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  LIbrary Treaties Non-Proliferation Treaty, Working Paper, 1999

Working Paper submitted by Canada


Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

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Purpose :

- One key outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference should be a "Principles and Objectives 2000" document.

- Canada has advocated this outcome at both the 1997 and the 1998 Preparatory Committee meetings; such a document is a central element in the implementation of the principle of "permanence with accountability".

- It would be a direct manifestation of our collective commitment to implement paragraph four (i.e. "to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, ...") and paragraph seven (i.e. "identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.") of the 1995 Decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty."

- And, as such, it would provide an ongoing reaffirmation of our commitment to the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.


- Various approaches could be followed for setting out a "Principles and Objectives 2000" document.

- On balance, precedent and the idea of "rolling accountability" suggests that the 1995 model should be employed.

- This "Principles and Objectives 2000" would be a new document drawing on the 1995 model, while reflecting changed circumstances and the updated expectations of the 2000 Review Conference. As such, it would not imply re-opening or re-negotiating the 1995 document.


- The Third Preparatory Committee should, first, confirm its willingness to recommend to the 2000 Review Conference that such a document be adopted.

- Drawing on ideas and concepts contained in the Chairman's Working Paper (NPT Conf 2000/PCII/35 of 9 June 1998) and other proposals and suggestions by delegations during the entire Preparatory process, the Preparatory Committee should forward its views, relevant material and specific recommendations, if possible, to the 2000 Review Conference for consideration and action. Any negotiation should take place at the Review Conference itself.

Canadian Suggestions:

- Based on the above and drawing on Canada's earlier submissions to the Preparatory Committee (e.g. document NPT/Conf2000/PCll/3 of 30 April 1998) as well as other proposals and suggestions Canada is circulating the attached draft "Principles and Objectives 2000" document (See Annex).

- This draft sets out some initial considerations; further considerations by Canada and others will be developed as our work progresses.

- Source reference for the ideas in each paragraph are listed at the end of each paragraph.


"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation

and Nuclear Disarmament": A Draft Review Conference 2000 Document

The Review Conference

Reaffirming the Preamble and Articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, [1995 text]

Welcoming the indefinite extension of that Treaty as decided at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, [new]

Recognizing the continuing relevance and importance of the Decisions on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty and the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, all of which continue to exist, [new]

Confirming the continuing value of a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued, and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in the Treaty, [1995 amended]

Affirming once more the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, [1995 amended]

Emphasizing that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty and full compliance with its provisions are essential to international peace and security, [new]

Adopts the following principles and objectives :


1. Securing universal adherence to the Treaty is an even greater and more urgent priority. All States parties should make every effort to achieve this objective. [1995 amended]

2. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. [1995]

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

3. Proliferation of nuclear weapons will seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty continues to make a vital contribution to nuclear non-proliferation; every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects so as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States party to the Treaty. [1995 amended]

4. Nuclear tests carried out by two states in 1998 have been strongly deplored or condemned by the great majority of the international community. Complete and comprehensive implementation of the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1172 adopted unanimously on 6 June 1998 should be pursued by all States; in particular those States, and all other States that have not yet done so, should become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions. [new; Paragraph 13 of UNSCR 1172]

Nuclear Disarmament

5. The commitments with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty should be fulfilled with determination. The nuclear-weapon States, having reaffirmed their commitment as stated in Article VI to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, should reinvigorate their determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons inventories, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. [1995 amended]

6. The achievement of the following measures is important for the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI, including the programme of action as elaborated below: [19951

(A) The START Process and should be renewed, accelerated and fully implemented. The reduction targets established by the Russian Federation and the USA for START 11 and START III should be achieved; further substantial reductions should be pursued. The other three nuclear-weapon States should become directly engaged in this process in the near future. [new]

(B) Additional measures [e.g. de-alerting; transparency; confidence-building] as regards nuclear weapons operations should also be pursued. [new]

(C) Measures to reduce the threats posed by tactical nuclear weapons - their numbers and their deployment - should be negotiated and implemented. [new]

(D) The earliest possible entry-into-force, drawing upon all measures consistent with international law, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be achieved. The rejection of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions as established by this Treaty is reaffirmed. [new]

(E) The early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as initiated within the Conference on Disarmament, should be pursued. Appropriate and effective measures to deal with stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should also be identified and implemented. [new]

(F) The five nuclear-weapon States should formally affirm a moratorium on the production of such fissile material pending negotiation of the Treaty. [new]

(G) Mechanisms should be devised both within the NPT context and within other relevant bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament for exchanges of information and the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to exploring possibilities for further progress on nuclear disarmament through national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives. [new]

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

7. The establishment of internationally-recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security. Further efforts, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia, to establish such zones should be urgently pursued. [1995 amended]

Security Assurances

8. Further steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be considered. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. [1995 amended]

Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosions

9. States party to the Treaty affirm that the provisions of Article V of the Treaty as regards the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of Article VIII of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. [new]


10. The authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the competent body responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the Statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with safeguards agreements with States parties should be preserved and enhanced. [1995 amended]

11. States parties required by Article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not done so should do so without delay. [1995] States not party to the Treaty should also be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. [1995]

12. Efforts to further strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards are strongly endorsed. In this context all States should conclude and implement Protocols Additional to their safeguards agreements based on the Model Protocol (INFCIRC/540 Corr.) of the IAEA. [new]

13. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition acceptance of IAEA fullscope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Consideration should be given to appropriate timeframe for the conclusion and entry-into-force of Protocols Additional [INFCIRC/540] as an element of fullscope safeguards. [1995 amended; new]

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty. [1995]

15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented. [1995]

16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account. [1995]

17. Transparency in nuclear related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested states party to the Treaty. [1995]

18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable level of nuclear safety including for waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials. [1995]

19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The IAEA should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources. [1995]

20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. [1995]

21. States party welcome proposals for the review, through the IAEA, of international standards for the physical protection of nuclear material, both during international transit and while under national jurisdiction. [new]

22. In this context, States party reaffirm their support for the commitments by participating States to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and to the Joint Convention on the Safe Management of Spent Fuel and the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste. [new]

23. High priority should be given to efforts to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear material; cooperation through the IAEA and other concerned organizations should be encouraged and enhanced. [new]

24. States party welcome the decision that the Ad Hoc Committee established by the LIN General Assembly shall continue to elaborate a draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism with a view to completing the instrument. [new]