rolling text of existing proposals to be transmitted to the 2000 Review Conference.
We have complete trust in your ability to lead this Session to a ftuitftil conclusion.
I wish you and this Third PrepCom godspeed.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.