


PARTNERSHIP FOR  A SECURE AMERICA

WMD REPORT CARD

**Evaluating U.S. Policies to Prevent Nuclear,
Chemical, & Biological Terrorism Since 2005**





The Partnership for a Secure America (PSA) is dedicated to recreating the bipartisan center in American national security and foreign policy.

Past decades have witnessed a hardening of partisan divisions on national security and foreign policy, limiting productive debate and blocking effective action by Congress and the Executive Branch on critical policy issues. This rising partisanship has soured working relationships among policymakers and their counterparts across the aisle at all levels of government, and our national security and foreign policy discourse has suffered as a result.

The Partnership for a Secure America was created to respond to this growing problem and to help foster sensible, bipartisan, consensus driven solutions to the major national security and foreign policy challenges facing our country.

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INTRODUCTION

On the sixth anniversary of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Partnership for a Secure America (PSA) announced an initiative to monitor and evaluate implementation of key unfulfilled recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. One of the top priorities of this effort was to follow up on the Commission's recommendation that the US government apply maximum effort to preventing a WMD terror attack on the United States by combating proliferation of weapons and materials around the world.

In 2004, the 9/11 Commission concluded that Al Qaeda still sought to commit major terrorist attacks against the United States, and that in the future they and other terrorists would try to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. To that end, the Commissioners advised the President and Congress that "preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort."¹

In 2005, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project found that the US government had made "insufficient progress" in implementing that recommendation, giving implementation efforts a "D" on its final report card.² That same report concluded that "preventing terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction must be elevated above all other problems of national security because it represents the greatest threat to the American people."³ In 2006,

the Partnership for a Secure America echoed this conclusion in a statement signed by twenty-two former senior officials from both parties.⁴

Today, almost seven years after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the threat of a new, major terrorist attack on the United States is still very real. A nuclear, chemical or biological weapon in the hands of terrorists remains the single greatest threat to our nation. While progress has been made in securing these weapons and materials, we are still dangerously vulnerable. That is why our next President, in close cooperation with the US Congress, must elevate to the highest priority our efforts to secure these weapons and materials at their source, and prevent their transit into the United States.

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This special report contains the results of analysis by independent experts who examined US government programs to prevent nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. These expert analyses focused on the time period following the 9/11 Public Discourse Project's 2005 assessment through the present, to determine in particular whether and what additional progress has been made against the threat of WMD terrorism. Based on the experts' conclusions, additional research and interviews, and the assessments of our bipartisan Advisory Board, PSA has assembled this Report Card on US government efforts to prevent WMD terrorism.


Lee Hamilton


Thomas Kean


Warren Rudman

REPORT CARD

ON WMD TERROR PREVENTION

The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission called for “maximum effort” against WMD proliferation and terrorism. A year and a half later, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project gave the United States Government a **D** grade for its efforts to prevent WMD terrorism. This is where we are today:

Recommendation	GRADE
 Maximum Effort to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism	C
 Maximum Effort to Prevent Chemical Terrorism	B -
 Maximum Effort to Prevent Biological Terrorism	C -
OVERALL GRADE	
C	

Here is what the US Government must do next:

- ★ **Put someone in charge.** There is a critical need for a top-level official with authority to make government-wide decisions on funding and programs. Someone needs to be responsible for turning our resolve into results.
- ★ **Build the blueprint.** We need a strategic plan that links all existing programs together, prioritizes funding across the Federal Government, and coordinates implementation. We can no longer afford to hope that our patchwork of programs and initiatives will naturally cohere into an effective whole.
- ★ **Strengthen international cooperation.** The United States cannot be safe working alone. Terrorism does not respect borders. We must utilize multilateral institutions, regional organizations and bilateral ties. We must be firm in our goals, but flexible in our approach.



NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Pillars Of Nuclear Terror Prevention:

Status in 2008:

	GRADE
Prevention (Cooperative Nonproliferation And Counter-Proliferation) Nonproliferation programs limited primarily by lack of interagency coordination and long term strategy, mismatch of US and foreign expectations; New multilateral counter-proliferation initiatives lacking US follow through.	C+
Detection/Interdiction Of Weapons And Materials Tenfold increase in port security funding, 90% of US-bound cargo pre-screened; public/private sector collaboration still inadequate.	B
Integration Of US Government Programs Authority and budgets stove-piped across multiple agencies; poor coordination between traditional security and development agencies.	D
Long-Term Sustainment Of Programs Lack of host country buy-in to ongoing program goals; US policies too short term in focus; human engagement programs under-funded.	D

★ Based on independent expert analysis available in full at www.psaonline.org ⁵

NUCLEAR GRADE:

C

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:

- ☢ **Conduct** a comprehensive re-evaluation of the changing threat of nuclear terrorism, resulting in a prevention strategy integrating US security, intelligence and development agencies, foreign allies, and relevant private actors.
- ☢ **Eliminate** bureaucratic obstacles to proliferation prevention: Address staffing shortfalls in implementing agencies, streamline contracting and other processes, remove unnecessary restrictions to better pair budgets to strategic priorities, and create an ongoing process for coherence between US goals and those of foreign partners.
- ☢ **Strongly encourage** foreign partners to live up to commitments under G8 Global Partnership, UNSCR 1540, and other agreements. Build public-private part

nerships to help detect and prevent acquisition of sensitive technologies by illicit actors.

