2. Reaffirmation of conviction that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty is essential to international peace and security.
3. Recognition of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses c' nuclear energy.
4. Reaffirmation that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
5. Recalling that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that these undertakings have been made on the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear weapon States of nuclear disarmament.
6. Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
7. Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" and on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" as well as the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
8. Affirmation that all the articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are binding on all States parties and at all times and in all circumstances.
9. Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187.
10.Urge all States not yet party to the Treaty, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, at the earliest possible date, without condition or further delay, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
11. Undertake to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty. These efforts should include the enhancement of regional security, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia.
12. Reaffirmation that every effort, should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.
13. Reaffirmation by nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly.
14. Reaffirmation by non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to receive from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly.
15. Expression of the concern of the States Parties with the cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by two States Parties which demand the close attention and effective response of the States Parties of the NPT.
16. Condemnation of the nuclear test explosions in South Asia in 1998. Note that the States concerned have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
17. Reaffirmation that in accordance with Article IX, States not currently States parties may accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.
18. Reiteration of the call on those States which possess the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and which have not yet acceded to the NPT to reverse clearly and urgently the pursuit of all nuclear-weapon development or deployment, and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.
19. Reaffirmation that the cessation of al I nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security.
20. Reaffirmation of the commitment to fulfil with determination the obligations under article VI. Reaffirmation, in this context, by all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, of their unequivocal commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and to that end, agreement to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons. Declaration of commitment to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Declaration that the achievement of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, necessitates the cooperation of all States.
21. Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Recognition also of the unilateral reduction measures taken by the other nuclear weapon States.
22. Recognition that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place:
a) Call upon the United States and the Russian Federation to revitalize the START process by bringing START II into force without delay, and immediately thereafter to proceed with negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion.
b) Require that in the near future the United States and the Russian Federation should be joined by the other NWS, in a seamless process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
c) Reaffirm the need for the nuclear-weapon States to reduce further their reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and to pursue negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities.
d) Invite increased transparency by NWS on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and ensure the effective management of the resultant fissile materials.
e) Proceed with interim measures to prevent accidental or unauthorised launches, such as de-alerting, de-targetting and de-activating their nuclear weapons, and removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.
f) Examine further interim measures, including measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines.
23.Achievement of the following measures is important in the full realisation and effective implementation of Article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:
a) Recognition of the importance for all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty unconditionally and without delay. Welcome of the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States (France and the United Kingdom). Call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Also call upon all States to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular to its efforts to implement the Treaty's verification regime, including to provide the Preparatory Commission with the necessary financial means.
b) Reaffirmation of the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Such a treaty would be an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as of non-proliferation. Welcome the establishment in August 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament for this purpose under Item I of its Agenda "Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", and urge its immediate reestablishment.
c) Welcome the announcements made by some NWS that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and call upon all NWS to declare collectively a moratorium on the production of such material for such devices.
d) Establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee I of Review Conferences, and the provision of specific time at all future meetings of Preparatory Committees, for a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
e) Urge the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad-hoc Committee under Item I of its Agenda with a negotiating mandate to address nuclear disarmament.
24. Welcome the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, in the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty through their significant measures in nuclear disarmament, in particular the voluntary decision to withdraw all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories, and taking note with satisfaction of the current efforts of those States to strengthen the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security.
25.Affirm that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.
26. Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.
27. Support of proposals for the establishment of NWFZ where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia and welcome of the initiative taken by states in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.
28.Welcome the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions, as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation.
29.Welcome the conclusion of the agreement regarding the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and urge its rapid implementation.
30. Recognition of the continuing contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons.
31. Reaffirmation of the importance of ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as of the continued work by all concerned States to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so
32. Welcome the consensus reached in the United Nations General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Urge all States directly concerned to take the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East as a first step towards the establishment in the same region of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.
33. Welcome the report on the "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned", adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 of April 1999.
The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
34. Recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome, and reaffirmation of the firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that resolution. Recognition, in this regard, of the special responsibility of the depositary States as cosponsors of this resolution.
35. Reaffirmation of the provisions of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and reaffirmation of the determination to work diligently towards its speedy implementation.