- ☢ **Resolve** outstanding bilateral legal disputes to facilitate continuation and expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
- ☢ **All** US Government activities taking place abroad must be sensitive to addressing common threat perceptions. Managing expectations and developing buy-in are critical to program stability and long-term sustainability.
- ☢ **Strengthen** existing science and human engagement programs to leverage US science and technology capacity, global development assistance, and other potential inducements as a means of building deeper and sustained cooperation for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, materials and know-how.

CHEMICAL TERRORISM

Pillars Of Chemical Terror Prevention:

Status in 2008:

	GRADE
Recognition And Prevention Of Chemical Terror Threat Multilateral non- & counter-proliferation initiatives lacking US follow through; Failure to recognize adequately chemical terrorism threat.	C -
Response: Detection, Resilience And Mitigation Programs Strong efforts for interagency coordination at federal level; Revolutionary defence countermeasures research budget cut in FY08; State laboratories unprepared; Response exercises occurring but unrealistic/inadequate.	B
Protecting Critical Infrastructure Physical security of industry facilities low priority; Chemical transport security assessment long overdue.	C+
Elimination: Demilitarization Of Chemical Weapons Half US stockpile destroyed; Additional funding needed for construction of remaining destruction facilities to reduce the overall risk; Additional funding and active engagement needed for destruction of Russian and Libyan weapons stockpiles.	B

★ Based on independent expert analysis available in full at www.psaonline.org ⁶

CHEMICAL GRADE:

B -

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Recognize the threats of traditional, improvised, and novel chemical terrorism.
- Pursue non-proliferation and counter-proliferation by strengthening the international regime to control transfers of dual-use chemicals, expanding the scheduled chemicals list, and addressing advances in science and technology creating potential for new proliferation; by reinvigorating of the G8 Global Partnership; and by adequate assistance under UNSCR 1540.
- Increase interagency coordination at a higher, strategic level, while continuing to foster program to program coordination.
- Increase investments in basic research enabling revolutionary science and technology capabilities, and engaging both academia and the private sector.
- Reduce focus on insider threats in securing industrial chemical facilities. Instead foster safe, efficient technological solutions to physical plant security.
- Make Transportation Security Administration (TSA) tracking data for rail cars carrying certain toxic chemicals available for review and oversight.
- Increase funding and accelerate destruction of the remaining US chemical stockpile. Implement GAO recommendations for improving management of chemical weapons demilitarization and disposal programs.
- Increase funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to aid destruction of Russian and Libyan chemical stockpiles.



BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

Pillars Of Biological Terror Prevention:

Status in 2008:

	GRADE
<p>Denial Of Access To Bioterror Agents, Especially In FSU Funding up for most global threat reduction programs, but still less than 2% of total biothreat response budget; Multilateral cooperation hampered by US disengagement from BWC.</p>	B
<p>Detection Of Covert Bioterror Preparations Inadequate monitoring of US labs; Limited global pathogen/equipment tracking; International data sharing voluntary, poorly integrated.</p>	C -
<p>Interdiction By Law Enforcement Interpol creating interdiction programs; 80 bilateral PSI agreements for maritime interdiction, mostly nuclear focused, non-binding.</p>	B -
<p>Confidence Building: Distinguish Biodefense From Threats Disengagement from BWC hurts multilateral confidence building; New State BWA Office authorized to strengthen cooperative non-proliferation.</p>	D+
<p>Resilience: New Vaccines And Drugs Project Bioshield stockpiling vaccines, drugs; Insufficient R&D coordination with allies.</p>	C -
<p>Mitigation: Global Public Health Preparedness And Response Inadequate “multidimensional” threat response; GHSAG recommendations and joint exercises aid cooperative global response capability; US programs actively monitoring, assisting infectious disease surveillance abroad.</p>	B

★ Based on independent expert analysis available in full at www.psaonline.org ⁷

BIOLOGICAL GRADE:

C -

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Promote development of global biosecurity standards, including mandatory national registries of high-risk pathogens and laboratories, and a monitoring system for transfers of high-risk pathogens, materials and equipment in international trade.
- Pursue multilateral efforts to strengthen national and international law enforcement capabilities against bioterrorism, including forensic capabilities

ties and training on detection and analysis of potential bioweapons activities.

- Take the lead in negotiating transparency and confidence-building measures to promote non-proliferation and compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
- Promote enhanced detection capabilities through cooperative infectious disease surveillance, epidemiological and laboratory investigation and analysis, rapid information sharing among relevant response constituencies, and effective and safe delivery of countermeasures.

- **Designate** USG official (e.g. the Coordinator for WMD Proliferation and Terrorism) to undertake a complete review of major bioterrorism prevention policies, assess priorities, identify significant gaps, and enable synergies.
- **Advocate** designation of a global authority to coordinate programs, assess trends and anticipate implications of advancing life sciences, and promote capacity-building and international cooperation for reducing biothreats.

¹ 9/11 Commission Report. Available at: <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm>

² "Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations," (one-page summary of grades) December 5, 2005. 9/11 Public Discourse Project. Available at: http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_summary.pdf

³ "Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations," December 5, 2005. 9/11 Public Discourse Project. Available at: http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf

⁴ "State of the Union: America Still Dangerously Vulnerable," Partnership for a Secure America Statement, January 26, 2006. Available at: <http://psaonline.org/article.php?id=76>

⁵ Finlay, Brian, "Nuclear Terrorism: The FOUR Pillars of Prevention." Available at: <http://www.PSAonline.org/>

⁶ Kosal, Margaret E., "U.S. Policies to Reduce the Threat of Chemical Terrorism." Available at: <http://www.PSAonline.org/>

⁷ Kellman, Barry, "U.S. Policies to Reduce Global Biothreats." Available at: <http://www.PSAonline.org/>