36. Recognition that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, Djibouti, Oman and the UAE have become parties to the Treaty. Expression of deep concern that Israel continues to be the only state in the region which has not yet acceded to the Treaty and refuses to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA.
37. Call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards without further delay and without conditions.
38. Recognition of the need for all States Parties to the Treaty, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
39. Affirmation of the importance of full compliance of all States parties to the NPT in the region with their obligations under the Treaty. Note that one State in the Middle East remains in noncompliance with the Treaty and with United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning weapons of mass destruction, and that this State continues not to allow IAEA inspections.
40. Reaffirmation that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded.
41. Welcome the establishment in March 1998 in the Conference on Disarmament of and Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and urge its immediate reestablishment.
42. Reiterate the need for the commitment, without any condition, by all the nuclear weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and conclude international legal instruments to this effect.
43. Reaffirmation that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and its safeguards system, compliance with Safeguards Agreements.
44. Urge all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude with the IAEA a full-scope Safeguards Agreement, as required by article III of the Treaty. Urge those States Parties to the IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreements, which are not in compliance, to implement all obligations under the Agreements fully and unconditionally.
45. Call on all States not parties to the Treaty to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
46. Welcome and support the adoption, in May 1997, of the Model Additional Protocol to existent Safeguards Agreements (laid down in document INFCIRC/540), designed to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives. Welcome the signature of such agreements by 36 non-nuclear weapon States.
47. Urge all States that have not yet done so to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540. Urge the nuclear-weapon States, which have not yet done so, to include in their Additional Protocols those measures which they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Additional Protocol.
48. Placement of nuclear material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States.
49. Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon states should require as a necessary precondition adherence to the Treaty and acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards.
50. Support for the Agency's efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and to integrate safeguards measures arising from the Model Additional Protocol with the traditional safeguards measures.
51. Urge all States to implement, to the extent possible, the IAEA recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 and also urge all States parties to examine ways and means to strengthen the current regime.
52. Underline the importance of the conclusions of the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security of 19 and 20 of April 1996, and the initiatives stemming from it.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
53. Reaffirmation of the commitment to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty and the commitment to cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty and the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
54. Reaffirmation of the importance attached to the work of IAEA regarding multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and with due consideration of the needs of the developing areas of the world, call again for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
55. Reaffirmation of the importance of nuclear safety as an essential prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties attach importance to ensuring a successful review process under the Nuclear Safety Convention and note the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as another contribution in this area. Urge all States that have not yet done so to accede to these Conventions at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate nuclear facilities. Welcome the agreement reached in December 1997 among a group of nine countries on guidelines for the management of plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities.
56. Affirmation that it is in the interest of all States that the maritime transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel plutonium and high-level waste be conducted in compliance with international standards of safety, security and environmental protection. Call on those directly engaged in the maritime transportation of such radioactive materials to continue to provide information, consistent with safety and security requirements, about the timing, route and liability arrangements to States in the vicinity of such shipments.
57. Consideration of the potential contributions from new, inherently-safe nuclear-power technologies in enhancing the safety of nuclear power. In this connection, to propose the elaboration, under the auspices of IAEA, of such a project to ensure that energy is obtained safely with minimal risk from the point of view of nonproliferation.
58. Recognition of the obligation of NPT states parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear items do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and recognition that co-ordination of national policies to this end can contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT and facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with Article IV.
59. Reaffirm the importance of non-discriminatory and universally binding nuclear control regimes. Welcome for the two International Seminars on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation held in 1997 and 1999, as well as other ongoing efforts by nuclear suppliers to respond to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference's call for the promotion of transparency in nuclear-export controls.
60. Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the respect of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly those under Chapter VII.
61. Express the determination to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and state the readiness to cooperate with each other, and support multilateral efforts to this end, inter alia review of the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials at the earliest possible time with the aim of strengthening and broadening its scope.
II. The following is a list of specific proposals put forward by delegations for consideration by the Preparatory Committee on the understanding that the proposals are without commitment by the Preparatory Committee and without prejudice to the position of any delegation and that the list is not conclusive.